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23 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Simon Kelley
30df7efc96 Merge i18n messages. 2017-10-02 14:13:51 +01:00
Simon Kelley
3e8c42cba5 Debian changlelog update. 2017-09-29 17:39:26 +01:00
Simon Kelley
62cb936cb7 Security fix, CVE-2017-14491, DNS heap buffer overflow.
Further fix to 0549c73b7e
Handles case when RR name is not a pointer to the question,
only occurs for some auth-mode replies, therefore not
detected by fuzzing (?)
2017-09-26 22:00:11 +01:00
Simon Kelley
39921d03ba Update credits for Google security team. 2017-09-26 18:43:19 +01:00
Simon Kelley
6a0b00f0d6 Misc code cleanups arising from Google analysis.
No security impleications or CVEs.
2017-09-25 20:19:55 +01:00
Simon Kelley
51eadb692a Security fix, CVE-2017-14495, OOM in DNS response creation.
Fix out-of-memory Dos vulnerability. An attacker which can
send malicious DNS queries to dnsmasq can trigger memory
allocations in the add_pseudoheader function
The allocated memory is never freed which leads to a DoS
through memory exhaustion. dnsmasq is vulnerable only
if one of the following option is specified:
--add-mac, --add-cpe-id or --add-subnet.
2017-09-25 20:16:50 +01:00
Simon Kelley
897c113fda Security fix, CVE-2017-14496, Integer underflow in DNS response creation.
Fix DoS in DNS. Invalid boundary checks in the
add_pseudoheader function allows a memcpy call with negative
size An attacker which can send malicious DNS queries
to dnsmasq can trigger a DoS remotely.
dnsmasq is vulnerable only if one of the following option is
specified: --add-mac, --add-cpe-id or --add-subnet.
2017-09-25 20:11:58 +01:00
Simon Kelley
33e3f1029c Security fix, CVE-2017-14494, Infoleak handling DHCPv6 forwarded requests.
Fix information leak in DHCPv6. A crafted DHCPv6 packet can
cause dnsmasq to forward memory from outside the packet
buffer to a DHCPv6 server when acting as a relay.
2017-09-25 20:05:11 +01:00
Simon Kelley
3d4ff1ba84 Security fix, CVE-2017-14493, DHCPv6 - Stack buffer overflow.
Fix stack overflow in DHCPv6 code. An attacker who can send
a DHCPv6 request to dnsmasq can overflow the stack frame and
crash or control dnsmasq.
2017-09-25 19:59:54 +01:00
Simon Kelley
24036ea507 Security fix, CVE-2017-14492, DHCPv6 RA heap overflow.
Fix heap overflow in IPv6 router advertisement code.
This is a potentially serious security hole, as a
crafted RA request can overflow a buffer and crash or
control dnsmasq. Attacker must be on the local network.
2017-09-25 19:59:27 +01:00
Simon Kelley
0549c73b7e Security fix, CVE-2017-14491 DNS heap buffer overflow.
Fix heap overflow in DNS code. This is a potentially serious
security hole. It allows an attacker who can make DNS
requests to dnsmasq, and who controls the contents of
a domain, which is thereby queried, to overflow
(by 2 bytes) a heap buffer and either crash, or
even take control of, dnsmasq.
2017-09-25 18:17:11 +01:00
Christian Hesse
b697fbb7f1 Do not include stdio.h before dnsmasq.h
We define some constants in dnsmasq.h, which have an influence on
stdio.h. So do not include stdio.h before dnsmasq.h.
2017-09-25 17:36:24 +01:00
Rasmus Ahlberg
96e063c43d Update contrib/try-all-ns. 2017-09-25 17:30:59 +01:00
Chris Novakovic
4e841da1a6 Fix broken translations after commit 730c6745 2017-09-25 17:21:49 +01:00
Simon Kelley
09ce307bdb Disable libIDN2 underscore workaround with libIDN or fixed libIDN2. 2017-09-25 16:53:55 +01:00
Simon Kelley
a3303e196e Don't return arcount=1 if EDNS0 RR won't fit in the packet.
Omitting the EDNS0 RR but setting arcount gives a malformed packet.
Also, don't accept UDP packet size less than 512 in recieved EDNS0.
2017-09-07 20:45:00 +01:00
Simon Kelley
63437ffbb5 Fix CVE-2017-13704, which resulted in a crash on a large DNS query.
A DNS query recieved by UDP which exceeds 512 bytes (or the EDNS0 packet size,
if different.) is enough to cause SIGSEGV.
2017-09-06 22:34:21 +01:00
Simon Kelley
69a815aa8f Fix loss of undercores in domain names when using libidn2.
libidn2 strips underscores from international domain names
when encoding them. Indeed, it strips underscores even if
no encoding is necessary, which breaks SRV records.

Don't submit domain names to IDN encoding if they contain
one or more underscores to fix this.
2017-07-08 21:20:16 +01:00
Simon Kelley
1d224949cc Remove ping-check of configured DHCP address.
This was added in 5ce3e76fbf but
it trips over too many buggy clients that leave an interface configured
even in DHCPDISCOVER case.
2017-07-08 20:52:55 +01:00
Simon Kelley
391f708a09 Man page tweak. 2017-07-08 20:48:51 +01:00
Rosen Penev
cbd29e5da8 Printf related fixes. 2017-06-27 22:29:51 +01:00
Rosen Penev
50a2841d34 Fix function declarations. 2017-06-27 22:27:02 +01:00
Hans Dedecker
9396752c11 Try other servers if first returns REFUSED when --strict-order active.
If a DNS server replies REFUSED for a given DNS query in strict order mode
no failover to the next DNS server is triggered as the failover logic only
covers non strict mode.
As a result the client will be returned the REFUSED reply without first
falling back to the secondary DNS server(s).

Make failover support work as well for strict mode config in case REFUSED is
replied by deleting the strict order check and rely only on forwardall being
equal to 0 which is the case in non strict mode when a single server has been
contacted or when strict order mode has been configured.
2017-06-27 22:08:47 +01:00
31 changed files with 5224 additions and 4609 deletions

View File

@@ -13,6 +13,76 @@ version 2.78
ff325644c7afae2588583f935f4ea9b9694eb52e. Thanks to
John Fitzgibbon for the diagnosis and patch.
Try other servers if first returns REFUSED when
--strict-order active. Thanks to Hans Dedecker
for the patch
Fix regression in 2.77, ironically added as a security
improvement, which resulted in a crash when a DNS
query exceeded 512 bytes (or the EDNS0 packet size,
if different.) Thanks to Christian Kujau, Arne Woerner
Juan Manuel Fernandez and Kevin Darbyshire-Bryant for
chasing this one down. CVE-2017-13704 applies.
Fix heap overflow in DNS code. This is a potentially serious
security hole. It allows an attacker who can make DNS
requests to dnsmasq, and who controls the contents of
a domain, which is thereby queried, to overflow
(by 2 bytes) a heap buffer and either crash, or
even take control of, dnsmasq.
CVE-2017-14491 applies.
Credit to Felix Wilhelm, Fermin J. Serna, Gabriel Campana
Kevin Hamacher and Ron Bowes of the Google Security Team for
finding this.
Fix heap overflow in IPv6 router advertisement code.
This is a potentially serious security hole, as a
crafted RA request can overflow a buffer and crash or
control dnsmasq. Attacker must be on the local network.
CVE-2017-14492 applies.
Credit to Felix Wilhelm, Fermin J. Serna, Gabriel Campana
and Kevin Hamacher of the Google Security Team for
finding this.
Fix stack overflow in DHCPv6 code. An attacker who can send
a DHCPv6 request to dnsmasq can overflow the stack frame and
crash or control dnsmasq.
CVE-2017-14493 applies.
Credit to Felix Wilhelm, Fermin J. Serna, Gabriel Campana
Kevin Hamacher and Ron Bowes of the Google Security Team for
finding this.
Fix information leak in DHCPv6. A crafted DHCPv6 packet can
cause dnsmasq to forward memory from outside the packet
buffer to a DHCPv6 server when acting as a relay.
CVE-2017-14494 applies.
Credit to Felix Wilhelm, Fermin J. Serna, Gabriel Campana
Kevin Hamacher and Ron Bowes of the Google Security Team for
finding this.
Fix DoS in DNS. Invalid boundary checks in the
add_pseudoheader function allows a memcpy call with negative
size An attacker which can send malicious DNS queries
to dnsmasq can trigger a DoS remotely.
dnsmasq is vulnerable only if one of the following option is
specified: --add-mac, --add-cpe-id or --add-subnet.
CVE-2017-14496 applies.
Credit to Felix Wilhelm, Fermin J. Serna, Gabriel Campana
Kevin Hamacher and Ron Bowes of the Google Security Team for
finding this.
Fix out-of-memory Dos vulnerability. An attacker which can
send malicious DNS queries to dnsmasq can trigger memory
allocations in the add_pseudoheader function
The allocated memory is never freed which leads to a DoS
through memory exhaustion. dnsmasq is vulnerable only
if one of the following option is specified:
--add-mac, --add-cpe-id or --add-subnet.
CVE-2017-14495 applies.
Credit to Felix Wilhelm, Fermin J. Serna, Gabriel Campana
Kevin Hamacher and Ron Bowes of the Google Security Team for
finding this.
version 2.77
Generate an error when configured with a CNAME loop,

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@@ -206,13 +206,13 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
unsigned int x;
if ((x = t/86400))
printf("%dd", x);
printf("%ud", x);
if ((x = (t/3600)%24))
printf("%dh", x);
printf("%uh", x);
if ((x = (t/60)%60))
printf("%dm", x);
printf("%um", x);
if ((x = t%60))
printf("%ds", x);
printf("%us", x);
}
return 0;
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
Hi,
I updated the try-all-ns patch to work with the latest version of git. Ended up implementing it on top of master, 2.78test2-7-g63437ff. As that specific if-clause has been changed in the last few commits, it's not compatible for 2.77, sadly.
Find the patch attached.
Regards,
Rasmus Ahlberg
Software Developer, R&D
Electrolux Small Appliances

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@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
diff --git a/src/forward.c b/src/forward.c
index e3fa94b..ecf3b98 100644
--- a/src/forward.c
+++ b/src/forward.c
@@ -789,9 +789,12 @@ void reply_query(int fd, int family, time_t now)
/* Note: if we send extra options in the EDNS0 header, we can't recreate
the query from the reply. */
- if (RCODE(header) == REFUSED &&
- forward->forwardall == 0 &&
- !(forward->flags & FREC_HAS_EXTRADATA))
+ if ((RCODE(header) == REFUSED &&
+ forward->forwardall == 0 &&
+ !(forward->flags & FREC_HAS_EXTRADATA)) ||
+ /* If strict-order is set, try next server on NXDOMAIN reply */
+ (RCODE(header) == NXDOMAIN && option_bool(OPT_ORDER) &&
+ server->next != NULL))
/* for broken servers, attempt to send to another one. */
{
unsigned char *pheader;

6
debian/changelog vendored
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@@ -1,8 +1,10 @@
dnsmasq (2.78-1) unstable; urgency=low
dnsmasq (2.78-1) unstable; urgency=high
* New upstream.
Security fixes for CVE-2017-13704 (closes: #877102)
Security fixes for CVE-2017-14491 - CVE-2017-14496 inclusive.
-- Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk> Sun, 25 Jun 2017 21:34:00 +0000
-- Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk> Sun, 29 Sep 2017 21:34:00 +0000
dnsmasq (2.77-2) unstable; urgency=low

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@@ -2048,7 +2048,7 @@ include set:<tag>, including one from the
.B dhcp-range
used to allocate the address, one from any matching
.B dhcp-host
(and "known" if a dhcp-host matches)
(and "known" or "known-othernet" if a dhcp-host matches)
The tag "bootp" is set for BOOTP requests, and a tag whose name is the
name of the interface on which the request arrived is also set.

930
po/de.po

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

953
po/es.po

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

945
po/fi.po

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

927
po/fr.po

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

956
po/id.po

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

945
po/it.po

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

951
po/no.po

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

930
po/pl.po

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

951
po/ro.po

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

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@@ -119,11 +119,6 @@ size_t answer_auth(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, size_t qlen, time_t n
struct cname *a, *candidate;
unsigned int wclen;
/* Clear buffer beyond request to avoid risk of
information disclosure. */
memset(((char *)header) + qlen, 0,
(limit - ((char *)header)) - qlen);
if (ntohs(header->qdcount) == 0 || OPCODE(header) != QUERY )
return 0;
@@ -597,12 +592,12 @@ size_t answer_auth(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, size_t qlen, time_t n
char *p = name;
if (subnet->prefixlen >= 24)
p += sprintf(p, "%d.", a & 0xff);
p += sprintf(p, "%u.", a & 0xff);
a = a >> 8;
if (subnet->prefixlen >= 16 )
p += sprintf(p, "%d.", a & 0xff);
p += sprintf(p, "%u.", a & 0xff);
a = a >> 8;
p += sprintf(p, "%d.in-addr.arpa", a & 0xff);
p += sprintf(p, "%u.in-addr.arpa", a & 0xff);
}
#ifdef HAVE_IPV6

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@@ -1511,7 +1511,7 @@ void dump_cache(time_t now)
/* ctime includes trailing \n - eat it */
*(p-1) = 0;
#endif
my_syslog(LOG_INFO, daemon->namebuff);
my_syslog(LOG_INFO, "%s", daemon->namebuff);
}
}
}

View File

@@ -16,6 +16,12 @@
#define COPYRIGHT "Copyright (c) 2000-2017 Simon Kelley"
/* We do defines that influence behavior of stdio.h, so complain
if included too early. */
#ifdef _STDIO_H
# error "Header file stdio.h included too early!"
#endif
#ifndef NO_LARGEFILE
/* Ensure we can use files >2GB (log files may grow this big) */
# define _LARGEFILE_SOURCE 1
@@ -1130,18 +1136,18 @@ unsigned int extract_request(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen,
char *name, unsigned short *typep);
size_t setup_reply(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen,
struct all_addr *addrp, unsigned int flags,
unsigned long local_ttl);
int extract_addresses(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, char *namebuff,
time_t now, char **ipsets, int is_sign, int checkrebind,
int no_cache, int secure, int *doctored);
unsigned long ttl);
int extract_addresses(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, char *name,
time_t now, char **ipsets, int is_sign, int check_rebind,
int no_cache_dnssec, int secure, int *doctored);
size_t answer_request(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
struct in_addr local_addr, struct in_addr local_netmask,
time_t now, int ad_reqd, int do_bit, int have_pseudoheader);
int check_for_bogus_wildcard(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, char *name,
struct bogus_addr *addr, time_t now);
struct bogus_addr *baddr, time_t now);
int check_for_ignored_address(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, struct bogus_addr *baddr);
int check_for_local_domain(char *name, time_t now);
unsigned int questions_crc(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *buff);
unsigned int questions_crc(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *name);
size_t resize_packet(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen,
unsigned char *pheader, size_t hlen);
int add_resource_record(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, int *truncp,
@@ -1163,11 +1169,11 @@ int in_zone(struct auth_zone *zone, char *name, char **cut);
/* dnssec.c */
size_t dnssec_generate_query(struct dns_header *header, unsigned char *end, char *name, int class, int type, union mysockaddr *addr, int edns_pktsz);
int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t n, char *name, char *keyname, int class);
int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *name, char *keyname, int class);
int dnssec_validate_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *name, char *keyname, int class);
int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *name, char *keyname, int *class,
int check_unsigned, int *neganswer, int *nons);
int dnskey_keytag(int alg, int flags, unsigned char *rdata, int rdlen);
int dnskey_keytag(int alg, int flags, unsigned char *key, int keylen);
size_t filter_rrsigs(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen);
unsigned char* hash_questions(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *name);
int setup_timestamp(void);
@@ -1177,9 +1183,9 @@ void rand_init(void);
unsigned short rand16(void);
u32 rand32(void);
u64 rand64(void);
int legal_hostname(char *c);
char *canonicalise(char *s, int *nomem);
unsigned char *do_rfc1035_name(unsigned char *p, char *sval);
int legal_hostname(char *name);
char *canonicalise(char *in, int *nomem);
unsigned char *do_rfc1035_name(unsigned char *p, char *sval, char *limit);
void *safe_malloc(size_t size);
void safe_pipe(int *fd, int read_noblock);
void *whine_malloc(size_t size);
@@ -1212,7 +1218,9 @@ int wildcard_matchn(const char* wildcard, const char* match, int num);
void die(char *message, char *arg1, int exit_code);
int log_start(struct passwd *ent_pw, int errfd);
int log_reopen(char *log_file);
void my_syslog(int priority, const char *format, ...);
void set_log_writer(void);
void check_log_writer(int force);
void flush_log(void);
@@ -1240,7 +1248,7 @@ struct frec *get_new_frec(time_t now, int *wait, int force);
int send_from(int fd, int nowild, char *packet, size_t len,
union mysockaddr *to, struct all_addr *source,
unsigned int iface);
void resend_query();
void resend_query(void);
struct randfd *allocate_rfd(int family);
void free_rfd(struct randfd *rfd);
@@ -1260,12 +1268,12 @@ void add_update_server(int flags,
void check_servers(void);
int enumerate_interfaces(int reset);
void create_wildcard_listeners(void);
void create_bound_listeners(int die);
void create_bound_listeners(int dienow);
void warn_bound_listeners(void);
void warn_wild_labels(void);
void warn_int_names(void);
int is_dad_listeners(void);
int iface_check(int family, struct all_addr *addr, char *name, int *auth_dns);
int iface_check(int family, struct all_addr *addr, char *name, int *auth);
int loopback_exception(int fd, int family, struct all_addr *addr, char *name);
int label_exception(int index, int family, struct all_addr *addr);
int fix_fd(int fd);
@@ -1286,7 +1294,7 @@ void newaddress(time_t now);
void dhcp_init(void);
void dhcp_packet(time_t now, int pxe_fd);
struct dhcp_context *address_available(struct dhcp_context *context,
struct in_addr addr,
struct in_addr taddr,
struct dhcp_netid *netids);
struct dhcp_context *narrow_context(struct dhcp_context *context,
struct in_addr taddr,
@@ -1345,7 +1353,7 @@ void lease_add_extradata(struct dhcp_lease *lease, unsigned char *data,
#ifdef HAVE_DHCP
size_t dhcp_reply(struct dhcp_context *context, char *iface_name, int int_index,
size_t sz, time_t now, int unicast_dest, int loopback,
int *is_inform, int pxe_fd, struct in_addr fallback, time_t recvtime);
int *is_inform, int pxe, struct in_addr fallback, time_t recvtime);
unsigned char *extended_hwaddr(int hwtype, int hwlen, unsigned char *hwaddr,
int clid_len, unsigned char *clid, int *len_out);
#endif
@@ -1460,10 +1468,10 @@ unsigned short relay_reply6( struct sockaddr_in6 *peer, ssize_t sz, char *arriva
#ifdef HAVE_DHCP
void dhcp_common_init(void);
ssize_t recv_dhcp_packet(int fd, struct msghdr *msg);
struct dhcp_netid *run_tag_if(struct dhcp_netid *input);
struct dhcp_netid *run_tag_if(struct dhcp_netid *tags);
struct dhcp_netid *option_filter(struct dhcp_netid *tags, struct dhcp_netid *context_tags,
struct dhcp_opt *opts);
int match_netid(struct dhcp_netid *check, struct dhcp_netid *pool, int negonly);
int match_netid(struct dhcp_netid *check, struct dhcp_netid *pool, int tagnotneeded);
char *strip_hostname(char *hostname);
void log_tags(struct dhcp_netid *netid, u32 xid);
int match_bytes(struct dhcp_opt *o, unsigned char *p, int len);
@@ -1521,13 +1529,13 @@ void slaac_ping_reply(struct in6_addr *sender, unsigned char *packet, char *inte
/* loop.c */
#ifdef HAVE_LOOP
void loop_send_probes();
void loop_send_probes(void);
int detect_loop(char *query, int type);
#endif
/* inotify.c */
#ifdef HAVE_INOTIFY
void inotify_dnsmasq_init();
void inotify_dnsmasq_init(void);
int inotify_check(time_t now);
void set_dynamic_inotify(int flag, int total_size, struct crec **rhash, int revhashsz);
#endif

View File

@@ -2230,7 +2230,7 @@ size_t dnssec_generate_query(struct dns_header *header, unsigned char *end, char
p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
p = do_rfc1035_name(p, name);
p = do_rfc1035_name(p, name, NULL);
*p++ = 0;
PUTSHORT(type, p);
PUTSHORT(class, p);

View File

@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ size_t add_pseudoheader(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char *l
GETSHORT(len, p);
/* malformed option, delete the whole OPT RR and start again. */
if (i + len > rdlen)
if (i + 4 + len > rdlen)
{
rdlen = 0;
is_last = 0;
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ size_t add_pseudoheader(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char *l
/* delete option if we're to replace it. */
p -= 4;
rdlen -= len + 4;
memcpy(p, p+len+4, rdlen - i);
memmove(p, p+len+4, rdlen - i);
PUTSHORT(rdlen, lenp);
lenp -= 2;
}
@@ -192,7 +192,15 @@ size_t add_pseudoheader(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char *l
!(p = skip_section(p,
ntohs(header->ancount) + ntohs(header->nscount) + ntohs(header->arcount),
header, plen)))
{
free(buff);
return plen;
}
if (p + 11 > limit)
{
free(buff);
return plen; /* Too big */
}
*p++ = 0; /* empty name */
PUTSHORT(T_OPT, p);
PUTSHORT(udp_sz, p); /* max packet length, 512 if not given in EDNS0 header */
@@ -204,11 +212,19 @@ size_t add_pseudoheader(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char *l
/* Copy back any options */
if (buff)
{
if (p + rdlen > limit)
{
free(buff);
return plen; /* Too big */
}
memcpy(p, buff, rdlen);
free(buff);
p += rdlen;
}
header->arcount = htons(ntohs(header->arcount) + 1);
/* Only bump arcount if RR is going to fit */
if (((ssize_t)optlen) <= (limit - (p + 4)))
header->arcount = htons(ntohs(header->arcount) + 1);
}
if (((ssize_t)optlen) > (limit - (p + 4)))
@@ -217,8 +233,12 @@ size_t add_pseudoheader(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char *l
/* Add new option */
if (optno != 0 && replace != 2)
{
if (p + 4 > limit)
return plen; /* Too big */
PUTSHORT(optno, p);
PUTSHORT(optlen, p);
if (p + optlen > limit)
return plen; /* Too big */
memcpy(p, opt, optlen);
p += optlen;
PUTSHORT(p - datap, lenp);

View File

@@ -790,7 +790,6 @@ void reply_query(int fd, int family, time_t now)
/* Note: if we send extra options in the EDNS0 header, we can't recreate
the query from the reply. */
if (RCODE(header) == REFUSED &&
!option_bool(OPT_ORDER) &&
forward->forwardall == 0 &&
!(forward->flags & FREC_HAS_EXTRADATA))
/* for broken servers, attempt to send to another one. */
@@ -1189,6 +1188,10 @@ void receive_query(struct listener *listen, time_t now)
(msg.msg_flags & MSG_TRUNC) ||
(header->hb3 & HB3_QR))
return;
/* Clear buffer beyond request to avoid risk of
information disclosure. */
memset(daemon->packet + n, 0, daemon->edns_pktsz - n);
source_addr.sa.sa_family = listen->family;
@@ -1409,6 +1412,8 @@ void receive_query(struct listener *listen, time_t now)
defaults to 512 */
if (udp_size > daemon->edns_pktsz)
udp_size = daemon->edns_pktsz;
else if (udp_size < PACKETSZ)
udp_size = PACKETSZ; /* Sanity check - can't reduce below default. RFC 6891 6.2.3 */
}
#ifdef HAVE_AUTH
@@ -1689,6 +1694,10 @@ unsigned char *tcp_request(int confd, time_t now,
if (size < (int)sizeof(struct dns_header))
continue;
/* Clear buffer beyond request to avoid risk of
information disclosure. */
memset(payload + size, 0, 65536 - size);
query_count++;

View File

@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@
along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include "dnsmasq.h"
#ifdef HAVE_SCRIPT

View File

@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ void lease_update_from_configs(void)
else if ((name = host_from_dns(lease->addr)))
lease_set_hostname(lease, name, 1, get_domain(lease->addr), NULL); /* updates auth flag only */
}
static void ourprintf(int *errp, char *format, ...)
{
va_list ap;

View File

@@ -882,7 +882,7 @@ static struct server *add_rev4(struct in_addr addr, int msize)
switch (msize)
{
case 32:
p += sprintf(p, "%d.", a & 0xff);
p += sprintf(p, "%u.", a & 0xff);
/* fall through */
case 24:
p += sprintf(p, "%d.", (a >> 8) & 0xff);
@@ -1415,7 +1415,7 @@ static int parse_dhcp_opt(char *errstr, char *arg, int flags)
}
p = newp;
end = do_rfc1035_name(p + len, dom);
end = do_rfc1035_name(p + len, dom, NULL);
*end++ = 0;
len = end - p;
free(dom);

View File

@@ -198,6 +198,9 @@ void icmp6_packet(time_t now)
/* look for link-layer address option for logging */
if (sz >= 16 && packet[8] == ICMP6_OPT_SOURCE_MAC && (packet[9] * 8) + 8 <= sz)
{
if ((packet[9] * 8 - 2) * 3 - 1 >= MAXDNAME) {
return;
}
print_mac(daemon->namebuff, &packet[10], (packet[9] * 8) - 2);
mac = daemon->namebuff;
}

View File

@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ int extract_name(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char **pp,
/* end marker */
{
/* check that there are the correct no of bytes after the name */
if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, plen, extrabytes))
if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p1 ? p1 : p, plen, extrabytes))
return 0;
if (isExtract)
@@ -498,6 +498,8 @@ static unsigned char *do_doctor(unsigned char *p, int count, struct dns_header *
{
unsigned int i, len = *p1;
unsigned char *p2 = p1;
if ((p1 + len - p) >= rdlen)
return 0; /* bad packet */
/* make counted string zero-term and sanitise */
for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
{
@@ -1062,6 +1064,7 @@ int check_for_ignored_address(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, struct bog
return 0;
}
int add_resource_record(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, int *truncp, int nameoffset, unsigned char **pp,
unsigned long ttl, int *offset, unsigned short type, unsigned short class, char *format, ...)
{
@@ -1071,29 +1074,47 @@ int add_resource_record(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, int *truncp, int
unsigned short usval;
long lval;
char *sval;
#define CHECK_LIMIT(size) \
if (limit && p + (size) > (unsigned char*)limit) \
{ \
va_end(ap); \
goto truncated; \
}
if (truncp && *truncp)
return 0;
va_start(ap, format); /* make ap point to 1st unamed argument */
if (nameoffset > 0)
{
CHECK_LIMIT(2);
PUTSHORT(nameoffset | 0xc000, p);
}
else
{
char *name = va_arg(ap, char *);
if (name)
p = do_rfc1035_name(p, name);
if (name && !(p = do_rfc1035_name(p, name, limit)))
{
va_end(ap);
goto truncated;
}
if (nameoffset < 0)
{
CHECK_LIMIT(2);
PUTSHORT(-nameoffset | 0xc000, p);
}
else
*p++ = 0;
{
CHECK_LIMIT(1);
*p++ = 0;
}
}
/* type (2) + class (2) + ttl (4) + rdlen (2) */
CHECK_LIMIT(10);
PUTSHORT(type, p);
PUTSHORT(class, p);
PUTLONG(ttl, p); /* TTL */
@@ -1106,6 +1127,7 @@ int add_resource_record(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, int *truncp, int
{
#ifdef HAVE_IPV6
case '6':
CHECK_LIMIT(IN6ADDRSZ);
sval = va_arg(ap, char *);
memcpy(p, sval, IN6ADDRSZ);
p += IN6ADDRSZ;
@@ -1113,36 +1135,47 @@ int add_resource_record(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, int *truncp, int
#endif
case '4':
CHECK_LIMIT(INADDRSZ);
sval = va_arg(ap, char *);
memcpy(p, sval, INADDRSZ);
p += INADDRSZ;
break;
case 'b':
CHECK_LIMIT(1);
usval = va_arg(ap, int);
*p++ = usval;
break;
case 's':
CHECK_LIMIT(2);
usval = va_arg(ap, int);
PUTSHORT(usval, p);
break;
case 'l':
CHECK_LIMIT(4);
lval = va_arg(ap, long);
PUTLONG(lval, p);
break;
case 'd':
/* get domain-name answer arg and store it in RDATA field */
if (offset)
*offset = p - (unsigned char *)header;
p = do_rfc1035_name(p, va_arg(ap, char *));
*p++ = 0;
/* get domain-name answer arg and store it in RDATA field */
if (offset)
*offset = p - (unsigned char *)header;
p = do_rfc1035_name(p, va_arg(ap, char *), limit);
if (!p)
{
va_end(ap);
goto truncated;
}
CHECK_LIMIT(1);
*p++ = 0;
break;
case 't':
usval = va_arg(ap, int);
CHECK_LIMIT(usval);
sval = va_arg(ap, char *);
if (usval != 0)
memcpy(p, sval, usval);
@@ -1154,20 +1187,24 @@ int add_resource_record(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, int *truncp, int
usval = sval ? strlen(sval) : 0;
if (usval > 255)
usval = 255;
CHECK_LIMIT(usval + 1);
*p++ = (unsigned char)usval;
memcpy(p, sval, usval);
p += usval;
break;
}
#undef CHECK_LIMIT
va_end(ap); /* clean up variable argument pointer */
j = p - sav - 2;
PUTSHORT(j, sav); /* Now, store real RDLength */
/* this has already been checked against limit before */
PUTSHORT(j, sav); /* Now, store real RDLength */
/* check for overflow of buffer */
if (limit && ((unsigned char *)limit - p) < 0)
{
truncated:
if (truncp)
*truncp = 1;
return 0;
@@ -1223,11 +1260,6 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
struct mx_srv_record *rec;
size_t len;
/* Clear buffer beyond request to avoid risk of
information disclosure. */
memset(((char *)header) + qlen, 0,
(limit - ((char *)header)) - qlen);
if (ntohs(header->ancount) != 0 ||
ntohs(header->nscount) != 0 ||
ntohs(header->qdcount) == 0 ||

View File

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ static void option_put(struct dhcp_packet *mess, unsigned char *end, int opt, in
static void option_put_string(struct dhcp_packet *mess, unsigned char *end,
int opt, char *string, int null_term);
static struct in_addr option_addr(unsigned char *opt);
static unsigned int option_uint(unsigned char *opt, int i, int size);
static unsigned int option_uint(unsigned char *opt, int offset, int size);
static void log_packet(char *type, void *addr, unsigned char *ext_mac,
int mac_len, char *interface, char *string, char *err, u32 xid);
static unsigned char *option_find(struct dhcp_packet *mess, size_t size, int opt_type, int minsize);
@@ -42,14 +42,14 @@ static void clear_packet(struct dhcp_packet *mess, unsigned char *end);
static int in_list(unsigned char *list, int opt);
static void do_options(struct dhcp_context *context,
struct dhcp_packet *mess,
unsigned char *real_end,
unsigned char *end,
unsigned char *req_options,
char *hostname,
char *config_domain,
char *domain,
struct dhcp_netid *netid,
struct in_addr subnet_addr,
unsigned char fqdn_flags,
int null_term, int pxearch,
int null_term, int pxe_arch,
unsigned char *uuid,
int vendor_class_len,
time_t now,
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ static void do_options(struct dhcp_context *context,
static void match_vendor_opts(unsigned char *opt, struct dhcp_opt *dopt);
static int do_encap_opts(struct dhcp_opt *opts, int encap, int flag, struct dhcp_packet *mess, unsigned char *end, int null_term);
static int do_encap_opts(struct dhcp_opt *opt, int encap, int flag, struct dhcp_packet *mess, unsigned char *end, int null_term);
static void pxe_misc(struct dhcp_packet *mess, unsigned char *end, unsigned char *uuid);
static int prune_vendor_opts(struct dhcp_netid *netid);
static struct dhcp_opt *pxe_opts(int pxe_arch, struct dhcp_netid *netid, struct in_addr local, time_t now);
@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ size_t dhcp_reply(struct dhcp_context *context, char *iface_name, int int_index,
for (offset = 0; offset < (len - 5); offset += elen + 5)
{
elen = option_uint(opt, offset + 4 , 1);
if (option_uint(opt, offset, 4) == BRDBAND_FORUM_IANA)
if (option_uint(opt, offset, 4) == BRDBAND_FORUM_IANA && offset + elen + 5 <= len)
{
unsigned char *x = option_ptr(opt, offset + 5);
unsigned char *y = option_ptr(opt, offset + elen + 5);
@@ -1040,8 +1040,6 @@ size_t dhcp_reply(struct dhcp_context *context, char *iface_name, int int_index,
else if (have_config(config, CONFIG_DECLINED) &&
difftime(now, config->decline_time) < (float)DECLINE_BACKOFF)
my_syslog(MS_DHCP | LOG_WARNING, _("not using configured address %s because it was previously declined"), addrs);
else if ((!lease || lease->addr.s_addr != config->addr.s_addr) && !do_icmp_ping(now, config->addr, 0, loopback))
my_syslog(MS_DHCP | LOG_WARNING, _("not using configured address %s because it is in use by another host"), addrs);
else
conf = config->addr;
}
@@ -2454,10 +2452,10 @@ static void do_options(struct dhcp_context *context,
if (fqdn_flags & 0x04)
{
p = do_rfc1035_name(p, hostname);
p = do_rfc1035_name(p, hostname, NULL);
if (domain)
{
p = do_rfc1035_name(p, domain);
p = do_rfc1035_name(p, domain, NULL);
*p++ = 0;
}
}

View File

@@ -206,6 +206,9 @@ static int dhcp6_maybe_relay(struct state *state, void *inbuff, size_t sz,
/* RFC-6939 */
if ((opt = opt6_find(opts, end, OPTION6_CLIENT_MAC, 3)))
{
if (opt6_len(opt) - 2 > DHCP_CHADDR_MAX) {
return 0;
}
state->mac_type = opt6_uint(opt, 0, 2);
state->mac_len = opt6_len(opt) - 2;
memcpy(&state->mac[0], opt6_ptr(opt, 2), state->mac_len);
@@ -213,6 +216,9 @@ static int dhcp6_maybe_relay(struct state *state, void *inbuff, size_t sz,
for (opt = opts; opt; opt = opt6_next(opt, end))
{
if (opt6_ptr(opt, 0) + opt6_len(opt) >= end) {
return 0;
}
int o = new_opt6(opt6_type(opt));
if (opt6_type(opt) == OPTION6_RELAY_MSG)
{
@@ -1479,10 +1485,10 @@ static struct dhcp_netid *add_options(struct state *state, int do_refresh)
if ((p = expand(len + 2)))
{
*(p++) = state->fqdn_flags;
p = do_rfc1035_name(p, state->hostname);
p = do_rfc1035_name(p, state->hostname, NULL);
if (state->send_domain)
{
p = do_rfc1035_name(p, state->send_domain);
p = do_rfc1035_name(p, state->send_domain, NULL);
*p = 0;
}
}

View File

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
static struct tftp_file *check_tftp_fileperm(ssize_t *len, char *prefix);
static void free_transfer(struct tftp_transfer *transfer);
static ssize_t tftp_err(int err, char *packet, char *mess, char *file);
static ssize_t tftp_err(int err, char *packet, char *message, char *file);
static ssize_t tftp_err_oops(char *packet, char *file);
static ssize_t get_block(char *packet, struct tftp_transfer *transfer);
static char *next(char **p, char *end);
@@ -734,7 +734,7 @@ static ssize_t get_block(char *packet, struct tftp_transfer *transfer)
if (transfer->opt_blocksize)
{
p += (sprintf(p, "blksize") + 1);
p += (sprintf(p, "%d", transfer->blocksize) + 1);
p += (sprintf(p, "%u", transfer->blocksize) + 1);
}
if (transfer->opt_transize)
{

View File

@@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ u64 rand64(void)
return (u64)out[outleft+1] + (((u64)out[outleft]) << 32);
}
/* returns 2 if names is OK but contains one or more underscores */
static int check_name(char *in)
{
/* remove trailing .
@@ -118,6 +119,7 @@ static int check_name(char *in)
size_t dotgap = 0, l = strlen(in);
char c;
int nowhite = 0;
int hasuscore = 0;
if (l == 0 || l > MAXDNAME) return 0;
@@ -141,13 +143,17 @@ static int check_name(char *in)
return 0;
#endif
else if (c != ' ')
nowhite = 1;
{
nowhite = 1;
if (c == '_')
hasuscore = 1;
}
}
if (!nowhite)
return 0;
return 1;
return hasuscore ? 2 : 1;
}
/* Hostnames have a more limited valid charset than domain names
@@ -186,56 +192,68 @@ int legal_hostname(char *name)
char *canonicalise(char *in, int *nomem)
{
char *ret = NULL;
#if defined(HAVE_IDN) || defined(HAVE_LIBIDN2)
int rc;
#endif
if (nomem)
*nomem = 0;
if (!check_name(in))
if (!(rc = check_name(in)))
return NULL;
#if defined(HAVE_IDN) || defined(HAVE_LIBIDN2)
#ifdef HAVE_LIBIDN2
rc = idn2_to_ascii_lz(in, &ret, IDN2_NONTRANSITIONAL);
if (rc == IDN2_DISALLOWED)
rc = idn2_to_ascii_lz(in, &ret, IDN2_TRANSITIONAL);
#else
rc = idna_to_ascii_lz(in, &ret, 0);
#if defined(HAVE_LIBIDN2) && (!defined(IDN2_VERSION_NUMBER) || IDN2_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x02000003)
/* older libidn2 strips underscores, so don't do IDN processing
if the name has an underscore (check_name() returned 2) */
if (rc != 2)
#endif
if (rc != IDNA_SUCCESS)
#if defined(HAVE_IDN) || defined(HAVE_LIBIDN2)
{
if (ret)
free(ret);
if (nomem && (rc == IDNA_MALLOC_ERROR || rc == IDNA_DLOPEN_ERROR))
# ifdef HAVE_LIBIDN2
rc = idn2_to_ascii_lz(in, &ret, IDN2_NONTRANSITIONAL);
if (rc == IDN2_DISALLOWED)
rc = idn2_to_ascii_lz(in, &ret, IDN2_TRANSITIONAL);
# else
rc = idna_to_ascii_lz(in, &ret, 0);
# endif
if (rc != IDNA_SUCCESS)
{
my_syslog(LOG_ERR, _("failed to allocate memory"));
*nomem = 1;
if (ret)
free(ret);
if (nomem && (rc == IDNA_MALLOC_ERROR || rc == IDNA_DLOPEN_ERROR))
{
my_syslog(LOG_ERR, _("failed to allocate memory"));
*nomem = 1;
}
return NULL;
}
return NULL;
return ret;
}
#else
#endif
if ((ret = whine_malloc(strlen(in)+1)))
strcpy(ret, in);
else if (nomem)
*nomem = 1;
#endif
return ret;
}
unsigned char *do_rfc1035_name(unsigned char *p, char *sval)
unsigned char *do_rfc1035_name(unsigned char *p, char *sval, char *limit)
{
int j;
while (sval && *sval)
{
if (limit && p + 1 > (unsigned char*)limit)
return p;
unsigned char *cp = p++;
for (j = 0; *sval && (*sval != '.'); sval++, j++)
{
if (limit && p + 1 > (unsigned char*)limit)
return p;
#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID) && *sval == NAME_ESCAPE)
*p++ = (*(++sval))-1;
@@ -448,13 +466,13 @@ void prettyprint_time(char *buf, unsigned int t)
{
unsigned int x, p = 0;
if ((x = t/86400))
p += sprintf(&buf[p], "%dd", x);
p += sprintf(&buf[p], "%ud", x);
if ((x = (t/3600)%24))
p += sprintf(&buf[p], "%dh", x);
p += sprintf(&buf[p], "%uh", x);
if ((x = (t/60)%60))
p += sprintf(&buf[p], "%dm", x);
p += sprintf(&buf[p], "%um", x);
if ((x = t%60))
p += sprintf(&buf[p], "%ds", x);
p += sprintf(&buf[p], "%us", x);
}
}