Fix occasional crashes with DNSSEC and large nunbers of --address configs.

Commit 3e659bd4ec removed the concept of an usptream DNS server which is capable of DNSSEC: they are all (at least in theory) now usable. As a very unfortunate side-effect, this removed the filter that ensured that dnssec_server() ONLY returns servers, and not domains with literal addresses. If we try and do DNSSEC queries for a domain, and there's a --address line which matches the domain, then dnssec_server() will return that. This would break DNSSEC validation, but that's turns out not to matter, because under these circumstances dnssec_server() will probably return an out-of-bounds index into the servers[] array, and the process dies with SIGSEGV. Many thanks to the hard workers at the Tomato project who found this bug and provided enough information to diagnose it.
Multiple typo and spelling fixes.
2025-04-04 22:01:51 +01:00 · 2025-03-29 21:41:40 +00:00 · 2025-03-15 17:02:02 +00:00 · 2025-03-15 16:47:55 +00:00 · 2025-03-15 09:05:47 +00:00 · 2025-03-14 15:12:46 +00:00
54 changed files with 1531 additions and 945 deletions
--- a/.gitmodules
+++ b/.gitmodules
@@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
 [submodule "debian"]
 	path = debian
 	url = git://thekelleys.org.uk/dnsmasq-debian.git
+[submodule "submodules/dnsmasq-debian"]
+	path = submodules/dnsmasq-debian
+	url = https://thekelleys.org.uk/git/dnsmasq-debian
--- a/100
+++ b/100
@@ -1,3 +1,25 @@
+version 2.92
+        Redesign the interaction between DNSSEC validation and per-domain
+	servers, specified as --server=/<domain>/<ip-address>. This should
+	just work in all cases now. If the normal chain-of-trust exists into
+	the delegated domain then whether the domain is signed or not, DNSSEC
+	validation will function normally. In the case the delegated domain
+	is an "overlay" on top of the global DNS and no NS and/or DS records
+	exist connecting it to the global dns, then if the domain is
+	unsigned the situation will be handled by synthesising a
+	proof-of-non-existence-of-DS for the domain and queries will be
+	answered unvalidated; this action will be logged. A signed domain
+	without chain-of-trust can be validated if a suitable trust-anchor
+	is provided using --trust-anchor. This change should be backwards
+	compatible for all existing working configurations; it extends the
+	space of possible configurations which are functional.
+
+	Fix a couple of problems with DNSSEC validation and DNAME. One
+	could cause validation failure on correct domains, and the other
+	would fail to spot an invalid domain. Thanks to Graham Clinch
+	for spotting the problem.
+
+	
 version 2.91
 	Fix spurious "resource limit exceeded messages". Thanks to 
 	Dominik Derigs for the bug report.
@@ -7,9 +29,9 @@ version 2.91
 	Literal address records are smaller and don't have
 	this field and don't need to be ordered on it.
 	To actually provoke this bug seems to need the same server-literal
-	to be repeated twice, eg --address=/a/1.1.1.1 --address-/a/1.1.1.1
+	to be repeated twice, e.g., --address=/a/1.1.1.1 --address-/a/1.1.1.1
 	which is clearly rare in the wild, but if it did exist it could
-	provoke a SIGSEV. Thanks to Daniel Rhea for fuzzing this one.
+	provoke a SIGSEGV. Thanks to Daniel Rhea for fuzzing this one.

 	Fix buffer overflow when configured lease-change script name
 	is too long.
@@ -17,7 +39,7 @@ version 2.91

 	Improve behaviour in the face of non-responsive upstream TCP DNS
 	servers. Without shorter timeouts, clients are blocked for too long
-	and fail wuth their own timeouts.
+	and fail with their own timeouts.

 	Set --fast-dns-retries by default when doing DNSSEC. A single
 	downstream query can trigger many upstream queries. On an
@@ -36,7 +58,7 @@ version 2.91
 	empty answer.

 	Fix handling of EDNS0 UDP packet sizes.
-	When talking upstream we always add a pseudoheader, and set the
+	When talking upstream we always add a pseudo header, and set the
        UDP packet size to --edns-packet-max. Answering queries from
 	downstream, we get the answer (either from upstream or local
 	data) If local data won't fit the advertised size (or 512 if
@@ -82,6 +104,50 @@ version 2.91
 	to queries which arrive a dnsmasq already carrying an EDNS client
 	subnet.

+	Handle DS queries to auth zones. When dnsmasq is configured to
+	act as an authoritative server and has an authoritative zone
+	configured, and receives a query for that zone _as_forwarder_
+	it answers the query directly rather than forwarding it. This
+	doesn't affect the answer, but it saves dnsmasq forwarding the
+	query to the recursor upstream, which then bounces it back to dnsmasq
+	in auth mode. The exception should be when the query is for the root
+	of zone, for a DS RR. The answer to that has to come from the parent,
+	via the recursor, and will typically be a proof-of-non-existence
+	since dnsmasq doesn't support signed zones. This patch suppresses
+	local answers and forces forwarding to the upstream recursor for such
+	queries. It stops breakage when a DNSSEC validating client makes
+	queries to dnsmasq acting as forwarder for a zone for which it is
+	authoritative.
+
+	Implement "DNS-0x20 encoding", for extra protection against
+	reply-spoof attacks. Since DNS queries are case-insensitive,
+	it's possible to randomly flip the case of letters in a query
+	and still get the correct answer back.
+	This adds an extra dimension for a cache-poisoning attacker
+	to guess when sending replies in-the-blind since it's expected
+	that the legitimate answer will have the same  pattern of upper
+	and lower case as the query, so any replies which don't can be
+	ignored as malicious. The amount of extra entropy clearly depends
+	on the number of a-z and A-Z characters in the query, and this
+	implementation puts a hard limit of 32 bits to make resource
+	allocation easy. This about doubles entropy over the standard
+	random ID and random port combination. This technique can interact
+	badly with rare broken DNS servers which don't preserve the case
+	of the query in their reply. The first time a reply is returned
+	which matches the query in all respects except case, a warning
+	will be logged. In this release, 0x020-encoding is default-off
+	and must be explicitly enabled with --do-0x20-encoding. In future
+	releases it may default on. You can avoid a future release
+	changing the behaviour of an installation with --no-x20-encode.
+	
+	Fix a long-standing problem when two queries which are identical
+	in every respect _except_ case, get combined by dnsmasq. If
+	dnsmasq gets eg, two queries for example.com and Example.com
+	in quick succession it will get the answer for example.com from
+	upstream and send that answer to both requestors. This means that
+	the query for Example.com will get an answer for example.com, and
+	in the modern DNS, that answer may not be accepted.
+
 	
 version 2.90
 	Fix reversion in --rev-server introduced in 2.88 which
@@ -93,7 +159,7 @@ version 2.90
 	for a particular domain. Thanks to Daniel Danzberger for
 	spotting this bug.

-	Set the default maximum DNS UDP packet sice to 1232. This
+	Set the default maximum DNS UDP packet size to 1232. This
 	has been the recommended value since 2020 because it's the
 	largest value that avoid fragmentation, and fragmentation
 	is just not reliable on the modern internet, especially
@@ -101,14 +167,14 @@ version 2.90
 	--edns-packet-max for special circumstances.

 	Add --no-dhcpv4-interface and --no-dhcpv6-interface for
-	better control over which inetrfaces are providing DHCP service.
+	better control over which interfaces are providing DHCP service.

 	Fix issue with stale caching: After replying with stale data,
 	dnsmasq sends the query upstream to refresh the cache asynchronously
 	and sometimes sends the wrong packet: packet length can be wrong,
 	and if an EDE marking stale data is added to the answer that can
 	end up in the query also. This bug only seems to cause problems
-	when the usptream server is a DOH/DOT proxy. Thanks to Justin He
+	when the upstream server is a DOH/DOT proxy. Thanks to Justin He
 	for the bug report.

 	Add configurable caching for arbitrary RR-types.
@@ -146,7 +212,7 @@ version 2.90
 	Applied Cybersecurity ATHENE for finding this vulnerability.

 	CVE 2023-50387 and CVE 2023-50868 apply.
-	Note that the is a security vulnerablity only when DNSSEC validation
+	Note that this a security vulnerability only when DNSSEC validation
 	is enabled.
 	
 	Fix memory-leak when attempting to cache SRV records with zero TTL.
@@ -232,7 +298,7 @@ version 2.88
 	upstream servers from /etc/resolv.conf or other sources that
 	can change dnsmasq tries to avoid memory fragmentation by re-using
 	existing records that are being re-read unchanged. This involves
-	seaching all the server records for each new one installed.
+	searching all the server records for each new one installed.
 	During startup this search is pointless, and can cause long
 	start times with thousands of --server options because the work
 	needed is O(n^2). Handle this case more intelligently.
@@ -295,7 +361,7 @@ version 2.87

 	Enhance --domain to accept, for instance,
 	--domain=net2.thekelleys.org.uk,eth2 so that hosts get a domain
-	which relects the interface they are attached to in a way which
+	which reflects the interface they are attached to in a way which
 	doesn't require hard-coding addresses. Thanks to Sten Spans for
 	the idea.

@@ -669,22 +735,22 @@ version 2.80
        but those which used the default of no checking will need to be
        altered to explicitly select no checking. The new default is
        because switching off checking for unsigned replies is
-	inherently dangerous. Not only does it open the possiblity of forged
+	inherently dangerous. Not only does it open the possibility of forged
        replies, but it allows everything to appear to be working even
        when the upstream namesevers do not support DNSSEC, and in this
-        case no DNSSEC validation at all is occuring.
+        case no DNSSEC validation at all is occurring.

        Fix DHCP broken-ness when --no-ping AND --dhcp-sequential-ip
 	are set. Thanks to Daniel Miess for help with this.

-	Add a facilty to store DNS packets sent/recieved in a
+	Add a facility to store DNS packets sent/received in a
 	pcap-format file for later debugging. The file location
 	is given by the --dumpfile option, and a bitmap controlling
 	which packets should be dumped is given by the --dumpmask
 	option.

 	Handle the case of both standard and constructed dhcp-ranges on the
-	same interface better. We don't now contruct a dhcp-range if there's
+	same interface better. We don't now construct a dhcp-range if there's
 	already one specified. This allows the specified interface to
 	have different parameters and avoids advertising the same
 	prefix twice. Thanks to Luis Marsano for spotting this case.
@@ -1154,7 +1220,7 @@ version 2.73

 	Use inotify for checking on updates to /etc/resolv.conf and
 	friends under Linux. This fixes race conditions when the files are 
-	updated rapidly and saves CPU by noy polling. To build
+	updated rapidly and saves CPU by not polling. To build
 	a binary that runs on old Linux kernels without inotify,
 	use make COPTS=-DNO_INOTIFY

@@ -1494,7 +1560,7 @@ version 2.68
 	are dynamic and works much better than the previous
 	work-around which exempted constructed DHCP ranges from the
 	IP address filtering. As a consequence, that work-around
-	is removed. Under certain circumstances, this change wil
+	is removed. Under certain circumstances, this change will
 	break existing configuration: if you're relying on the
 	constructed-range exception, you need to change --auth-zone
 	to specify the same interface as is used to construct your
@@ -1951,7 +2017,7 @@ version 2.61

 	Set the environment variable DNSMASQ_LOG_DHCP when running
 	the script id --log-dhcp is in effect, so that script can
-	taylor their logging verbosity. Suggestion from Malte
+	tailor their logging verbosity. Suggestion from Malte
 	Forkel.

 	Arrange that addresses specified with --listen-address
--- a/6
+++ b/6
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
+# dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
 #
 #  This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
 #  it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -71,8 +71,8 @@ nft_cflags =    `echo $(COPTS) | $(top)/bld/pkg-wrapper HAVE_NFTSET $(PKG_CONFIG
 nft_libs =      `echo $(COPTS) | $(top)/bld/pkg-wrapper HAVE_NFTSET $(PKG_CONFIG) --libs libnftables`
 version =       -DVERSION='\"`$(top)/bld/get-version $(top)`\"'

-sum?=$(shell $(CC) -DDNSMASQ_COMPILE_OPTS $(COPTS) -E $(top)/$(SRC)/dnsmasq.h | ( md5sum 2>/dev/null || md5 ) | cut -f 1 -d ' ')
-sum!=$(CC) -DDNSMASQ_COMPILE_OPTS $(COPTS) -E $(top)/$(SRC)/dnsmasq.h | ( md5sum 2>/dev/null || md5 ) | cut -f 1 -d ' '
+sum?=$(shell echo $(CC) -DDNSMASQ_COMPILE_FLAGS="$(CFLAGS)" -DDNSMASQ_COMPILE_OPTS $(COPTS) -E $(top)/$(SRC)/dnsmasq.h | ( md5sum 2>/dev/null || md5 ) | cut -f 1 -d ' ')
+sum!=echo $(CC) -DDNSMASQ_COMPILE_FLAGS="$(CFLAGS)" -DDNSMASQ_COMPILE_OPTS $(COPTS) -E $(top)/$(SRC)/dnsmasq.h | ( md5sum 2>/dev/null || md5 ) | cut -f 1 -d ' '
 copts_conf = .copts_$(sum)

 objs = cache.o rfc1035.o util.o option.o forward.o network.o \
--- a/1
+++ b/1
--- a/1
+++ b/1
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+submodules/dnsmasq-debian/debian
--- a/man/dnsmasq.8
+++ b/man/dnsmasq.8
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.TH DNSMASQ 8 2021-08-16
+.TH DNSMASQ 8 2025-02-05
 .SH NAME
 dnsmasq \- A lightweight DHCP and caching DNS server.
 .SH SYNOPSIS
@@ -498,10 +498,7 @@ xxx.internal.thekelleys.org.uk at 192.168.1.1 then giving  the flag
 .B --server=/internal.thekelleys.org.uk/192.168.1.1
 will send all queries for
 internal machines to that nameserver, everything else will go to the
-servers in /etc/resolv.conf. DNSSEC validation is turned off for such
-private nameservers, UNLESS a
-.B --trust-anchor
-is specified for the domain in question. An empty domain specification,
+servers in /etc/resolv.conf. An empty domain specification,
 .B // 
 has the special meaning of "unqualified names only" ie names without any
 dots in them. A non-standard port may be specified as 
@@ -852,6 +849,18 @@ name on successive queries, for load-balancing. This turns off that
 behaviour, so that the records are always returned in the order
 that they are received from upstream.
 .TP
+.B --do-0x20-encode, --no-0x20-encode
+Dnsmasq can scramble the case of letters in DNS queries it sends upstream as a security feature.
+This technique can interact badly with rare broken DNS servers which don't preserve the case
+of the query in their reply. The first time a reply is returned
+which matches the query in all respects except case, a warning
+will be logged. If this coincides with DNS not functioning, it
+is necessary to disable the feature. As at version 2.91, 0x20 encoding
+is disabled by default, and must be enabled with --do-0x20-encode. The default
+may change in the future, so to be sure of its status after an upgrade, set --do-0x20-encode
+or --no-0x20-encode in your config. --no-0x20-encode overrides --do-x20-encode or a future default
+0x20-encode enable.
+.TP
 .B --use-stale-cache[=<max TTL excess in s>]
 When set, if a DNS name exists in the cache, but its time-to-live has expired, dnsmasq will return the data anyway. (It attempts to refresh the
 data with an upstream query after returning the stale data.) This can improve speed and reliability. It comes at the expense
@@ -864,7 +873,7 @@ Set the maximum number of concurrent DNS queries. The default value is
 150, which should be fine for most setups. The only known situation
 where this needs to be increased is when using web-server log file
 resolvers, which can generate large numbers of concurrent queries. This
-parameter actually controls the number of concurrent queries per server group, where a server group is the set of server(s) associated with a single domain. So if a domain has it's own server via --server=/example.com/1.2.3.4 and 1.2.3.4 is not responding, but queries for *.example.com cannot go elsewhere, then other queries will not be affected. On configurations with many such server groups and tight resources, this value may need to be reduced.
+parameter actually controls the number of concurrent queries per server group, where a server group is the set of server(s) associated with a single domain. So if a domain has its own server via --server=/example.com/1.2.3.4 and 1.2.3.4 is not responding, but queries for *.example.com cannot go elsewhere, then other queries will not be affected. On configurations with many such server groups and tight resources, this value may need to be reduced.
 .TP
 .B --dnssec
 Validate DNS replies and cache DNSSEC data. When forwarding DNS queries, dnsmasq requests the 
@@ -882,12 +891,15 @@ ie capable of returning DNSSEC records with data. If they are not,
 then dnsmasq will not be able to determine the trusted status of
 answers and this means that DNS service will be entirely broken.
 .TP
-.B --trust-anchor=[<class>],<domain>,<key-tag>,<algorithm>,<digest-type>,<digest>
+.B --trust-anchor=<domain>,[<class>,][<key-tag>,<algorithm>,<digest-type>,<digest>]
 Provide DS records to act a trust anchors for DNSSEC
-validation. Typically these will be the DS record(s) for Key Signing
+validation. The class defaults to IN. Typically these will be the DS record(s) for Key Signing
 key(s) (KSK) of the root zone,
-but trust anchors for limited domains are also possible. The current
-root-zone trust anchors may be downloaded from https://data.iana.org/root-anchors/root-anchors.xml 
+but trust anchors for limited domains are also possible.
+A negative trust anchor (ie. proof that a DS record doesn't exist) may be configured be specifying
+only the name or only the name and class. This can be useful for forcing dnsmasq to treat zones delegated
+using \fB--server=/<domain>/<ip-address>\fP as unsigned. The current
+root-zone trust anchors may be downloaded from https://data.iana.org/root-anchors/root-anchors.xml
 .TP
 .B --dnssec-check-unsigned[=no]
 As a default, dnsmasq checks that unsigned DNS replies are
@@ -1188,7 +1200,7 @@ available, though it normally is for direct-connected clients, or
 clients using DHCP relays which support RFC 6939.


-For DHCPv4, the  special option id:* means "ignore any client-id 
+For DHCPv4, the special option \fBid:*\fP means "ignore any client-id 
 and use MAC addresses only." This is useful when a client presents a client-id sometimes 
 but not others.

@@ -1216,36 +1228,34 @@ the result is undefined. A corollary to this is that the name associated with a
 does not appear in the DNS until the host obtains a DHCP lease.


-The special keyword "ignore"
-tells dnsmasq to never offer a DHCP lease to a machine. The machine
-can be specified by hardware address, client ID or hostname, for
-instance
-.B --dhcp-host=00:20:e0:3b:13:af,ignore
-This is
-useful when there is another DHCP server on the network which should
+The special keyword \fBignore\fP tells dnsmasq never to offer a DHCP lease
+to a machine. The machine
+can be specified by hardware address, client ID or hostname. For
+example: \fB--dhcp-host=00:20:e0:3b:13:af,ignore\fP. 
+This can be useful when there is another DHCP server on the network which should
 be used by some machines.

-The set:<tag> construct sets the tag
+The \fBset:<tag>\fP construct sets the tag
 whenever this \fB--dhcp-host\fP directive is in use. This can be used to
 selectively send DHCP options just for this host. More than one tag
 can be set in a \fB--dhcp-host\fP directive (but not in other places where
-"set:<tag>" is allowed). When a host matches any
+\fBset:<tag>\fP is allowed). When a host matches any
 \fB--dhcp-host\fP directive (or one implied by /etc/ethers) then the special
-tag "known" is set. This allows dnsmasq to be configured to
+tag \fBknown\fP is set. This allows dnsmasq to be configured to
 ignore requests from unknown machines using
-.B --dhcp-ignore=tag:!known
+\fB--dhcp-ignore=tag:!known\fP.
 If the host matches only a \fB--dhcp-host\fP directive which cannot
-be used because it specifies an address on different subnet, the tag "known-othernet" is set.
+be used because it specifies an address on a different subnet, the tag \fBknown-othernet\fP is set.

-The tag:<tag> construct filters which dhcp-host directives are used; more than
-one can be provided, in this case the request must match all of them. Tagged
+The \fBtag:<tag>\fP construct filters which dhcp-host directives are used. More than
+one tag can be provided. In this case, the request must match all tags. Tagged
 directives are used in preference to untagged ones. Note that one of <hwaddr>,
-<client_id> or <hostname> still needs to be specified (can be a wildcard).
+<client_id> or <hostname> still must be specified (can be a wildcard).

 Ethernet addresses (but not client-ids) may have
 wildcard bytes, so for example 
 .B --dhcp-host=00:20:e0:3b:13:*,ignore 
-will cause dnsmasq to ignore a range of hardware addresses. Note that
+will cause dnsmasq to ignore the given range of hardware addresses. Note that
 the "*" will need to be escaped or quoted on a command line, but not
 in the configuration file.

@@ -1259,11 +1269,11 @@ is 6.

 As a special case, in DHCPv4, it is possible to include more than one
 hardware address. eg:
-.B --dhcp-host=11:22:33:44:55:66,12:34:56:78:90:12,192.168.0.2
+\fB--dhcp-host=11:22:33:44:55:66,12:34:56:78:90:12,192.168.0.2\fP.
 This allows an IP address to be associated with
 multiple hardware addresses, and gives dnsmasq permission to abandon a
 DHCP lease to one of the hardware addresses when another one asks for
-a lease. Beware that this is a dangerous thing to do, it will only
+a lease. Beware that this is a dangerous thing to do: it will only
 work reliably if only one of the hardware addresses is active at any
 time and there is no way for dnsmasq to enforce this. It is, for instance,
 useful to allocate a stable IP address to a laptop which
@@ -1310,27 +1320,25 @@ options containing the same information. /etc/ethers is re-read when
 dnsmasq receives SIGHUP. IPv6 addresses are NOT read from /etc/ethers.
 .TP
 .B \-O, --dhcp-option=[tag:<tag>,[tag:<tag>,]][encap:<opt>,][vi-encap:<enterprise>,][vendor:[<vendor-class>],][<opt>|option:<opt-name>|option6:<opt>|option6:<opt-name>],[<value>[,<value>]]
-Specify different or extra options to DHCP clients. By default,
+Send various extra options to DHCP clients. By default,
 dnsmasq sends some standard options to DHCP clients, the netmask and
 broadcast address are set to the same as the host running dnsmasq, and
 the DNS server and default route are set to the address of the machine
 running dnsmasq. (Equivalent rules apply for IPv6.) If the domain name option has been set, that is sent.
 This configuration allows these defaults to be overridden,
-or other options specified. The option, to be sent may be given as a
-decimal number or as "option:<option-name>" The option numbers are
+or other options specified. The option to be sent may be given as a
+decimal number or as \fBoption:<option-name>\fP. 
+
+Option numbers are
 specified in RFC2132 and subsequent RFCs. The set of option-names
-known by dnsmasq can be discovered by running "dnsmasq --help dhcp".
-For example, to set the default route option to 
-192.168.4.4, do 
-.B --dhcp-option=3,192.168.4.4 
-or
-.B --dhcp-option = option:router, 192.168.4.4
-and to set the time-server address to 192.168.0.4, do
-.B --dhcp-option = 42,192.168.0.4 
-or 
-.B --dhcp-option = option:ntp-server, 192.168.0.4
-The special address 0.0.0.0 is taken to mean "the address of the
-machine running dnsmasq".
+known by dnsmasq can be discovered by running \fBdnsmasq --help dhcp\fP.
+For example, to set the default route option to 192.168.4.4, use 
+\fB--dhcp-option=3,192.168.4.4\fP or 
+\fB--dhcp-option=option:router,192.168.4.4\fP 
+and to set the time-server address to 192.168.0.4, use
+\fB--dhcp-option=42,192.168.0.4\fP or
+\fB--dhcp-option=option:ntp-server,192.168.0.4\fP.
+The special address 0.0.0.0 means "the address of the system running dnsmasq".

 An option without data is valid, and includes just the option without data.
 (There is only one option with a zero length data field currently defined for DHCPv4, 80:rapid commit, so this feature is not very useful in practice). Options for which dnsmasq normally
@@ -1351,30 +1359,29 @@ to option 120 are handled as per RFC 3361. Dotted-quad IP addresses
 which are followed by a slash and then a netmask size are encoded as
 described in RFC 3442.

-IPv6 options are specified using the 
-.B option6:
+IPv6 options are specified using the \fBoption6:\fP
 keyword, followed by the option number or option name. The IPv6 option
 name space is disjoint from the IPv4 option name space. IPv6 addresses
 in options must be bracketed with square brackets, eg. 
-.B --dhcp-option=option6:ntp-server,[1234::56]
+\fB --dhcp-option=option6:ntp-server,[1234::56]\fP. 
 For IPv6, [::] means "the global address of
 the machine running dnsmasq", whilst [fd00::] is replaced with the
 ULA, if it exists, and [fe80::] with the link-local address.

-Be careful: no checking is done that the correct type of data for the
-option number is sent, it is quite possible to
-persuade dnsmasq to generate illegal DHCP packets with injudicious use
-of this flag. When the value is a decimal number, dnsmasq must determine how 
+Be careful: data-type suitability for the option number sent is not checked.
+It is quite possible to persuade dnsmasq to generate illegal DHCP packets with
+injudicious use of this flag. 
+When the value is a decimal number, dnsmasq must determine how 
 large the data item is. It does this by examining the option number and/or the
 value, but can be overridden by appending a single letter flag as follows:
 b = one byte, s = two bytes, i = four bytes. This is mainly useful with 
 encapsulated vendor class options (see below) where dnsmasq cannot
-determine data size from the  option number. Option data which
+determine data size from the option number. Option data which
 consists solely of periods and digits will be interpreted by dnsmasq
 as an IP address, and inserted into an option as such. To force a
 literal string, use quotes. For instance when using option 66 to send
-a literal IP address as TFTP server name, it is necessary to do
-.B --dhcp-option=66,"1.2.3.4"
+a literal IP address as TFTP server name, it is necessary to do 
+\fB--dhcp-option=66,"1.2.3.4"\fP.

 Encapsulated Vendor-class options may also be specified (IPv4 only) using
 \fB--dhcp-option\fP: for instance
@@ -1403,7 +1410,7 @@ Vendor Options" as specified by RFC3925. These are denoted like this:
 The number in the vi-encap: section is the IANA enterprise number
 used to identify this option. This form of encapsulation is supported
 in IPv6.
- 
+
 The address 0.0.0.0 is not treated specially in
 encapsulated options.
 .TP
@@ -1529,45 +1536,47 @@ via relays. If a list of IP addresses is given, only interactions via
 relays at those addresses are affected.
 .TP
 .B --dhcp-match=set:<tag>,<option number>|option:<option name>|vi-encap:<enterprise>[,<value>]
-Without a value, set the tag if the client sends a DHCP
-option of the given number or name. When a value is given, set the tag only if
-the option is sent and matches the value. The value may be of the form
+Without \fB<value>\fP, set \fB<tag>\fP if the client sends a DHCP
+\fBoption\fP of the given number or name. With \fB<value>\fP, set \fB<tag>\fP only if
+the client sends the \fBoption\fP matching or containing \fB<value>\fP. 
+
+The value may be of the form
 "01:ff:*:02" in which case the value must match (apart from wildcards)
 but the option sent may have unmatched data past the end of the
 value. The value may also be of the same form as in 
 .B --dhcp-option
 in which case the option sent is treated as an array, and one element
-must match, so
+must match.
 .B --dhcp-match=set:efi-ia32,option:client-arch,6
-will set the tag "efi-ia32" if the the number 6 appears in the list of
+sets the tag \fBefi-ia32\fP if the number \fB6\fP appears in the list of
 architectures sent by the client in option 93. (See RFC 4578 for
-details.)  If the value is a string, substring matching is used.
+details.) If the value is a string, substring matching is used.

 The special form with vi-encap:<enterprise number> matches against
 vendor-identifying vendor classes for the specified enterprise. Please
 see RFC 3925 for more details of these rare and interesting beasts.
 .TP
 .B --dhcp-name-match=set:<tag>,<name>[*]
-Set the tag if the given name is supplied by a DHCP client. There may be a single trailing wildcard *, which has the usual meaning. Combined with dhcp-ignore or dhcp-ignore-names this gives the ability to ignore certain clients by name, or disallow certain hostnames from being claimed by a client.
+Set a \fB<tag>\fP if the given \fB<name>\fP is supplied by a DHCP client. There may be a single trailing wildcard *, with a glob meaning. Combined with \fBdhcp-ignore\fP or \fBdhcp-ignore-names\fP this gives the ability to ignore certain clients by name, or disallow certain hostnames from being claimed by a client.
 .TP
 .B --tag-if=set:<tag>[,set:<tag>[,tag:<tag>[,tag:<tag>]]]
-Perform boolean operations on tags. Any tag appearing as set:<tag> is set if
-all the tags which appear as tag:<tag> are set, (or unset when tag:!<tag> is used)
-If no tag:<tag> appears set:<tag> tags are set unconditionally.
-Any number of set: and tag: forms may appear, in any order. 
-\fB--tag-if\fP lines are executed in order, so if the tag in tag:<tag> is a
+Perform boolean operations on tags. All \fBset:<tag>\fP tags are set if
+all \fBtag:<tag>\fP are already set, (or unset when \fBtag:!<tag>\fP is used).
+If no \fBtag:<tag>\fP appears, \fBset:<tag>\fP tags are set unconditionally.
+Any number of \fBset:\fP and \fBtag:\fP forms may appear, in any order. 
+\fB--tag-if\fP lines are executed in order, so if the tag in \fBtag:<tag>\fP is a
 tag set by another
 .B --tag-if,
-the line which sets the tag must precede the one which tests it.
+the line which sets the tag must precede the line which tests it.

-As an extension, the tag:<tag> clauses support limited wildcard matching,
-similar to the matching in the \fB--interface\fP directive.  This allows, for
-example, using \fB--tag-if=set:ppp,tag:ppp*\fP to set the tag 'ppp' for all requests
-received on any matching interface (ppp0, ppp1, etc).  This can be used in conjunction
-with the tag:!<tag> format meaning that no tag matching the wildcard may be set.
+As an extension, the \fBtag:<tag>\fP clauses support limited wildcard matching,
+similar to the matching in the \fB--interface\fP directive. This allows the
+example \fB--tag-if=set:ppp,tag:ppp*\fP to set the tag 'ppp' for all requests
+received on any matching interface (ppp0, ppp1, etc). This can be used in conjunction
+with the \fBtag:!<tag>\fP format meaning that no tag matching the wildcard may be set.
 .TP
 .B \-J, --dhcp-ignore=tag:<tag>[,tag:<tag>]
-When all the given tags appear in the tag set ignore the host and do
+When all the given tags appear in the tag set, ignore the host and do
 not allocate it a DHCP lease.
 .TP
 .B --dhcp-ignore-names[=tag:<tag>[,tag:<tag>]]
@@ -2416,48 +2425,67 @@ the CNAME. To work around this, add the CNAME to /etc/hosts so that
 the CNAME is shadowed too.

 .PP
-The tag system works as follows: For each DHCP request, dnsmasq
-collects a set of valid tags from active configuration lines which
-include set:<tag>, including one from the 
-.B --dhcp-range
-used to allocate the address, one from any matching 
-.B --dhcp-host
-(and "known" or "known-othernet" if a \fB--dhcp-host\fP matches)
-The tag "bootp" is set for BOOTP requests, and a tag whose name is the 
-name of the interface on which the request arrived is also set.
+The tag system works as follows: dnsmasq tags each DHCP request
+with tags from applicable configuration lines containing \fBset:<tag>\fP i.e. 

-Any configuration lines which include one or more tag:<tag> constructs
-will only be valid if all that tags are matched in the set derived
-above. Typically this is \fB--dhcp-option\fP.
-.B --dhcp-option
-which has tags will be used in preference  to an untagged 
-.B --dhcp-option,
-provided that _all_ the tags match somewhere in the
-set collected as described above. The prefix '!' on a tag means 'not'
-so \fB--dhcp-option=tag:!purple,3,1.2.3.4\fP sends the option when the
-tag purple is not in the set of valid tags. (If using this in a
-command line rather than a configuration file, be sure to escape !,
-which is a shell metacharacter)
+\fBset:<tag>\fP from the \fB--dhcp-range\fP used to allocate the address;
+
+\fBset:<tag>\fP from any matching \fB--dhcp-host\fP (plus the tag \fBknown\fP or 
+\fBknown-othernet\fP).
+
+BOOTP requests are tagged \fBbootp\fP. Each request is also tagged with the name of  
+the interface on which the request arrived.
+
+Each configuration line containing one or more \fBtag:<tag>\fP constructs
+applies when all its tags exist on the request. That is:
+
+Configuration tag:A applies to a request set:tagged A.
+
+Configuration tag:B applies to a request set:tagged B.
+
+Configuration tag:A+B doesn't apply to a request set:tagged A.
+
+Configuration tag:A+B doesn't apply to a request set:tagged B.
+
+Configurations tag:A+B, tag:A, tag:B apply to a request set:tagged A+B.
+
+\fBset:<tag>\fP constructs in \fB--dhcp-range\fP and \fB--dhcp-host\fP tag requests.
+
+Use \fBtag:<tag>\fPs in \fB--dhcp-option\fPs to match \fBset:<tag>\fP and apply configurations.
+
+A \fB--dhcp-option\fP with \fBtag:<tag>\fP is preferred over an untagged 
+\fB--dhcp-option\fP, provided that \fBall\fP its tags match somewhere in the
+set gathered above. 
+
+The tag prefix '!' means 'not'.
+\fB--dhcp-option=tag:!purple,3,1.2.3.4\fP sends the option when the request 
+is not tagged with purple. (The shell metacharacter '!' must be escaped on the
+command line but not in a configuration file).
+
+When selecting \fB--dhcp-option\fPs, a \fB--dhcp-range\fP tag is second class 
+to other tags, to make it easy to override options for
+individual hosts, so:

-When selecting \fB--dhcp-options\fP, a tag from \fB--dhcp-range\fP is second class
-relative to other tags, to make it easy to override options for
-individual hosts, so 
 .B --dhcp-range=set:interface1,......
+
 .B --dhcp-host=set:myhost,.....
+
 .B --dhcp-option=tag:interface1,option:nis-domain,"domain1"
+
 .B --dhcp-option=tag:myhost,option:nis-domain,"domain2"
-will set the NIS-domain to domain1 for hosts in the range, but
-override that to domain2 for a particular host.
+
+sets the NIS-domain to domain1 for hosts in the range, but
+to domain2 for a particular host that may or may not fall in the range.

 .PP
-Note that for 
-.B --dhcp-range
-both tag:<tag> and set:<tag> are allowed, to both select the range in
+Note that for \fB--dhcp-range\fP both 
+\fBtag:<tag>\fP and 
+\fBset:<tag>\fP are possible, in order to both select the range in
 use based on (eg) \fB--dhcp-host\fP, and to affect the options sent, based on
 the range selected.

-This system evolved from an earlier, more limited one and for backward
-compatibility "net:" may be used instead of "tag:" and "set:" may be
+The tag system evolved from an earlier, more limited system. For backward
+compatibility, "net:" may be used instead of "tag:" and "set:" may be
 omitted. (Except in 
 .B --dhcp-host,
 where "net:" may be used instead of "set:".) For the same reason, '#'
@@ -2475,7 +2503,7 @@ configuration option is present to activate the DHCP server
 on a particular network. (Setting \fB--bootp-dynamic\fP removes the need for
 static address mappings.) The filename
 parameter in a BOOTP request is used as a tag,
-as is the tag "bootp", allowing some control over the options returned to
+as is the tag \fBbootp\fP, allowing some control over the options returned to
 different classes of hosts.

 .SH AUTHORITATIVE CONFIGURATION
--- a/src/arp.c
+++ b/src/arp.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
+/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley

   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
--- a/src/auth.c
+++ b/src/auth.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
+/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley

   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ size_t answer_auth(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, size_t qlen, time_t n
      nameoffset = p - (unsigned char *)header;

      /* now extract name as .-concatenated string into name */
-      if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p, name, 1, 4))
+      if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 4))
 	return 0; /* bad packet */
 
      GETSHORT(qtype, p); 
@@ -513,7 +513,7 @@ size_t answer_auth(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, size_t qlen, time_t n
 		 nxdomain = 0;
 		 if ((crecp->flags & flag) && (local_query || filter_zone(zone, flag, &(crecp->addr))))
 		   {
-		     log_query(crecp->flags, name, &crecp->addr, record_source(crecp->uid), 0);
+		     log_query(crecp->flags & ~F_REVERSE, name, &crecp->addr, record_source(crecp->uid), 0);
 		     if (add_resource_record(header, limit, &trunc, nameoffset, &ansp, 
 					     daemon->auth_ttl, NULL, qtype, C_IN, 
 					     qtype == T_A ? "4" : "6", &crecp->addr))
--- a/src/blockdata.c
+++ b/src/blockdata.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
+/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley

   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
--- a/src/bpf.c
+++ b/src/bpf.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
+/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley

   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -126,112 +126,110 @@ int iface_enumerate(int family, void *parm, callback_t callback)
  
  for (addrs = head; addrs; addrs = addrs->ifa_next)
    {
-      if (addrs->ifa_addr->sa_family == family)
+      int iface_index = if_nametoindex(addrs->ifa_name);
+      
+      if (iface_index == 0 || !addrs->ifa_addr || 
+	  addrs->ifa_addr->sa_family != family ||
+	  (!addrs->ifa_netmask && family != AF_LINK))
+	continue;
+      
+      if (family == AF_INET)
 	{
-	  int iface_index = if_nametoindex(addrs->ifa_name);
-
-	  if (iface_index == 0 || !addrs->ifa_addr || 
-	      (!addrs->ifa_netmask && family != AF_LINK))
+	  struct in_addr addr, netmask, broadcast;
+	  addr = ((struct sockaddr_in *) addrs->ifa_addr)->sin_addr;
+#ifdef HAVE_BSD_NETWORK
+	  if (del_family == AF_INET && del_addr.addr4.s_addr == addr.s_addr)
 	    continue;
-
-	  if (family == AF_INET)
-	    {
-	      struct in_addr addr, netmask, broadcast;
-	      addr = ((struct sockaddr_in *) addrs->ifa_addr)->sin_addr;
-#ifdef HAVE_BSD_NETWORK
-	      if (del_family == AF_INET && del_addr.addr4.s_addr == addr.s_addr)
-		continue;
 #endif
-	      netmask = ((struct sockaddr_in *) addrs->ifa_netmask)->sin_addr;
-	      if (addrs->ifa_broadaddr)
-		broadcast = ((struct sockaddr_in *) addrs->ifa_broadaddr)->sin_addr; 
-	      else 
-		broadcast.s_addr = 0;	      
-	      if (!callback.af_inet(addr, iface_index, NULL, netmask, broadcast, parm))
-		goto err;
-	    }
-	  else if (family == AF_INET6)
-	    {
-	      struct in6_addr *addr = &((struct sockaddr_in6 *) addrs->ifa_addr)->sin6_addr;
-	      unsigned char *netmask = (unsigned char *) &((struct sockaddr_in6 *) addrs->ifa_netmask)->sin6_addr;
-	      int scope_id = ((struct sockaddr_in6 *) addrs->ifa_addr)->sin6_scope_id;
-	      int i, j, prefix = 0;
-	      u32 valid = 0xffffffff, preferred = 0xffffffff;
-	      int flags = 0;
+	  netmask = ((struct sockaddr_in *) addrs->ifa_netmask)->sin_addr;
+	  if (addrs->ifa_broadaddr)
+	    broadcast = ((struct sockaddr_in *) addrs->ifa_broadaddr)->sin_addr; 
+	  else 
+	    broadcast.s_addr = 0;	      
+	  if (!callback.af_inet(addr, iface_index, NULL, netmask, broadcast, parm))
+	    goto err;
+	}
+      else if (family == AF_INET6)
+	{
+	  struct in6_addr *addr = &((struct sockaddr_in6 *) addrs->ifa_addr)->sin6_addr;
+	  unsigned char *netmask = (unsigned char *) &((struct sockaddr_in6 *) addrs->ifa_netmask)->sin6_addr;
+	  int scope_id = ((struct sockaddr_in6 *) addrs->ifa_addr)->sin6_scope_id;
+	  int i, j, prefix = 0;
+	  u32 valid = 0xffffffff, preferred = 0xffffffff;
+	  int flags = 0;
 #ifdef HAVE_BSD_NETWORK
-	      if (del_family == AF_INET6 && IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&del_addr.addr6, addr))
-		continue;
+	  if (del_family == AF_INET6 && IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&del_addr.addr6, addr))
+	    continue;
 #endif
 #if defined(HAVE_BSD_NETWORK) && !defined(__APPLE__)
-	      struct in6_ifreq ifr6;
-
-	      memset(&ifr6, 0, sizeof(ifr6));
-	      safe_strncpy(ifr6.ifr_name, addrs->ifa_name, sizeof(ifr6.ifr_name));
+	  struct in6_ifreq ifr6;
+	  
+	  memset(&ifr6, 0, sizeof(ifr6));
+	  safe_strncpy(ifr6.ifr_name, addrs->ifa_name, sizeof(ifr6.ifr_name));
+	  
+	  ifr6.ifr_addr = *((struct sockaddr_in6 *) addrs->ifa_addr);
+	  if (fd != -1 && ioctl(fd, SIOCGIFAFLAG_IN6, &ifr6) != -1)
+	    {
+	      if (ifr6.ifr_ifru.ifru_flags6 & IN6_IFF_TENTATIVE)
+		flags |= IFACE_TENTATIVE;
+	      
+	      if (ifr6.ifr_ifru.ifru_flags6 & IN6_IFF_DEPRECATED)
+		flags |= IFACE_DEPRECATED;
 	      
-	      ifr6.ifr_addr = *((struct sockaddr_in6 *) addrs->ifa_addr);
-	      if (fd != -1 && ioctl(fd, SIOCGIFAFLAG_IN6, &ifr6) != -1)
-		{
-		  if (ifr6.ifr_ifru.ifru_flags6 & IN6_IFF_TENTATIVE)
-		    flags |= IFACE_TENTATIVE;
-		  
-		  if (ifr6.ifr_ifru.ifru_flags6 & IN6_IFF_DEPRECATED)
-		    flags |= IFACE_DEPRECATED;
-
 #ifdef IN6_IFF_TEMPORARY
-		  if (!(ifr6.ifr_ifru.ifru_flags6 & (IN6_IFF_AUTOCONF | IN6_IFF_TEMPORARY)))
-		    flags |= IFACE_PERMANENT;
+	      if (!(ifr6.ifr_ifru.ifru_flags6 & (IN6_IFF_AUTOCONF | IN6_IFF_TEMPORARY)))
+		flags |= IFACE_PERMANENT;
 #endif
-
+	      
 #ifdef IN6_IFF_PRIVACY
-		  if (!(ifr6.ifr_ifru.ifru_flags6 & (IN6_IFF_AUTOCONF | IN6_IFF_PRIVACY)))
-		    flags |= IFACE_PERMANENT;
+	      if (!(ifr6.ifr_ifru.ifru_flags6 & (IN6_IFF_AUTOCONF | IN6_IFF_PRIVACY)))
+		flags |= IFACE_PERMANENT;
 #endif
-		}
-	      
-	      ifr6.ifr_addr = *((struct sockaddr_in6 *) addrs->ifa_addr);
-	      if (fd != -1 && ioctl(fd, SIOCGIFALIFETIME_IN6, &ifr6) != -1)
-		{
-		  valid = ifr6.ifr_ifru.ifru_lifetime.ia6t_vltime;
-		  preferred = ifr6.ifr_ifru.ifru_lifetime.ia6t_pltime;
-		}
+	    }
+	  
+	  ifr6.ifr_addr = *((struct sockaddr_in6 *) addrs->ifa_addr);
+	  if (fd != -1 && ioctl(fd, SIOCGIFALIFETIME_IN6, &ifr6) != -1)
+	    {
+	      valid = ifr6.ifr_ifru.ifru_lifetime.ia6t_vltime;
+	      preferred = ifr6.ifr_ifru.ifru_lifetime.ia6t_pltime;
+	    }
 #endif
-	      	      
-	      for (i = 0; i < IN6ADDRSZ; i++, prefix += 8) 
-                if (netmask[i] != 0xff)
-		  break;
-	      
-	      if (i != IN6ADDRSZ && netmask[i]) 
-                for (j = 7; j > 0; j--, prefix++) 
-		  if ((netmask[i] & (1 << j)) == 0)
-		    break;
-	      
-	      /* voodoo to clear interface field in address */
-	      if (!option_bool(OPT_NOWILD) && IN6_IS_ADDR_LINKLOCAL(addr))
-		{
-		  addr->s6_addr[2] = 0;
-		  addr->s6_addr[3] = 0;
-		} 
-	     
-	      if (!callback.af_inet6(addr, prefix, scope_id, iface_index, flags,
-				(unsigned int) preferred, (unsigned int)valid, parm))
-		goto err;	      
-	    }
-
-#ifdef HAVE_DHCP6      
-	  else if (family == AF_LINK)
-	    { 
-	      /* Assume ethernet again here */
-	      struct sockaddr_dl *sdl = (struct sockaddr_dl *) addrs->ifa_addr;
-	      if (sdl->sdl_alen != 0 && 
-		  !callback.af_local(iface_index, ARPHRD_ETHER, LLADDR(sdl), sdl->sdl_alen, parm))
-		goto err;
-	    }
-#endif 
+	  
+	  for (i = 0; i < IN6ADDRSZ; i++, prefix += 8) 
+	    if (netmask[i] != 0xff)
+	      break;
+	  
+	  if (i != IN6ADDRSZ && netmask[i]) 
+	    for (j = 7; j > 0; j--, prefix++) 
+	      if ((netmask[i] & (1 << j)) == 0)
+		break;
+	  
+	  /* voodoo to clear interface field in address */
+	  if (!option_bool(OPT_NOWILD) && IN6_IS_ADDR_LINKLOCAL(addr))
+	    {
+	      addr->s6_addr[2] = 0;
+	      addr->s6_addr[3] = 0;
+	    } 
+	  
+	  if (!callback.af_inet6(addr, prefix, scope_id, iface_index, flags,
+				 (unsigned int) preferred, (unsigned int)valid, parm))
+	    goto err;	      
 	}
+      
+#ifdef HAVE_DHCP6      
+      else if (family == AF_LINK)
+	{ 
+	  /* Assume ethernet again here */
+	  struct sockaddr_dl *sdl = (struct sockaddr_dl *) addrs->ifa_addr;
+	  if (sdl->sdl_alen != 0 && 
+	      !callback.af_local(iface_index, ARPHRD_ETHER, LLADDR(sdl), sdl->sdl_alen, parm))
+	    goto err;
+	}
+#endif 
    }
  
  ret = 1;
-
+  
 err:
  errsave = errno;
  freeifaddrs(head); 
--- a/src/cache.c
+++ b/src/cache.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
+/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley

   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -479,7 +479,7 @@ static struct crec *cache_scan_free(char *name, union all_addr *addr, unsigned s
 	  if ((crecp->flags & F_FORWARD) && hostname_isequal(cache_get_name(crecp), name))
 	    {
 	      int rrmatch = 0;
-	      if (crecp->flags & flags & F_RR)
+	      if (addr && (crecp->flags & flags & F_RR))
 		{
 		  unsigned short rrc = (crecp->flags & F_KEYTAG) ? crecp->addr.rrblock.rrtype : crecp->addr.rrdata.rrtype;
 		  unsigned short rra = (flags & F_KEYTAG) ? addr->rrblock.rrtype : addr->rrdata.rrtype;
@@ -1448,11 +1448,17 @@ void cache_reload(void)
 	cache->flags = F_FORWARD | F_IMMORTAL | F_DS | F_CONFIG | F_NAMEP;
 	cache->ttd = daemon->local_ttl;
 	cache->name.namep = ds->name;
-	cache->addr.ds.keylen = ds->digestlen;
-	cache->addr.ds.algo = ds->algo;
-	cache->addr.ds.keytag = ds->keytag;
-	cache->addr.ds.digest = ds->digest_type;
 	cache->uid = ds->class;
+	if (ds->digestlen != 0)
+	  {
+	    cache->addr.ds.keylen = ds->digestlen;
+	    cache->addr.ds.algo = ds->algo;
+	    cache->addr.ds.keytag = ds->keytag;
+	    cache->addr.ds.digest = ds->digest_type;
+	  }
+	else
+	  cache->flags |= F_NEG | F_DNSSECOK | F_NO_RR;
+	
 	cache_hash(cache);
 	make_non_terminals(cache);
      }
@@ -1852,15 +1858,31 @@ int cache_make_stat(struct txt_record *t)
 #endif

 /* There can be names in the cache containing control chars, don't 
-   mess up logging or open security holes. */
+   mess up logging or open security holes. Also convert to all-LC
+   so that 0x20-encoding doesn't make logs look like ransom notes
+   made out of letters cut from a newspaper.
+   Overwrites daemon->workspacename */
 static char *sanitise(char *name)
 {
-  unsigned char *r;
+  unsigned char *r = (unsigned char *)name;
+  
  if (name)
-    for (r = (unsigned char *)name; *r; r++)
-      if (!isprint((int)*r))
-	return "<name unprintable>";
-
+    {
+      char *d = name = daemon->workspacename;
+      
+      for (; *r; r++, d++)
+	if (!isprint((int)*r))
+	  return "<name unprintable>";
+	else
+	  {
+	    unsigned char c = *r;
+	    
+	    *d = (char)((c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z') ? c + 'a' - 'A' : c);
+	  }
+      
+      *d = 0;
+    }
+  
  return name;
 }

--- a/src/config.h
+++ b/src/config.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
+/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley

   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
 #define DNSSEC_LIMIT_SIG_FAIL 20 /* Number of signature that can fail to validate in one answer */
 #define DNSSEC_LIMIT_CRYPTO 200 /* max no. of crypto operations to validate one query. */
 #define DNSSEC_LIMIT_NSEC3_ITERS 150 /* Max. number if iterations allowed in NSEC3 record. */
+#define DNSSEC_ASSUMED_DS_TTL 3600 /* TTL for negative DS records implied by server=/domain/ */
 #define TIMEOUT 10     /* drop UDP queries after TIMEOUT seconds */
 #define SMALL_PORT_RANGE 30 /* If DNS port range is smaller than this, use different allocation. */
 #define FORWARD_TEST 50 /* try all servers every 50 queries */
@@ -362,6 +363,11 @@ HAVE_SOCKADDR_SA_LEN
 #define HAVE_INOTIFY
 #endif

+/* This never compiles code, it's only used by the makefile to fingerprint builds. */
+#ifdef DNSMASQ_COMPILE_FLAGS
+static char *compile_flags = DNSMASQ_COMPILE_FLAGS;
+#endif
+
 /* Define a string indicating which options are in use.
   DNSMASQ_COMPILE_OPTS is only defined in dnsmasq.c */

--- a/src/conntrack.c
+++ b/src/conntrack.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
+/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley

   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
--- a/src/crypto.c
+++ b/src/crypto.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
+/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley

   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
--- a/src/dbus.c
+++ b/src/dbus.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
+/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley

   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
--- a/src/dhcp-common.c
+++ b/src/dhcp-common.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
+/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley

   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
--- a/src/dhcp-protocol.h
+++ b/src/dhcp-protocol.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
+/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley

   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
--- a/src/dhcp.c
+++ b/src/dhcp.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
+/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley

   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
--- a/src/dhcp6-protocol.h
+++ b/src/dhcp6-protocol.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
+/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley

   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
--- a/src/dhcp6.c
+++ b/src/dhcp6.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
+/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley

   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -812,7 +812,7 @@ void dhcp_construct_contexts(time_t now)
 	{
 	  if ((context->flags & CONTEXT_RA) || option_bool(OPT_RA))
 	    {
-	      /* previously constructed context has gone. advertise it's demise */
+	      /* previously constructed context has gone; advertise its demise */
 	      context->flags |= CONTEXT_OLD;
 	      context->address_lost_time = now;
 	      /* Apply same ceiling of configured lease time as in radv.c */
--- a/src/dns-protocol.h
+++ b/src/dns-protocol.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
+/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley

   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
--- a/src/dnsmasq.c
+++ b/src/dnsmasq.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
+/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley

   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ static volatile int pipewrite;
 static void set_dns_listeners(void);
 static void set_tftp_listeners(void);
 static void check_dns_listeners(time_t now);
+static void do_tcp_connection(struct listener *listener, time_t now, int slot);
 static void sig_handler(int sig);
 static void async_event(int pipe, time_t now);
 static void fatal_event(struct event_desc *ev, char *msg);
@@ -132,6 +133,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
 	 '.' or NAME_ESCAPE then all would have to be escaped, so the 
 	 presentation format would be twice as long as the spec. */
      daemon->keyname = safe_malloc((MAXDNAME * 2) + 1);
+      daemon->cname = safe_malloc((MAXDNAME * 2) + 1);
      /* one char flag per possible RR in answer section (may get extended). */
      daemon->rr_status_sz = 64;
      daemon->rr_status = safe_malloc(sizeof(*daemon->rr_status) * daemon->rr_status_sz);
@@ -929,7 +931,8 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
 	my_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("DNSSEC signature timestamps not checked until system time valid"));

      for (ds = daemon->ds; ds; ds = ds->next)
-	my_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("configured with trust anchor for %s keytag %u"),
+	my_syslog(LOG_INFO,
+		  ds->digestlen == 0 ? _("configured with negative trust anchor for %s") : _("configured with trust anchor for %s keytag %u"),
 		  ds->name[0] == 0 ? "<root>" : ds->name, ds->keytag);
    }
 #endif
@@ -961,7 +964,14 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
 	my_syslog(LOG_WARNING, _("warning: ignoring resolv-file flag because no-resolv is set"));
      daemon->resolv_files = NULL;
      if (!daemon->servers)
-	my_syslog(LOG_WARNING, _("warning: no upstream servers configured"));
+	{
+#ifdef HAVE_DBUS
+	  if (option_bool(OPT_DBUS))
+	    my_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("no upstream servers configured - please set them from DBus"));
+	  else
+#endif
+	  my_syslog(LOG_WARNING, _("warning: no upstream servers configured"));
+	}
    } 

  if (daemon->max_logs != 0)
@@ -1476,7 +1486,7 @@ static void async_event(int pipe, time_t now)
 {
  pid_t p;
  struct event_desc ev;
-  int i, check = 0;
+  int wstatus, i, check = 0;
  char *msg;
  
  /* NOTE: the memory used to return msg is leaked: use msgs in events only
@@ -1539,7 +1549,7 @@ static void async_event(int pipe, time_t now)
 		
      case EVENT_CHILD:
 	/* See Stevens 5.10 */
-	while ((p = waitpid(-1, NULL, WNOHANG)) != 0)
+	while ((p = waitpid(-1, &wstatus, WNOHANG)) != 0)
 	  if (p == -1)
 	    {
 	      if (errno != EINTR)
@@ -1550,6 +1560,20 @@ static void async_event(int pipe, time_t now)
 	      if (daemon->tcp_pids[i] == p)
 		{
 		  daemon->tcp_pids[i] = 0;
+
+		  if (!WIFEXITED(wstatus))
+		    {
+		      /* If a helper process dies, (eg with SIGSEV)
+			 log that and attempt to patch things up so that the 
+			 parent can continue to function. */
+		      my_syslog(LOG_WARNING, _("TCP helper process %u died unexpectedly"), (unsigned int)p);
+		      if (daemon->tcp_pipes[i] != -1)
+			{
+			  close(daemon->tcp_pipes[i]);
+			  daemon->tcp_pipes[i] = -1;
+			}
+		    }
+		  
 		  /* tcp_pipes == -1 && tcp_pids == 0 required to free slot */
 		  if (daemon->tcp_pipes[i] == -1)
 		    daemon->metrics[METRIC_TCP_CONNECTIONS]--;
@@ -1832,247 +1856,281 @@ static void check_dns_listeners(time_t now)
  struct listener *listener;
  struct randfd_list *rfl;
  int i;
-  int pipefd[2];
  
+  /* Note that handling events here can create or destroy fds and
+     render the result of the last poll() call invalid. Once
+     we find an fd that needs service, do it, then return to go around the
+     poll() loop again. This avoid really, really, wierd bugs. */
+
+  if (!option_bool(OPT_DEBUG))
+    for (i = 0; i < daemon->max_procs; i++)
+      if (daemon->tcp_pipes[i] != -1 &&
+	  poll_check(daemon->tcp_pipes[i], POLLIN | POLLHUP))
+	{
+	   /* Races. The child process can die before we read all of the data from the
+	      pipe, or vice versa. Therefore send tcp_pids to zero when we wait() the 
+	      process, and tcp_pipes to -1 and close the FD when we read the last
+	      of the data - indicated by cache_recv_insert returning zero.
+	      The order of these events is indeterminate, and both are needed
+	      to free the process slot. Once the child process has gone, poll()
+	      returns POLLHUP, not POLLIN, so have to check for both here. */
+	  if (!cache_recv_insert(now, daemon->tcp_pipes[i]))
+	    {
+	      close(daemon->tcp_pipes[i]);
+	      daemon->tcp_pipes[i] = -1;	
+	      /* tcp_pipes == -1 && tcp_pids == 0 required to free slot */
+	      if (daemon->tcp_pids[i] == 0)
+		daemon->metrics[METRIC_TCP_CONNECTIONS]--;
+	    }
+	  return;
+	}
+
  for (serverfdp = daemon->sfds; serverfdp; serverfdp = serverfdp->next)
    if (poll_check(serverfdp->fd, POLLIN))
-      reply_query(serverfdp->fd, now);
+      {
+	reply_query(serverfdp->fd, now);
+	return;
+      }
  
  for (i = 0; i < daemon->numrrand; i++)
    if (daemon->randomsocks[i].refcount != 0 && 
 	poll_check(daemon->randomsocks[i].fd, POLLIN))
-      reply_query(daemon->randomsocks[i].fd, now);
-
+      {
+	reply_query(daemon->randomsocks[i].fd, now);
+	return;
+      }
+  
  /* Check overflow random sockets too. */
  for (rfl = daemon->rfl_poll; rfl; rfl = rfl->next)
    if (poll_check(rfl->rfd->fd, POLLIN))
-      reply_query(rfl->rfd->fd, now);
-
-  /* Races. The child process can die before we read all of the data from the
-     pipe, or vice versa. Therefore send tcp_pids to zero when we wait() the 
-     process, and tcp_pipes to -1 and close the FD when we read the last
-     of the data - indicated by cache_recv_insert returning zero.
-     The order of these events is indeterminate, and both are needed
-     to free the process slot. Once the child process has gone, poll()
-     returns POLLHUP, not POLLIN, so have to check for both here. */
-  if (!option_bool(OPT_DEBUG))
-    for (i = 0; i < daemon->max_procs; i++)
-      if (daemon->tcp_pipes[i] != -1 &&
-	  poll_check(daemon->tcp_pipes[i], POLLIN | POLLHUP) &&
-	  !cache_recv_insert(now, daemon->tcp_pipes[i]))
-	{
-	  close(daemon->tcp_pipes[i]);
-	  daemon->tcp_pipes[i] = -1;	
-	  /* tcp_pipes == -1 && tcp_pids == 0 required to free slot */
-	  if (daemon->tcp_pids[i] == 0)
-	    daemon->metrics[METRIC_TCP_CONNECTIONS]--;
-	}
-	
+      {
+	reply_query(rfl->rfd->fd, now);
+	return;
+      }
+  
  for (listener = daemon->listeners; listener; listener = listener->next)
-    {
-      if (listener->fd != -1 && poll_check(listener->fd, POLLIN))
+    if (listener->fd != -1 && poll_check(listener->fd, POLLIN))
+      {
 	receive_query(listener, now); 
-      
-      /* check to see if we have a free tcp process slot.
-	 Note that we can't assume that because we had
-	 at least one a poll() time, that we still do.
-	 There may be more waiting connections after
-	 poll() returns then free process slots. */
-      for (i = daemon->max_procs - 1; i >= 0; i--)
-	if (daemon->tcp_pids[i] == 0 && daemon->tcp_pipes[i] == -1)
-	  break;
+	return;
+      }
+  
+  /* check to see if we have a free tcp process slot.
+     Note that we can't assume that because we had
+     at least one a poll() time, that we still do.
+     There may be more waiting connections after
+     poll() returns then free process slots. */
+  for (i = daemon->max_procs - 1; i >= 0; i--)
+    if (daemon->tcp_pids[i] == 0 && daemon->tcp_pipes[i] == -1)
+      break;

-      if (listener->tcpfd != -1 && i >= 0 && poll_check(listener->tcpfd, POLLIN))
+  if (i >= 0)
+    for (listener = daemon->listeners; listener; listener = listener->next)
+      if (listener->tcpfd != -1 && poll_check(listener->tcpfd, POLLIN))
 	{
-	  int confd, client_ok = 1;
-	  struct irec *iface = NULL;
-	  pid_t p;
-	  union mysockaddr tcp_addr;
-	  socklen_t tcp_len = sizeof(union mysockaddr);
+	  do_tcp_connection(listener, now, i);
+	  return;
+	}
+}

-	  while ((confd = accept(listener->tcpfd, NULL, NULL)) == -1 && errno == EINTR);
-	  
-	  if (confd == -1)
-	    continue;
-	  
-	  if (getsockname(confd, (struct sockaddr *)&tcp_addr, &tcp_len) == -1)
-	    {
-	      close(confd);
-	      continue;
-	    }
-	  
-	  /* Make sure that the interface list is up-to-date.
-	     
-	     We do this here as we may need the results below, and
-	     the DNS code needs them for --interface-name stuff.
+static void do_tcp_connection(struct listener *listener, time_t now, int slot)
+{
+  int confd, client_ok = 1;
+  struct irec *iface = NULL;
+  pid_t p;
+  union mysockaddr tcp_addr;
+  socklen_t tcp_len = sizeof(union mysockaddr);
+  unsigned char a = 0, *buff;
+  struct server *s; 
+  int flags, auth_dns;
+  struct in_addr netmask;
+  int pipefd[2];

-	     Multiple calls to enumerate_interfaces() per select loop are
-	     inhibited, so calls to it in the child process (which doesn't select())
-	     have no effect. This avoids two processes reading from the same
-	     netlink fd and screwing the pooch entirely.
-	  */
- 
-	  enumerate_interfaces(0);
+  while ((confd = accept(listener->tcpfd, NULL, NULL)) == -1 && errno == EINTR);
+  
+  if (confd == -1)
+    return;
+  
+  if (getsockname(confd, (struct sockaddr *)&tcp_addr, &tcp_len) == -1)
+    {
+    closeconandreturn:
+      shutdown(confd, SHUT_RDWR);
+      close(confd);
+      return;
+    }
+  
+  /* Make sure that the interface list is up-to-date.
+     
+     We do this here as we may need the results below, and
+     the DNS code needs them for --interface-name stuff.
+     
+     Multiple calls to enumerate_interfaces() per select loop are
+     inhibited, so calls to it in the child process (which doesn't select())
+     have no effect. This avoids two processes reading from the same
+     netlink fd and screwing the pooch entirely.
+  */
+  
+  enumerate_interfaces(0);
+  
+  if (option_bool(OPT_NOWILD))
+    iface = listener->iface; /* May be NULL */
+  else 
+    {
+      int if_index;
+      char intr_name[IF_NAMESIZE];
+      
+      /* if we can find the arrival interface, check it's one that's allowed */
+      if ((if_index = tcp_interface(confd, tcp_addr.sa.sa_family)) != 0 &&
+	  indextoname(listener->tcpfd, if_index, intr_name))
+	{
+	  union all_addr addr;
 	  
-	  if (option_bool(OPT_NOWILD))
-	    iface = listener->iface; /* May be NULL */
-	  else 
-	    {
-	      int if_index;
-	      char intr_name[IF_NAMESIZE];
-	      
-	      /* if we can find the arrival interface, check it's one that's allowed */
-	      if ((if_index = tcp_interface(confd, tcp_addr.sa.sa_family)) != 0 &&
-		  indextoname(listener->tcpfd, if_index, intr_name))
-		{
-		  union all_addr addr;
-		  
-		  if (tcp_addr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6)
-		    addr.addr6 = tcp_addr.in6.sin6_addr;
-		  else
-		    addr.addr4 = tcp_addr.in.sin_addr;
-		  
-		  for (iface = daemon->interfaces; iface; iface = iface->next)
-		    if (iface->index == if_index &&
-		        iface->addr.sa.sa_family == tcp_addr.sa.sa_family)
-		      break;
-		  
-		  if (!iface && !loopback_exception(listener->tcpfd, tcp_addr.sa.sa_family, &addr, intr_name))
-		    client_ok = 0;
-		}
-	      
-	      if (option_bool(OPT_CLEVERBIND))
-		iface = listener->iface; /* May be NULL */
-	      else
-		{
-		  /* Check for allowed interfaces when binding the wildcard address:
-		     we do this by looking for an interface with the same address as 
-		     the local address of the TCP connection, then looking to see if that's
-		     an allowed interface. As a side effect, we get the netmask of the
-		     interface too, for localisation. */
-		  
-		  for (iface = daemon->interfaces; iface; iface = iface->next)
-		    if (sockaddr_isequal(&iface->addr, &tcp_addr))
-		      break;
-		  
-		  if (!iface)
-		    client_ok = 0;
-		}
-	    }
-	  
-	  if (!client_ok)
-	    {
-	      shutdown(confd, SHUT_RDWR);
-	      close(confd);
-	    }
-	  else if (!option_bool(OPT_DEBUG) && pipe(pipefd) == 0 && (p = fork()) != 0)
-	    {
-	      close(pipefd[1]); /* parent needs read pipe end. */
-	      if (p == -1)
-		close(pipefd[0]);
-	      else
-		{
-#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_NETWORK
-		  /* The child process inherits the netlink socket, 
-		     which it never uses, but when the parent (us) 
-		     uses it in the future, the answer may go to the 
-		     child, resulting in the parent blocking
-		     forever awaiting the result. To avoid this
-		     the child closes the netlink socket, but there's
-		     a nasty race, since the parent may use netlink
-		     before the child has done the close.
-		     
-		     To avoid this, the parent blocks here until a 
-		     single byte comes back up the pipe, which
-		     is sent by the child after it has closed the
-		     netlink socket. */
-		  
-		  unsigned char a;
-		  read_write(pipefd[0], &a, 1, RW_READ);
-#endif
-
-		  /* i holds index of free slot */
-		  daemon->tcp_pids[i] = p;
-		  daemon->tcp_pipes[i] = pipefd[0];
-		  daemon->metrics[METRIC_TCP_CONNECTIONS]++;
-		  if (daemon->metrics[METRIC_TCP_CONNECTIONS] > daemon->max_procs_used)
-		    daemon->max_procs_used = daemon->metrics[METRIC_TCP_CONNECTIONS];
-		}
-	      close(confd);
-
-	      /* The child can use up to TCP_MAX_QUERIES ids, so skip that many. */
-	      daemon->log_id += TCP_MAX_QUERIES;
-#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
-	      /* It can do more if making DNSSEC queries too. */
-	      if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID))
-		daemon->log_id += daemon->limit[LIMIT_WORK];
-#endif
-	    }
+	  if (tcp_addr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6)
+	    addr.addr6 = tcp_addr.in6.sin6_addr;
 	  else
-	    {
-	      unsigned char *buff;
-	      struct server *s; 
-	      int flags;
-	      struct in_addr netmask;
-	      int auth_dns;
-	   
-	      if (iface)
-		{
-		  netmask = iface->netmask;
-		  auth_dns = iface->dns_auth;
-		}
-	      else
-		{
-		  netmask.s_addr = 0;
-		  auth_dns = 0;
-		}
-
-	      /* Arrange for SIGALRM after CHILD_LIFETIME seconds to
-		 terminate the process. */
-	      if (!option_bool(OPT_DEBUG))
-		{
-#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_NETWORK
-		  /* See comment above re: netlink socket. */
-		  unsigned char a = 0;
-
-		  close(daemon->netlinkfd);
-		  read_write(pipefd[1], &a, 1, RW_WRITE);
-#endif		  
-		  alarm(CHILD_LIFETIME);
-		  close(pipefd[0]); /* close read end in child. */
-		  daemon->pipe_to_parent = pipefd[1];
-		}
-
-	      /* The connected socket inherits non-blocking
-		 attribute from the listening socket. 
-		 Reset that here. */
-	      if ((flags = fcntl(confd, F_GETFL, 0)) != -1)
-		while(retry_send(fcntl(confd, F_SETFL, flags & ~O_NONBLOCK)));
-	      
-	      buff = tcp_request(confd, now, &tcp_addr, netmask, auth_dns);
-	       
-	      if (buff)
-		free(buff);
-	      
-	      for (s = daemon->servers; s; s = s->next)
-		if (s->tcpfd != -1)
-		  {
-		    shutdown(s->tcpfd, SHUT_RDWR);
-		    close(s->tcpfd);
-		    s->tcpfd = -1;
-		  }
-	      
-	      if (!option_bool(OPT_DEBUG))
-		{
-		  close(daemon->pipe_to_parent);
-		  flush_log();
-		  _exit(0);
-		}
-	    }
+	    addr.addr4 = tcp_addr.in.sin_addr;
+	  
+	  for (iface = daemon->interfaces; iface; iface = iface->next)
+	    if (iface->index == if_index &&
+		iface->addr.sa.sa_family == tcp_addr.sa.sa_family)
+	      break;
+	  
+	  if (!iface && !loopback_exception(listener->tcpfd, tcp_addr.sa.sa_family, &addr, intr_name))
+	    client_ok = 0;
+	}
+      
+      if (option_bool(OPT_CLEVERBIND))
+	iface = listener->iface; /* May be NULL */
+      else
+	{
+	  /* Check for allowed interfaces when binding the wildcard address:
+	     we do this by looking for an interface with the same address as 
+	     the local address of the TCP connection, then looking to see if that's
+	     an allowed interface. As a side effect, we get the netmask of the
+	     interface too, for localisation. */
+	  
+	  for (iface = daemon->interfaces; iface; iface = iface->next)
+	    if (sockaddr_isequal(&iface->addr, &tcp_addr))
+	      break;
+	  
+	  if (!iface)
+	    client_ok = 0;
 	}
    }
+  
+  if (!client_ok)
+    goto closeconandreturn;
+  
+  if (!option_bool(OPT_DEBUG))
+    {
+      if (pipe(pipefd) == -1)
+	goto closeconandreturn; /* pipe failed */
+            
+      if ((p = fork()) == -1)
+	{
+	  /* fork failed */
+	  close(pipefd[0]);
+	  close(pipefd[1]);
+	  goto closeconandreturn;
+	}
+
+      if (p != 0)
+	{
+	  /* fork() done: parent side */
+	  close(pipefd[1]); /* parent needs read pipe end. */
+      
+#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_NETWORK
+	  /* The child process inherits the netlink socket, 
+	     which it never uses, but when the parent (us) 
+	     uses it in the future, the answer may go to the 
+	     child, resulting in the parent blocking
+	     forever awaiting the result. To avoid this
+	     the child closes the netlink socket, but there's
+	     a nasty race, since the parent may use netlink
+	     before the child has done the close.
+	     
+	     To avoid this, the parent blocks here until a 
+	     single byte comes back up the pipe, which
+	     is sent by the child after it has closed the
+	     netlink socket. */
+	  
+	  read_write(pipefd[0], &a, 1, RW_READ);
+#endif
+	  
+
+	  daemon->tcp_pids[slot] = p;
+	  daemon->tcp_pipes[slot] = pipefd[0];
+	  daemon->metrics[METRIC_TCP_CONNECTIONS]++;
+	  if (daemon->metrics[METRIC_TCP_CONNECTIONS] > daemon->max_procs_used)
+	    daemon->max_procs_used = daemon->metrics[METRIC_TCP_CONNECTIONS];
+	
+	  close(confd);
+	  
+	  /* The child can use up to TCP_MAX_QUERIES ids, so skip that many. */
+	  daemon->log_id += TCP_MAX_QUERIES;
+#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
+	  /* It can do more if making DNSSEC queries too. */
+	  if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID))
+	    daemon->log_id += daemon->limit[LIMIT_WORK];
+#endif
+	  
+	  return;
+	}
+    }
+         
+  if (iface)
+    {
+      netmask = iface->netmask;
+      auth_dns = iface->dns_auth;
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      netmask.s_addr = 0;
+      auth_dns = 0;
+    }
+  
+  /* Arrange for SIGALRM after CHILD_LIFETIME seconds to
+     terminate the process. */
+  if (!option_bool(OPT_DEBUG))
+    {
+#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_NETWORK
+      /* See comment above re: netlink socket. */
+      close(daemon->netlinkfd);
+      read_write(pipefd[1], &a, 1, RW_WRITE);
+#endif		  
+      alarm(CHILD_LIFETIME);
+      close(pipefd[0]); /* close read end in child. */
+      daemon->pipe_to_parent = pipefd[1];
+    }
+
+  /* The connected socket inherits non-blocking
+     attribute from the listening socket. 
+     Reset that here. */
+  if ((flags = fcntl(confd, F_GETFL, 0)) != -1)
+    while(retry_send(fcntl(confd, F_SETFL, flags & ~O_NONBLOCK)));
+
+  buff = tcp_request(confd, now, &tcp_addr, netmask, auth_dns);
+	      
+  if (buff)
+    free(buff);
+  
+  for (s = daemon->servers; s; s = s->next)
+    if (s->tcpfd != -1)
+      {
+	shutdown(s->tcpfd, SHUT_RDWR);
+	close(s->tcpfd);
+	s->tcpfd = -1;
+      }
+  
+  if (!option_bool(OPT_DEBUG))
+    {
+      close(daemon->pipe_to_parent);
+      flush_log();
+      _exit(0);
+    }
 }

+
 #ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
 /* If a DNSSEC query over UDP returns a truncated answer,
   we swap to the TCP path. This routine is responsible for forking
@@ -2084,7 +2142,7 @@ static void check_dns_listeners(time_t now)
   cache_recv_insert() calls pop_and_retry_query() after the result 
   arrives via the pipe to the parent. */
 int swap_to_tcp(struct frec *forward, time_t now, int status, struct dns_header *header,
-		ssize_t *plen, int class, struct server *server, int *keycount, int *validatecount)
+		ssize_t *plen, char *name, int class, struct server *server, int *keycount, int *validatecount)
 {
  struct server *s;

@@ -2158,8 +2216,7 @@ int swap_to_tcp(struct frec *forward, time_t now, int status, struct dns_header
 	}
    }
  
-  status = tcp_from_udp(now, status, header, plen, class, daemon->namebuff, daemon->keyname, 
-			server, keycount, validatecount);
+  status = tcp_from_udp(now, status, header, plen, class, name, server, keycount, validatecount);
  
  /* close upstream connections. */
  for (s = daemon->servers; s; s = s->next)
--- a/src/dnsmasq.h
+++ b/src/dnsmasq.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
+/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
 
   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
   along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
 */

-#define COPYRIGHT "Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley"
+#define COPYRIGHT "Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley"

 /* We do defines that influence behavior of stdio.h, so complain
   if included too early. */
@@ -279,7 +279,9 @@ struct event_desc {
 #define OPT_CACHE_RR       71
 #define OPT_LOCALHOST_SERVICE  72
 #define OPT_LOG_PROTO      73
-#define OPT_LAST           74
+#define OPT_NO_0x20        74
+#define OPT_DO_0x20        75
+#define OPT_LAST           76

 #define OPTION_BITS (sizeof(unsigned int)*8)
 #define OPTION_SIZE ( (OPT_LAST/OPTION_BITS)+((OPT_LAST%OPTION_BITS)!=0) )
@@ -774,12 +776,13 @@ struct dyndir {
 #define FREC_DO_QUESTION       64
 #define FREC_HAS_PHEADER      128
 #define FREC_GONE_TO_TCP      256
+#define FREC_ANSWER           512

 struct frec {
  struct frec_src {
    union mysockaddr source;
    union all_addr dest;
-    unsigned int iface, log_id;
+    unsigned int iface, log_id, encode_bitmap, *encode_bigmap;
    int fd;
    unsigned short orig_id, udp_pkt_size;
    struct frec_src *next;
@@ -1245,7 +1248,7 @@ extern struct daemon {
  char *namebuff; /* MAXDNAME size buffer */
  char *workspacename;
 #ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
-  char *keyname; /* MAXDNAME size buffer */
+  char *keyname, *cname; /* MAXDNAME size buffer */
  unsigned long *rr_status; /* ceiling in TTL from DNSSEC or zero for insecure */
  int rr_status_sz;
  int dnssec_no_time_check;
@@ -1386,12 +1389,12 @@ int is_rev_synth(int flag, union all_addr *addr, char *name);
 /* rfc1035.c */
 int do_doctor(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, char *namebuff);
 int extract_name(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char **pp, 
-                 char *name, int isExtract, int extrabytes);
+                 char *name, int func, unsigned int parm);
 unsigned char *skip_name(unsigned char *ansp, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, int extrabytes);
 unsigned char *skip_questions(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen);
 unsigned char *skip_section(unsigned char *ansp, int count, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen);
-unsigned int extract_request(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, 
-			       char *name, unsigned short *typep);
+unsigned int extract_request(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, char *name,
+			     unsigned short *typep, unsigned short *classp);
 void setup_reply(struct dns_header *header, unsigned int flags, int ede);
 int extract_addresses(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, char *name,
 		      time_t now, struct ipsets *ipsets, struct ipsets *nftsets, int is_sign,
@@ -1413,6 +1416,11 @@ int add_resource_record(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, int *truncp,
 			int *offset, unsigned short type, unsigned short class, char *format, ...);
 int in_arpa_name_2_addr(char *namein, union all_addr *addrp);
 int private_net(struct in_addr addr, int ban_localhost);
+/* extract_name ops */
+#define EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT   1
+#define EXTR_NAME_COMPARE   2
+#define EXTR_NAME_NOCASE    3
+#define EXTR_NAME_FLIP      4

 /* auth.c */
 #ifdef HAVE_AUTH
@@ -1522,7 +1530,7 @@ void return_reply(time_t now, struct frec *forward, struct dns_header *header, s
 #ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
 void pop_and_retry_query(struct frec *forward, int status, time_t now);
 int tcp_from_udp(time_t now, int status, struct dns_header *header, ssize_t *n, 
-		 int class, char *name, char *keyname, struct server *server, 
+		 int class, char *name, struct server *server, 
 		 int *keycount, int *validatecount);
 #endif
 unsigned char *tcp_request(int confd, time_t now,
@@ -1646,7 +1654,7 @@ void send_event(int fd, int event, int data, char *msg);
 void clear_cache_and_reload(time_t now);
 #ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
 int swap_to_tcp(struct frec *forward, time_t now, int status, struct dns_header *header,
-		ssize_t *plen, int class, struct server *server, int *keycount, int *validatecount);
+		ssize_t *plen, char *name, int class, struct server *server, int *keycount, int *validatecount);
 #endif

 /* netlink.c */
--- a/src/dnssec.c
+++ b/src/dnssec.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /* dnssec.c is Copyright (c) 2012 Giovanni Bajo <rasky@develer.com>
-           and Copyright (c) 2012-2023 Simon Kelley
+           and Copyright (c) 2012-2025 Simon Kelley

   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ static int get_rdata(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, struct rdata_state
 	      /* domain-name, canonicalise */
 	      int len;
 	      
-	      if (!extract_name(header, plen, &state->ip, state->buff, 1, 0) ||
+	      if (!extract_name(header, plen, &state->ip, state->buff, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0) ||
 		  (len = to_wire(state->buff)) == 0)
 		continue;
 	      
@@ -339,7 +339,7 @@ static int explore_rrset(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, int class, int

      pstart = p;
      
-      if (!(res = extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 0, 10)))
+      if (!(res = extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, EXTR_NAME_COMPARE, 10)))
 	return 0; /* bad packet */
      
      GETSHORT(stype, p);
@@ -374,14 +374,14 @@ static int explore_rrset(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, int class, int
 	      if (gotkey)
 		{
 		  /* If there's more than one SIG, ensure they all have same keyname */
-		  if (extract_name(header, plen, &p, keyname, 0, 0) != 1)
+		  if (extract_name(header, plen, &p, keyname, EXTR_NAME_COMPARE, 0) != 1)
 		    return 0;
 		}
 	      else
 		{
 		  gotkey = 1;
 		  
-		  if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, keyname, 1, 0))
+		  if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, keyname, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0))
 		    return 0;
 		  
 		  /* RFC 4035 5.3.1 says that the Signer's Name field MUST equal
@@ -503,7 +503,7 @@ static int validate_rrset(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, in
      GETLONG(sig_inception, p);
      GETSHORT(key_tag, p);
      
-      if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, keyname, 1, 0))
+      if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, keyname, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0))
 	return STAT_BOGUS;

      if (!time_check)
@@ -568,7 +568,7 @@ static int validate_rrset(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, in
 	  
 	  p = rrset[i];
 	  
-	  if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 1, 10)) 
+	  if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 10)) 
 	    return STAT_BOGUS;

 	  name_start = name;
@@ -661,7 +661,7 @@ static int validate_rrset(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, in
      
      /* namebuff used for workspace above, restore to leave unchanged on exit */
      p = (unsigned char*)(rrset[0]);
-      if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 1, 0))
+      if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0))
 	return STAT_BOGUS;

      if (key)
@@ -727,7 +727,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
  static unsigned char **cached_digest;
  static size_t cached_digest_size = 0;

-  if (ntohs(header->qdcount) != 1 || RCODE(header) != NOERROR || !extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 1, 4))
+  if (ntohs(header->qdcount) != 1 || RCODE(header) != NOERROR || !extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 4))
    return STAT_BOGUS | DNSSEC_FAIL_NOKEY;

  GETSHORT(qtype, p);
@@ -752,7 +752,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
  for (j = ntohs(header->ancount); j != 0; j--) 
    {
      /* Ensure we have type, class  TTL and length */
-      if (!(rc = extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 0, 10)))
+      if (!(rc = extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, EXTR_NAME_COMPARE, 10)))
 	return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
  
      GETSHORT(qtype, p); 
@@ -904,7 +904,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
 	      for (j = ntohs(header->ancount); j != 0; j--) 
 		{
 		  /* Ensure we have type, class  TTL and length */
-		  if (!(rc = extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 0, 10)))
+		  if (!(rc = extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, EXTR_NAME_COMPARE, 10)))
 		    return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
 		  
 		  GETSHORT(qtype, p); 
@@ -997,49 +997,57 @@ int dnssec_validate_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char
  unsigned long ttl;
  union all_addr a;

-  if (ntohs(header->qdcount) != 1 ||
-      !(p = skip_name(p, header, plen, 4)))
-    return STAT_BOGUS;
-  
-  GETSHORT(qtype, p);
-  GETSHORT(qclass, p);
-
-  if (qtype != T_DS || qclass != class)
-    return STAT_BOGUS;
-
-  /* A SERVFAIL answer has been seen to a DS query not at start of authority,
+   /* A SERVFAIL answer has been seen to a DS query not at start of authority,
     so treat it as such and continue to search for a DS or proof of no existence
     further down the tree. */
  if (RCODE(header) == SERVFAIL)
    servfail = neganswer = nons = 1;
  else
-    {
-      rc = dnssec_validate_reply(now, header, plen, name, keyname, NULL, 0, &neganswer, &nons, &neg_ttl, validate_counter);
+    rc = dnssec_validate_reply(now, header, plen, name, keyname, NULL, 0, &neganswer, &nons, &neg_ttl, validate_counter);
  
+  p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
+  if (ntohs(header->qdcount) != 1 ||
+      !extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 4))
+    return STAT_BOGUS;
+  
+  GETSHORT(qtype, p);
+  GETSHORT(qclass, p);
+  
+  if (qtype != T_DS || qclass != class)
+    return STAT_BOGUS;
+
+  if (!servfail)
+    {
      if (STAT_ISEQUAL(rc, STAT_INSECURE))
 	{
-	  my_syslog(LOG_WARNING, _("Insecure DS reply received for %s, check domain configuration and upstream DNS server DNSSEC support"), name);
-	  log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_UPSTREAM, name, NULL, "BOGUS DS - not secure", 0);
-	  return STAT_BOGUS | DNSSEC_FAIL_INDET;
+	  if (lookup_domain(name, F_DOMAINSRV, NULL, NULL))
+	    {
+	      my_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("Insecure reply received for DS %s, assuming non-DNSSEC domain-specific server."), name);
+	      neganswer = 1;
+	      nons = 0; /* If we're faking a DS, fake one with an NS. */
+	      neg_ttl = DNSSEC_ASSUMED_DS_TTL;
+	    }
+	  else
+	    {
+	      my_syslog(LOG_WARNING, _("Insecure DS reply received for %s, check domain configuration and upstream DNS server DNSSEC support"), name);
+	      log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_UPSTREAM, name, NULL, "BOGUS DS - not secure", 0);
+	      return STAT_BOGUS | DNSSEC_FAIL_INDET;
+	    }
 	}
-      
-      p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
-      if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 1, 4))
-	return STAT_BOGUS;
-
-      p += 4; /* qtype, qclass */
-      
-      /* If the key needed to validate the DS is on the same domain as the DS, we'll
-	 loop getting nowhere. Stop that now. This can happen of the DS answer comes
-	 from the DS's zone, and not the parent zone. */
-      if (STAT_ISEQUAL(rc, STAT_NEED_KEY) && hostname_isequal(name, keyname))
+      else
 	{
-	  log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_UPSTREAM, name, NULL, "BOGUS DS", 0);
-	  return STAT_BOGUS;
+	  if (STAT_ISEQUAL(rc, STAT_NEED_KEY) && hostname_isequal(name, keyname))
+	    {
+	      /* If the key needed to validate the DS is on the same domain as the DS, we'll
+		 loop getting nowhere. Stop that now. This can happen of the DS answer comes
+		 from the DS's zone, and not the parent zone. */
+	      log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_UPSTREAM, name, NULL, "BOGUS DS", 0);
+	      return STAT_BOGUS;
+	    }
+
+	  if (!STAT_ISEQUAL(rc, STAT_SECURE))
+	    return rc;
 	}
-  
-      if (!STAT_ISEQUAL(rc, STAT_SECURE))
-	return rc;
    }
  
  if (!neganswer)
@@ -1050,7 +1058,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char
 	{
 	  unsigned char *psave;

-	  if (!(rc = extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 0, 10)))
+	  if (!(rc = extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, EXTR_NAME_COMPARE, 10)))
 	    return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
 	  
 	  GETSHORT(atype, p);
@@ -1129,9 +1137,19 @@ int dnssec_validate_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char
      /* We only cache validated DS records, DNSSECOK flag hijacked 
 	 to store presence/absence of NS. */
      if (nons)
-	flags &= ~F_DNSSECOK;
+	{
+	  if (lookup_domain(name, F_DOMAINSRV, NULL, NULL))
+	    {
+	      my_syslog(LOG_WARNING, _("Negative DS reply without NS record received for %s, assuming non-DNSSEC domain-specific server."), name);
+	      nons = 0;
+	    }
+	  else
+	    /* We only cache validated DS records, DNSSECOK flag hijacked 
+	       to store presence/absence of NS. */
+	    flags &= ~F_DNSSECOK;
+	}
    }
-  
+
  cache_start_insert();
  
  /* Use TTL from NSEC for negative cache entries */
@@ -1231,12 +1249,13 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsi
      int sig_labels, name_labels;

      p = nsecs[i];
-      if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, workspace1, 1, 10))
+      if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, workspace1, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 10))
 	return DNSSEC_FAIL_BADPACKET;
      p += 8; /* class, type, TTL */
      GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
      psave = p;
-      if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, workspace2, 1, 0))
+
+      if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, workspace2, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0))
 	return DNSSEC_FAIL_BADPACKET;

      /* If NSEC comes from wildcard expansion, use original wildcard
@@ -1258,7 +1277,22 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsi
 	  workspace1--;
 	  *workspace1 = '*';
 	}
-	  
+
+      rdlen -= p - psave;
+      /* rdlen is now length of type map, and p points to it 
+	 packet checked to be as long as rdlen implies in prove_non_existence() */
+      
+      /* check that the first typemap is complete. */
+      if (rdlen < 2 || rdlen < p[1] + 2)
+	return DNSSEC_FAIL_BADPACKET;
+
+      /* RFC 6672 5.3.4.1. */
+#define DNAME_OFFSET (T_DNAME >> 3)
+#define DNAME_MASK (0x80 >> (T_DNAME & 0x07))
+      if (p[0] == 0 && (p[1] >= DNAME_OFFSET + 1) && (p[2 + DNAME_OFFSET] & DNAME_MASK) != 0 &&
+	  hostname_issubdomain(name, workspace1) == 1)
+	return DNSSEC_FAIL_NONSEC;
+      
      rc = hostname_cmp(workspace1, name);
      
      if (rc == 0)
@@ -1269,16 +1303,12 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsi

 	  /* NSEC with the same name as the RR we're testing, check
 	     that the type in question doesn't appear in the type map */
-	  rdlen -= p - psave;
-	  /* rdlen is now length of type map, and p points to it 
-	     packet checked to be as long as rdlen implies in prove_non_existence() */
-	  
-	  /* If we can prove that there's no NS record, return that information. */
-	  if (nons && rdlen >= 2 && p[0] == 0 && (p[2] & (0x80 >> T_NS)) != 0)
-	    *nons = 0;
-	  
-	  if (rdlen >= 2 && p[0] == 0)
+	  if (p[0] == 0 && p[1] >= 1)
 	    {
+	      /* If we can prove that there's no NS record, return that information. */
+	      if (nons && (p[2] & (0x80 >> T_NS)) != 0)
+		*nons = 0;
+	    
 	      /* A CNAME answer would also be valid, so if there's a CNAME is should 
 		 have been returned. */
 	      if ((p[2] & (0x80 >> T_CNAME)) != 0)
@@ -1290,10 +1320,10 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsi
 	      if (name_labels != 0 && type == T_DS && (p[2] & (0x80 >> T_SOA)) != 0)
 		return DNSSEC_FAIL_NONSEC;
 	    }
-
-	  while (rdlen >= 2)
+	  
+	  while (rdlen > 0)
 	    {
-	      if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
+	      if (rdlen < 2 || rdlen < p[1] + 2)
 		return DNSSEC_FAIL_BADPACKET;
 	      
 	      if (p[0] == type >> 8)
@@ -1400,7 +1430,7 @@ static int check_nsec3_coverage(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, int dige
  for (i = 0; i < nsec_count; i++)
    if ((p = nsecs[i]))
      {
-       	if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, workspace1, 1, 10) ||
+       	if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, workspace1, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 10) ||
 	    !(base32_len = base32_decode(workspace1, (unsigned char *)workspace2)))
 	  return 0;
 	
@@ -1433,7 +1463,11 @@ static int check_nsec3_coverage(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, int dige
 		p += hash_len; /* skip next-domain hash */
 		rdlen -= p - psave;

-		if (rdlen >= 2 && p[0] == 0)
+		/* check that the first typemap is complete. */
+		if (rdlen < 2 || rdlen < p[1] + 2)
+		  return DNSSEC_FAIL_BADPACKET;
+		
+		if (p[0] == 0 && p[1] >= 1)
 		  {
 		    /* If we can prove that there's no NS record, return that information. */
 		    if (nons && (p[2] & (0x80 >> T_NS)) != 0)
@@ -1451,8 +1485,11 @@ static int check_nsec3_coverage(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, int dige
 		      return 0;
 		  }

-		while (rdlen >= 2)
+		while (rdlen > 0)
 		  {
+		    if (rdlen < 2 || rdlen < p[1] + 2)
+		      return DNSSEC_FAIL_BADPACKET;
+
 		    if (p[0] == type >> 8)
 		      {
 			/* Does the NSEC3 say our type exists? */
@@ -1609,7 +1646,7 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, uns
      for (i = 0; i < nsec_count; i++)
 	if ((p = nsecs[i]))
 	  {
-	    if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, workspace1, 1, 0))
+	    if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, workspace1, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0))
 	      return DNSSEC_FAIL_BADPACKET;

 	    if (!(base32_len = base32_decode(workspace1, (unsigned char *)workspace2)))
@@ -1684,7 +1721,7 @@ static int prove_non_existence(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *key
    {
      unsigned char *pstart = p;
      
-      if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, daemon->workspacename, 1, 10))
+      if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, daemon->workspacename, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 10))
 	return DNSSEC_FAIL_BADPACKET;
 	  
      GETSHORT(type, p); 
@@ -1735,7 +1772,7 @@ static int prove_non_existence(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *key
 		{
 		  unsigned char *psav;

-		  if (!(res = extract_name(header, plen, &p1, daemon->workspacename, 0, 10)))
+		  if (!(res = extract_name(header, plen, &p1, daemon->workspacename, EXTR_NAME_COMPARE, 10)))
 		    return DNSSEC_FAIL_BADPACKET;
 		  
 		   GETSHORT(type1, p1); 
@@ -1924,11 +1961,13 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
  static unsigned char **targets = NULL;
  static int target_sz = 0;

-  unsigned char *ans_start, *p1, *p2;
-  int type1, class1, rdlen1 = 0, type2, class2, rdlen2, qclass, qtype, targetidx;
-  int i, j, rc = STAT_INSECURE;
+  unsigned char *ans_start, *p1, *p2, *p3;
+  int type1, class1, rdlen1 = 0, type2, class2, rdlen2, qclass, qtype, targetidx, gotdname;
+  int i, j, k, rc = STAT_INSECURE;
  int secure = STAT_SECURE;
  int rc_nsec;
+  unsigned long ttl;
+  
  /* extend rr_status if necessary */
  if (daemon->rr_status_sz < ntohs(header->ancount) + ntohs(header->nscount))
    {
@@ -1965,7 +2004,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
  targets[0] = p1;
  targetidx = 1;
   
-  if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p1, name, 1, 4))
+  if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p1, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 4))
    return STAT_BOGUS;
  
  GETSHORT(qtype, p1);
@@ -1975,27 +2014,119 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
  /* Can't validate an RRSIG query */
  if (qtype == T_RRSIG)
    return STAT_INSECURE;
+
+  /* Find CNAME targets. */
+  for (gotdname = i = 0; i < ntohs(header->ancount); i++) 
+    {
+      if (!(p1 = skip_name(p1, header, plen, 10)))
+	return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
+      
+      GETSHORT(type1, p1); 
+      GETSHORT(class1, p1);
+      p1 += 4; /* TTL */
+      GETSHORT(rdlen1, p1);  
+      
+      if (type1 == T_DNAME)
+	gotdname = 1;
+      
+      if (qtype != T_CNAME && qtype != T_ANY && type1 == T_CNAME && class1 == qclass)
+	{
+	  if (!expand_workspace(&targets, &target_sz, targetidx))
+	    return STAT_BOGUS;
+	  
+	  targets[targetidx++] = p1; /* pointer to target name */
+	}
+      
+      if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p1, plen, rdlen1))
+	return STAT_BOGUS;
+    }
  
-  if (qtype != T_CNAME && qtype != T_ANY)
-    for (j = ntohs(header->ancount); j != 0; j--) 
+  /* A DNAME capable of sythesising a CNAME means we don't need to validate the CNAME,
+     we can just assume that it's valid. RFC 4035 3.2.3 */
+  if (gotdname)
+    for (p1 = ans_start, i = 0; i < ntohs(header->ancount); i++) 
      {
-	if (!(p1 = skip_name(p1, header, plen, 10)))
+	if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p1, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 10))
 	  return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
 	
-	GETSHORT(type2, p1); 
-	p1 += 6; /* class, TTL */
-	GETSHORT(rdlen2, p1);  
+	GETSHORT(type1, p1); 
+	GETSHORT(class1, p1);
+	p1 += 4; /* TTL */
+	GETSHORT(rdlen1, p1);  
 	
-	if (type2 == T_CNAME)
+	if (type1 != T_DNAME)
 	  {
-	    if (!expand_workspace(&targets, &target_sz, targetidx))
+	    if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p1, plen, rdlen1))
 	      return STAT_BOGUS;
-	    
-	    targets[targetidx++] = p1; /* pointer to target name */
 	  }
-	
-	if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p1, plen, rdlen2))
-	  return STAT_BOGUS;
+	else
+	  {
+	    if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p1, keyname, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0))
+	      return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
+	    
+	    /* We now have the name of the DNAME in name, and the target in keyname.
+	       Look for any CNAMEs which could have been synthesised from this DNAME
+	       and pre-qualify them. */
+	    for (p2 = ans_start, j = 0; j < ntohs(header->ancount); j++)
+	      {
+		if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p2, daemon->cname, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 10))
+		  return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
+		
+		GETSHORT(type2, p2); 
+		GETSHORT(class2, p2);
+		GETLONG(ttl, p2);
+		GETSHORT(rdlen2, p2);  
+		
+		if (type2 != T_CNAME || class2 != class1)
+		  {
+		    if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p2, plen, rdlen2))
+		      return STAT_BOGUS;
+		  }
+		else
+		  {
+		    size_t name_prefix_len = strlen(daemon->cname) - strlen(name);
+		    
+		    if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p2, daemon->workspacename, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0))
+		      return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
+		    
+		    /* We have the name of the CNAME in daemon->cname, and the target in daemon->workspacename.
+		       See if the CNAME was sythesised from the DNAME.
+		       CNAME must be <subdomain>.<dname>
+		       CNAME target must be <subdomain>.<dname_target>
+		       <subdomain>s must match for name and target. */ 
+		    if (hostname_issubdomain(name, daemon->cname) == 1 &&
+			hostname_issubdomain(keyname, daemon->workspacename) == 1 &&
+			name_prefix_len == strlen(daemon->workspacename) - strlen(keyname))
+		      {
+			char save = daemon->cname[name_prefix_len];
+			daemon->cname[name_prefix_len] = 0;
+			daemon->workspacename[name_prefix_len] = 0;
+			
+			if (hostname_isequal(daemon->cname, daemon->workspacename))
+			  {
+			    /* pre-qualify this as validated */
+			    daemon->rr_status[j] = ttl > 0 ? ttl : 1;
+			    
+			    /* and remove it from the targets we need to have validated answers to. */
+			    if (class2 == qclass)
+			      {
+				daemon->cname[name_prefix_len] = save;
+				for (k = 0; k <targetidx; k++)
+				  if ((p3 = targets[k]))
+				    {
+				      int rc1;
+				      if (!(rc1 = extract_name(header, plen, &p3, daemon->cname, EXTR_NAME_COMPARE, 0)))
+					return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
+				      
+				      if (rc1 == 1)
+					targets[k] = NULL;
+				    }
+			      }
+			  }
+		      }
+		  }
+	      }
+	  }
      }
  
  for (p1 = ans_start, i = 0; i < ntohs(header->ancount) + ntohs(header->nscount); i++)
@@ -2003,7 +2134,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
      if (i != 0 && !ADD_RDLEN(header, p1, plen, rdlen1))
 	return STAT_BOGUS;
      
-      if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p1, name, 1, 10))
+      if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p1, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 10))
 	return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
      
      GETSHORT(type1, p1);
@@ -2014,11 +2145,15 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
      /* Don't try and validate RRSIGs! */
      if (type1 == T_RRSIG)
 	continue;
+
+      /* Pre-validated by DNAME above don't validate. */
+      if (daemon->rr_status[i] != 0)
+	continue;
      
      /* Check if we've done this RRset already */
      for (p2 = ans_start, j = 0; j < i; j++)
 	{
-	  if (!(rc = extract_name(header, plen, &p2, name, 0, 10)))
+	  if (!(rc = extract_name(header, plen, &p2, name, EXTR_NAME_COMPARE, 10)))
 	    return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
 	  
 	  GETSHORT(type2, p2);
@@ -2115,7 +2250,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
 		    if ((p2 = targets[j]))
 		      {
 			int rc1;
-			if (!(rc1 = extract_name(header, plen, &p2, name, 0, 10)))
+			if (!(rc1 = extract_name(header, plen, &p2, name, EXTR_NAME_COMPARE, 10)))
 			  return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
 			
 			if (class1 == qclass && rc1 == 1 && (type1 == T_CNAME || type1 == qtype || qtype == T_ANY ))
@@ -2149,13 +2284,15 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
 	if (neganswer)
 	  *neganswer = 1;
 	
-	if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p2, name, 1, 10))
+	if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p2, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 10))
 	  return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
 	
 	/* NXDOMAIN or NODATA reply, unanswered question is (name, qclass, qtype) */
 	
 	/* For anything other than a DS record, this situation is OK if either
-	   the answer is in an unsigned zone, or there's a NSEC records. */
+	   the answer is in an unsigned zone, or there's NSEC records.
+	   For a DS record, we return INSECURE, which almost always turns
+	   into BOGUS in the caller. */
 	if ((rc_nsec = prove_non_existence(header, plen, keyname, name, qtype, qclass, NULL, nons, nsec_ttl, validate_counter)) != 0)
 	  {
 	    if (rc_nsec & DNSSEC_FAIL_WORK)
@@ -2163,7 +2300,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch

 	    /* Empty DS without NSECS */
 	    if (qtype == T_DS)
-	      return STAT_BOGUS | rc_nsec;
+	      return STAT_INSECURE;
 	    
 	    if ((rc_nsec & (DNSSEC_FAIL_NONSEC | DNSSEC_FAIL_NSEC3_ITERS)) &&
 		!STAT_ISEQUAL((rc = zone_status(name, qclass, keyname, now)), STAT_SECURE))
--- a/src/domain-match.c
+++ b/src/domain-match.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
+/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley

   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -94,8 +94,7 @@ void build_server_array(void)
   server=/.example.com/ works.

   A flag of F_SERVER returns an upstream server only.
-   A flag of F_DNSSECOK returns a DNSSEC capable server only and
-   also disables NODOTS servers from consideration.
+   A flag of F_DNSSECOK disables NODOTS servers from consideration.
   A flag of F_DOMAINSRV returns a domain-specific server only.
   A flag of F_CONFIG returns anything that generates a local
   reply of IPv4 or IPV6.
@@ -338,12 +337,8 @@ int filter_servers(int seed, int flags, int *lowout, int *highout)
 		      
 		      if (i != nlow)
 			{
-			  /* If we want a server that can do DNSSEC, and this one can't, 
-			     return nothing, similarly if were looking only for a server
-			     for a particular domain. */
-			  if ((flags & F_DNSSECOK) && !(daemon->serverarray[nlow]->flags & SERV_DO_DNSSEC))
-			    nlow = nhigh;
-			  else if ((flags & F_DOMAINSRV) && daemon->serverarray[nlow]->domain_len == 0)
+			  /* If we want a server for a particular domain, and this one isn't, return nothing. */
+			  if ((flags & F_DOMAINSRV) && daemon->serverarray[nlow]->domain_len == 0)
 			    nlow = nhigh;
 			  else
 			    nhigh = i;
@@ -351,7 +346,7 @@ int filter_servers(int seed, int flags, int *lowout, int *highout)
 		      else
 			{
 			  /* --local=/domain/, only return if we don't need a server. */
-			  if (flags & (F_DNSSECOK | F_DOMAINSRV | F_SERVER))
+			  if (flags & (F_DOMAINSRV | F_SERVER))
 			    nhigh = i;
 			}
 		    }
@@ -472,7 +467,7 @@ int dnssec_server(struct server *server, char *keyname, int *firstp, int *lastp)
  /* Find server to send DNSSEC query to. This will normally be the 
     same as for the original query, but may be another if
     servers for domains are involved. */		      
-  if (!lookup_domain(keyname, F_DNSSECOK, &first, &last))
+  if (!lookup_domain(keyname, F_SERVER | F_DNSSECOK, &first, &last))
    return -1;

  for (index = first; index != last; index++)
--- a/src/domain.c
+++ b/src/domain.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
+/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley

   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
--- a/src/dump.c
+++ b/src/dump.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
+/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley

   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
--- a/src/edns0.c
+++ b/src/edns0.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
+/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley

   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
--- a/src/forward.c
+++ b/src/forward.c
--- a/src/helper.c
+++ b/src/helper.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
+/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley

   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
--- a/src/inotify.c
+++ b/src/inotify.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
+/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
 
   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
--- a/src/ip6addr.h
+++ b/src/ip6addr.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
+/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley

   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
--- a/src/lease.c
+++ b/src/lease.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
+/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley

   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
--- a/src/log.c
+++ b/src/log.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
+/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley

   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
--- a/src/loop.c
+++ b/src/loop.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
+/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley

   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
--- a/src/metrics.c
+++ b/src/metrics.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
+/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley

   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
--- a/src/metrics.h
+++ b/src/metrics.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
+/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
   
   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
--- a/src/netlink.c
+++ b/src/netlink.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
+/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley

   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
--- a/src/network.c
+++ b/src/network.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
+/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley

   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -1379,7 +1379,7 @@ int local_bind(int fd, union mysockaddr *addr, char *intname, unsigned int ifind
  /* cannot set source _port_ for TCP connections. */
  if (is_tcp)
    port = 0;
-  else if (port == 0 && daemon->max_port != 0)
+  else if (port == 0 && daemon->max_port != 0 && daemon->max_port >= daemon->min_port)
    {
      /* Bind a random port within the range given by min-port and max-port if either
 	 or both are set. Otherwise use the OS's random ephemeral port allocation by
@@ -1587,33 +1587,6 @@ void check_servers(int no_loop_check)

  for (count = 0, serv = daemon->servers; serv; serv = serv->next)
    {
-#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
-      if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID))
-	{ 
-	  if (!(serv->flags & SERV_FOR_NODOTS))
-	    serv->flags |= SERV_DO_DNSSEC;
-	  
-	  /* Disable DNSSEC validation when using server=/domain/.... servers
-	     unless there's a configured trust anchor. */
-	  if (strlen(serv->domain) != 0)
-	    {
-	      struct ds_config *ds;
-	      char *domain = serv->domain;
-	      
-	      /* .example.com is valid */
-	      while (*domain == '.')
-		domain++;
-	      
-	      for (ds = daemon->ds; ds; ds = ds->next)
-		if (ds->name[0] != 0 && hostname_isequal(domain, ds->name))
-		  break;
-	      
-	      if (!ds)
-		serv->flags &= ~SERV_DO_DNSSEC;
-	    }
-	}
-#endif
-      
      port = prettyprint_addr(&serv->addr, daemon->namebuff);
      
      /* 0.0.0.0 is nothing, the stack treats it like 127.0.0.1 */
@@ -1659,10 +1632,6 @@ void check_servers(int no_loop_check)
 	{
 	  char *s1, *s2, *s3 = "", *s4 = "";

-#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
-	  if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID) && !(serv->flags & SERV_DO_DNSSEC))
-	    s3 = _("(no DNSSEC)");
-#endif
 	  if (serv->flags & SERV_FOR_NODOTS)
 	    s1 = _("unqualified"), s2 = _("names");
 	  else if (strlen(serv->domain) == 0)
--- a/src/nftset.c
+++ b/src/nftset.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
+/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley

   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
--- a/src/option.c
+++ b/src/option.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
+/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley

   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -193,6 +193,8 @@ struct myoption {
 #define LOPT_MAX_PROCS     384
 #define LOPT_DNSSEC_LIMITS 385
 #define LOPT_PXE_OPT       386
+#define LOPT_NO_ENCODE     387
+#define LOPT_DO_ENCODE     388

 #ifdef HAVE_GETOPT_LONG
 static const struct option opts[] =  
@@ -247,6 +249,8 @@ static const struct myoption opts[] =
    { "local-ttl", 1, 0, 'T' },
    { "no-negcache", 0, 0, 'N' },
    { "no-round-robin", 0, 0, LOPT_NORR },
+    { "no-0x20-encode", 0, 0, LOPT_NO_ENCODE },
+    { "do-0x20-encode", 0, 0, LOPT_DO_ENCODE },
    { "cache-rr", 1, 0, LOPT_CACHE_RR },
    { "addn-hosts", 1, 0, 'H' },
    { "hostsdir", 1, 0, LOPT_HOST_INOTIFY },
@@ -568,7 +572,7 @@ static struct {
  { LOPT_CMARK_ALST, ARG_DUP, "<connmark>[/<mask>][,<pattern>[/<pattern>...]]", gettext_noop("Set allowed DNS patterns for a connection-track mark."), NULL },
  { LOPT_SYNTH, ARG_DUP, "<domain>,<range>,[<prefix>]", gettext_noop("Specify a domain and address range for synthesised names"), NULL },
  { LOPT_SEC_VALID, OPT_DNSSEC_VALID, NULL, gettext_noop("Activate DNSSEC validation"), NULL },
-  { LOPT_TRUST_ANCHOR, ARG_DUP, "<domain>,[<class>],...", gettext_noop("Specify trust anchor key digest."), NULL },
+  { LOPT_TRUST_ANCHOR, ARG_DUP, "<domain>,[<class>,]...", gettext_noop("Specify trust anchor key digest."), NULL },
  { LOPT_DNSSEC_DEBUG, OPT_DNSSEC_DEBUG, NULL, gettext_noop("Disable upstream checking for DNSSEC debugging."), NULL },
  { LOPT_DNSSEC_CHECK, ARG_DUP, NULL, gettext_noop("Ensure answers without DNSSEC are in unsigned zones."), NULL },
  { LOPT_DNSSEC_TIME, OPT_DNSSEC_TIME, NULL, gettext_noop("Don't check DNSSEC signature timestamps until first cache-reload"), NULL },
@@ -591,6 +595,8 @@ static struct {
  { LOPT_UMBRELLA, ARG_ONE, "[=<optspec>]", gettext_noop("Send Cisco Umbrella identifiers including remote IP."), NULL },
  { LOPT_QUIET_TFTP, OPT_QUIET_TFTP, NULL, gettext_noop("Do not log routine TFTP."), NULL },
  { LOPT_NORR, OPT_NORR, NULL, gettext_noop("Suppress round-robin ordering of DNS records."), NULL },
+  { LOPT_NO_ENCODE, OPT_NO_0x20, NULL, gettext_noop("Suppress DNS bit 0x20 encoding."), NULL },
+  { LOPT_DO_ENCODE, OPT_DO_0x20, NULL, gettext_noop("Enable DNS bit 0x20 encoding."), NULL },
  { LOPT_NO_IDENT, OPT_NO_IDENT, NULL, gettext_noop("Do not add CHAOS TXT records."), NULL },
  { LOPT_CACHE_RR, ARG_DUP, "<RR-type>", gettext_noop("Cache this DNS resource record type."), NULL },
  { LOPT_MAX_PROCS, ARG_ONE, "<integer>", gettext_noop("Maximum number of concurrent tcp connections."), NULL },
@@ -955,7 +961,7 @@ char *parse_server(char *arg, struct server_details *sdetails)
      hints.ai_family = AF_UNSPEC;

      /* Get addresses suitable for sending datagrams. We assume that we can use the
-	 same addresses for TCP connections. Settting this to zero gets each address
+	 same addresses for TCP connections. Setting this to zero gets each address
 	 threes times, for SOCK_STREAM, SOCK_RAW and SOCK_DGRAM, which is not useful. */
      hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM;

@@ -2669,15 +2675,15 @@ static int one_opt(int option, char *arg, char *errstr, char *gen_err, int comma
 			if (msize > 128)
 			  ret_err_free(_("bad prefix length"), new);
 			
-			mask = (1LLU << (128 - msize)) - 1LLU;
+			/* prefix==64 overflows the mask calculation */
+			if (msize <= 64)
+			  mask = (u64)-1LL;
+			else
+			  mask = (1LLU << (128 - msize)) - 1LLU;
 			
 			new->is6 = 1;
 			new->prefixlen = msize;
 			
-			/* prefix==64 overflows the mask calculation above */
-			if (msize <= 64)
-			  mask = (u64)-1LL;
-			  
 			new->end6 = new->start6;
 			setaddr6part(&new->start6, addrpart & ~mask);
 			setaddr6part(&new->end6, addrpart | mask);
@@ -3981,7 +3987,7 @@ static int one_opt(int option, char *arg, char *errstr, char *gen_err, int comma
 	while (arg)
 	  {
 	    comma = split(arg);
-	    if (strchr(arg, ':')) /* ethernet address, netid or binary CLID */
+	    if (strchr(arg, ':')) /* Ethernet address, netid or binary CLID */
 	      {
 		if ((arg[0] == 'i' || arg[0] == 'I') &&
 		    (arg[1] == 'd' || arg[1] == 'D') &&
@@ -4043,10 +4049,8 @@ static int one_opt(int option, char *arg, char *errstr, char *gen_err, int comma
 		      }

 		    new_addr = opt_malloc(sizeof(struct addrlist));
-		    new_addr->next = new->addr6;
 		    new_addr->flags = 0;
 		    new_addr->addr.addr6 = in6;
-		    new->addr6 = new_addr;
 		    
 		    if (pref)
 		      {
@@ -4057,7 +4061,7 @@ static int one_opt(int option, char *arg, char *errstr, char *gen_err, int comma
 			    ((((u64)1<<(128-new_addr->prefixlen))-1) & addrpart) != 0)
 			  {
 			    dhcp_config_free(new);
-			    ret_err(_("bad IPv6 prefix"));
+			    ret_err_free(_("bad IPv6 prefix"), new_addr);
 			  }
 			
 			new_addr->flags |= ADDRLIST_PREFIX;
@@ -4071,6 +4075,8 @@ static int one_opt(int option, char *arg, char *errstr, char *gen_err, int comma
 		    if (i == 8)
 		      new_addr->flags |= ADDRLIST_WILDCARD;
 		    
+		    new_addr->next = new->addr6;
+		    new->addr6 = new_addr;
 		    new->flags |= CONFIG_ADDR6;
 		  }
 #endif
@@ -5331,7 +5337,8 @@ err:
 	
 	new->class = C_IN;
 	new->name = NULL;
-
+	new->digestlen = 0;
+	
 	if ((comma = split(arg)) && (algo = split(comma)))
 	  {
 	    int class = 0;
@@ -5349,29 +5356,37 @@ err:
 		algo = split(comma);
 	      }
 	  }
-		  
-       	if (!comma || !algo || !(digest = split(algo)) || !(keyhex = split(digest)) ||
-	    !atoi_check16(comma, &new->keytag) || 
-	    !atoi_check8(algo, &new->algo) ||
-	    !atoi_check8(digest, &new->digest_type) ||
-	    !(new->name = canonicalise_opt(arg)))
+	
+	if (!(new->name = canonicalise_opt(arg)))
 	  ret_err_free(_("bad trust anchor"), new);
-	    
-	/* Upper bound on length */
-	len = (2*strlen(keyhex))+1;
-	new->digest = opt_malloc(len);
-	unhide_metas(keyhex);
-	/* 4034: "Whitespace is allowed within digits" */
-	for (cp = keyhex; *cp; )
-	  if (isspace((unsigned char)*cp))
-	    for (cp1 = cp; *cp1; cp1++)
-	      *cp1 = *(cp1+1);
-	  else
-	    cp++;
-	if ((new->digestlen = parse_hex(keyhex, (unsigned char *)new->digest, len, NULL, NULL)) == -1)
+
+	if (comma)
 	  {
-	    free(new->name);
-	    ret_err_free(_("bad HEX in trust anchor"), new);
+	    if (!algo || !(digest = split(algo)) || !(keyhex = split(digest)) ||
+		!atoi_check16(comma, &new->keytag) || 
+		!atoi_check8(algo, &new->algo) ||
+		!atoi_check8(digest, &new->digest_type))
+	      {
+		free(new->name);
+		ret_err_free(_("bad trust anchor"), new);
+	      }
+	    
+	    /* Upper bound on length */
+	    len = (2*strlen(keyhex))+1;
+	    new->digest = opt_malloc(len);
+	    unhide_metas(keyhex);
+	    /* 4034: "Whitespace is allowed within digits" */
+	    for (cp = keyhex; *cp; )
+	      if (isspace((unsigned char)*cp))
+		for (cp1 = cp; *cp1; cp1++)
+		  *cp1 = *(cp1+1);
+	      else
+		cp++;
+	    if ((new->digestlen = parse_hex(keyhex, (unsigned char *)new->digest, len, NULL, NULL)) == -1)
+	      {
+		free(new->name);
+		ret_err_free(_("bad HEX in trust anchor"), new);
+	      }
 	  }
 	
 	new->next = daemon->ds;
@@ -5920,6 +5935,9 @@ void read_opts(int argc, char **argv, char *compile_opts)
  daemon->randport_limit = 1;
  daemon->host_index = SRC_AH;
  daemon->max_procs = MAX_PROCS;
+#ifdef HAVE_DUMPFILE
+  daemon->dump_mask = 0xffffffff;
+#endif
 #ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
  daemon->limit[LIMIT_SIG_FAIL] = DNSSEC_LIMIT_SIG_FAIL;
  daemon->limit[LIMIT_CRYPTO] = DNSSEC_LIMIT_CRYPTO;
--- a/src/outpacket.c
+++ b/src/outpacket.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
+/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley

   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
--- a/src/pattern.c
+++ b/src/pattern.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
+/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley

   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
--- a/src/poll.c
+++ b/src/poll.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
+/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley

   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ void poll_listen(int fd, short event)
     {
       if (arrsize == nfds)
 	 {
-	   /* Array too small, extend. */
+	   /* Array too small. Extend. */
 	   struct pollfd *new;

 	   arrsize = (arrsize == 0) ? 64 : arrsize * 2;
--- a/src/radv-protocol.h
+++ b/src/radv-protocol.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
+/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley

   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
--- a/src/radv.c
+++ b/src/radv.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
+/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley

   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ static void send_ra_alias(time_t now, int iface, char *iface_name, struct in6_ad
  if (!old_prefix && !parm.found_context)
    return; 
  
-  /* If we're sending router address instead of prefix in at least on prefix,
+  /* If we're sending router address instead of prefix in at least one prefix,
     include the advertisement interval option. */
  if (parm.adv_router)
    {
@@ -825,10 +825,10 @@ time_t periodic_ra(time_t now)
 	}
      else if (iface_enumerate(AF_INET6, &param, (callback_t){.af_inet6=iface_search}))
 	/* There's a context overdue, but we can't find an interface
-	   associated with it, because it's for a subnet we dont 
+	   associated with it, because it's for a subnet we don't
 	   have an interface on. Probably we're doing DHCP on
 	   a remote subnet via a relay. Zero the timer, since we won't
-	   ever be able to send ra's and satisfy it. */
+	   ever be able to send RAs to satisfy it. */
 	context->ra_time = 0;
      
      if (param.iface != 0 &&
--- a/src/rfc1035.c
+++ b/src/rfc1035.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
+/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley

   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -16,16 +16,42 @@

 #include "dnsmasq.h"

-int extract_name(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char **pp, 
-		 char *name, int isExtract, int extrabytes)
-{
-  unsigned char *cp = (unsigned char *)name, *p = *pp, *p1 = NULL;
-  unsigned int j, l, namelen = 0, hops = 0;
-  int retvalue = 1;
-  
-  if (isExtract)
-    *cp = 0;
+/* EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT -> extract name
+   EXTR_NAME_COMPARE -> compare name, case insensitive
+   EXTR_NAME_NOCASE -> compare name, case sensitive
+   EXTR_NAME_FLIP -> flip 0x20 bits in packet.

+   For flip, name is  an array of ints, whose size
+   is given in parm, which forms the bitmap. Bits beyond the size
+   are assumed to be zero.
+   
+   return = 0 -> error
+   return = 1 -> extract OK, compare OK, flip OK
+   return = 2 -> extract OK, compare failed.
+   return = 3 -> extract OK, compare failed but only on case.
+
+   If pp == NULL, operate on the query name in the packet.
+*/
+int extract_name(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char **pp, 
+		 char *name, int func, unsigned int parm)
+{
+  unsigned char *cp = (unsigned char *)name, *p1 = NULL;
+  unsigned int j, l, namelen = 0, hops = 0;
+  unsigned int bigmap_counter = 0, bigmap_posn = 0, bigmap_size = parm, bitmap = 0;
+  int retvalue = 1, case_insens = 1, isExtract = 0, flip = 0, extrabytes = (int)parm;
+  unsigned int *bigmap = (unsigned int *)name;
+  unsigned char *p = pp ? *pp : (unsigned char *)(header+1);
+  
+  if (func == EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT)
+    isExtract = 1, *cp = 0;
+  else if (func == EXTR_NAME_NOCASE)
+    case_insens = 0;
+  else if (func == EXTR_NAME_FLIP)
+    {
+      flip = 1, extrabytes = 0;
+      name = NULL;
+    }
+  
  while (1)
    { 
      unsigned int label_type;
@@ -46,13 +72,16 @@ int extract_name(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char **pp,
 		cp--;
 	      *cp = 0; /* terminate: lose final period */
 	    }
-	  else if (*cp != 0)
+	  else if (!flip && *cp != 0)
 	    retvalue = 2;
-	  
-	  if (p1) /* we jumped via compression */
-	    *pp = p1;
-	  else
-	    *pp = p;
+
+	  if (pp)
+	    {
+	      if (p1) /* we jumped via compression */
+		*pp = p1;
+	      else
+		*pp = p;
+	    }
 	  
 	  return retvalue;
 	}
@@ -85,7 +114,7 @@ int extract_name(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char **pp,
 	  if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, plen, l))
 	    return 0;
 	  
-	  for(j=0; j<l; j++, p++)
+	  for (j=0; j<l; j++, p++)
 	    if (isExtract)
 	      {
 		unsigned char c = *p;
@@ -98,6 +127,24 @@ int extract_name(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char **pp,
 		else
 		  *cp++ = c; 
 	      }
+	    else if (flip)
+	      {
+		unsigned char c = *p;
+
+		if ((c >= 'a' && c <= 'z') || (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z'))
+		  {
+		    /* Get the next int of the bitmap */
+		    if (bigmap_posn < bigmap_size && bigmap_counter-- == 0)
+		      {
+			bitmap = bigmap[bigmap_posn++];
+			bigmap_counter = (sizeof(unsigned int) * 8) - 1;
+		      }
+		    
+		    if (bitmap & 1)
+		      *p ^= 0x20;
+		    bitmap >>= 1;
+		  }
+	      }
 	    else 
 	      {
 		unsigned char c1 = *cp, c2 = *p;
@@ -107,23 +154,35 @@ int extract_name(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char **pp,
 		else 
 		  {
 		    cp++;
-		    if (c1 >= 'A' && c1 <= 'Z')
-		      c1 += 'a' - 'A';

 		    if (c1 == NAME_ESCAPE)
 		      c1 = (*cp++)-1;
+		    else if (case_insens && c1 >= 'A' && c1 <= 'Z')
+		      c1 += 'a' - 'A';
 		    
-		    if (c2 >= 'A' && c2 <= 'Z')
+		    if (case_insens && c2 >= 'A' && c2 <= 'Z')
 		      c2 += 'a' - 'A';
-		     
+
+		    if (!case_insens && retvalue != 2 && c1 != c2)
+		      {
+			if (c1 >= 'A' && c1 <= 'Z')
+			  c1 += 'a' - 'A';
+			
+			if (c2 >= 'A' && c2 <= 'Z')
+			  c2 += 'a' - 'A';
+			
+			if (c1 == c2)
+			  retvalue = 3;
+		      }
+		    
 		    if (c1 != c2)
-		      retvalue =  2;
+		      retvalue = 2;
 		  }
 	      }
 	    
 	  if (isExtract)
 	    *cp++ = '.';
-	  else if (*cp != 0 && *cp++ != '.')
+	  else if (!flip && *cp != 0 && *cp++ != '.')
 	    retvalue = 2;
 	}
      else
@@ -399,7 +458,7 @@ int do_doctor(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, char *namebuff)
      if (i == ntohs(header->ancount) && !(p = skip_section(p, ntohs(header->nscount), header, qlen)))
 	return done;
      
-      if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p, namebuff, 1, 10))
+      if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p, namebuff, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 10))
 	return done; /* bad packet */
      
      GETSHORT(qtype, p); 
@@ -480,7 +539,7 @@ static int find_soa(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, char *name, int *sub
  
  for (i = 0; i < ntohs(header->nscount); i++)
    {
-      if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p, daemon->workspacename, 1, 0))
+      if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p, daemon->workspacename, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0))
 	return 0; /* bad packet */
      
      GETSHORT(qtype, p); 
@@ -509,7 +568,7 @@ static int find_soa(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, char *name, int *sub
 	      
 	      for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) /* MNAME, RNAME */
 		{
-		  if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p, daemon->workspacename, 1, 0))
+		  if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p, daemon->workspacename, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0))
 		    {
 		      if (!no_cache)
 			blockdata_free(addr.rrblock.rrdata);
@@ -537,18 +596,18 @@ static int find_soa(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, char *name, int *sub
 		}
 	      
 	      /* rest of RR */
-	      if (!no_cache && !blockdata_expand(addr.rrblock.rrdata, addr.rrblock.datalen, (char *)p, 20))
-		{
-		  blockdata_free(addr.rrblock.rrdata);
-		  return 0;
-		}
-
-	      addr.rrblock.datalen += 20;
-	      
 	      if (!no_cache)
 		{
 		  int secflag = 0;

+		  if (!blockdata_expand(addr.rrblock.rrdata, addr.rrblock.datalen, (char *)p, 20))
+		    {
+		      blockdata_free(addr.rrblock.rrdata);
+		      return 0;
+		    }
+		  
+		  addr.rrblock.datalen += 20;
+		  
 #ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
 		  if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID) && daemon->rr_status[i + ntohs(header->ancount)] != 0)
 		    {
@@ -660,7 +719,7 @@ int extract_addresses(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, char *name, time_t

  namep = p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
  
-  if (ntohs(header->qdcount) != 1 || !extract_name(header, qlen, &p, name, 1, 4))
+  if (ntohs(header->qdcount) != 1 || !extract_name(header, qlen, &p, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 4))
    return 2; /* bad packet */
  
  GETSHORT(qtype, p); 
@@ -684,7 +743,7 @@ int extract_addresses(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, char *name, time_t
 	  for (j = 0; j < ntohs(header->ancount); j++) 
 	    {
 	      int secflag = 0;
-	      if (!(res = extract_name(header, qlen, &p1, name, 0, 10)))
+	      if (!(res = extract_name(header, qlen, &p1, name, EXTR_NAME_COMPARE, 10)))
 		return 2; /* bad packet */
 	      
 	      GETSHORT(aqtype, p1); 
@@ -722,7 +781,7 @@ int extract_addresses(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, char *name, time_t
 		  if (aqtype == T_CNAME)
 		    log_query(secflag | F_CNAME | F_FORWARD | F_UPSTREAM, name, NULL, NULL, 0);
 		  
-		  if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p1, name, 1, 0))
+		  if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p1, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0))
 		    return 2;
 		  
 		  if (aqtype == T_CNAME)
@@ -800,7 +859,7 @@ int extract_addresses(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, char *name, time_t
 	{
 	  int secflag = 0;
 	  
-	  if (!(res = extract_name(header, qlen, &p1, name, 0, 10)))
+	  if (!(res = extract_name(header, qlen, &p1, name, EXTR_NAME_COMPARE, 10)))
 	    return 2; /* bad packet */
 	  
 	  GETSHORT(aqtype, p1); 
@@ -862,7 +921,7 @@ int extract_addresses(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, char *name, time_t
 		}
 	      
 	      namep = p1;
-	      if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p1, name, 1, 0))
+	      if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p1, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0))
 		return 2;
 	      
 	      if (qtype != T_CNAME)
@@ -932,7 +991,7 @@ int extract_addresses(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, char *name, time_t
 			      /* Name, extract it then re-encode. */
 			      int len;
 			      
-			      if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p1, name, 1, 0))
+			      if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p1, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0))
 				{
 				  blockdata_free(addr.rrblock.rrdata);
 				  return 2;
@@ -965,7 +1024,7 @@ int extract_addresses(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, char *name, time_t
 			} while (desc != -1);
 		      
 		      /* we overwrote the original name, so get it back here. */
-		      if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &tmp, name, 1, 0))
+		      if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &tmp, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0))
 			{
 			  blockdata_free(addr.rrblock.rrdata);
 			  return 2;
@@ -1127,7 +1186,7 @@ void report_addresses(struct dns_header *header, size_t len, u32 mark)
    {
      int aqtype, aqclass, ardlen;
      
-      if (!extract_name(header, len, &p, daemon->namebuff, 1, 10))
+      if (!extract_name(header, len, &p, daemon->namebuff, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 10))
 	return;
      
      if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, len, 10))
@@ -1145,7 +1204,7 @@ void report_addresses(struct dns_header *header, size_t len, u32 mark)
 	{
 	  if (aqtype == T_CNAME)
 	    {
-	      if (!extract_name(header, len, &p, daemon->workspacename, 1, 0))
+	      if (!extract_name(header, len, &p, daemon->workspacename, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0))
 		return;
 	      if (safe_name(daemon->namebuff) && safe_name(daemon->workspacename))
 		ubus_event_bcast_connmark_allowlist_resolved(mark, daemon->namebuff, daemon->workspacename, attl);
@@ -1179,7 +1238,8 @@ void report_addresses(struct dns_header *header, size_t len, u32 mark)

 /* If the packet holds exactly one query
   return F_IPV4 or F_IPV6  and leave the name from the query in name */
-unsigned int extract_request(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, char *name, unsigned short *typep)
+unsigned int extract_request(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, char *name,
+			     unsigned short *typep, unsigned short *classp)
 {
  unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
  int qtype, qclass;
@@ -1195,7 +1255,7 @@ unsigned int extract_request(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, char *name,
  if (!(header->hb3 & HB3_QR) && (ntohs(header->ancount) != 0 || ntohs(header->nscount) != 0))
    return 0; /* non-standard query. */
  
-  if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p, name, 1, 4))
+  if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 4))
    return 0; /* bad packet */
   
  GETSHORT(qtype, p); 
@@ -1204,6 +1264,9 @@ unsigned int extract_request(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, char *name,
  if (typep)
    *typep = qtype;

+  if (classp)
+    *classp = qclass;
+
  if (qclass == C_IN)
    {
      if (qtype == T_A)
@@ -1215,9 +1278,7 @@ unsigned int extract_request(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, char *name,
    }

 #ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
-  /* F_DNSSECOK as agument to search_servers() inhibits forwarding
-     to servers for domains without a trust anchor. This make the
-     behaviour for DS and DNSKEY queries we forward the same
+  /* Make the behaviour for DS and DNSKEY queries we forward the same
     as for DS and DNSKEY queries we originate. */
  if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID) && (qtype == T_DS || qtype == T_DNSKEY))
    return F_DNSSECOK;
@@ -1309,7 +1370,7 @@ static int check_bad_address(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, struct bogu

  for (i = ntohs(header->ancount); i != 0; i--)
    {
-      if (name && !extract_name(header, qlen, &p, name, 1, 10))
+      if (name && !extract_name(header, qlen, &p, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 10))
 	return 0; /* bad packet */

      if (!name && !(p = skip_name(p, header, qlen, 10)))
@@ -1559,7 +1620,7 @@ static unsigned long crec_ttl(struct crec *crecp, time_t now)
    return daemon->max_ttl;
 }

-static int cache_validated(const struct crec *crecp)
+static int cache_not_validated(const struct crec *crecp)
 {
  return (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID) && !(crecp->flags & F_DNSSECOK));
 }
@@ -1619,7 +1680,7 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
  nameoffset = p - (unsigned char *)header;
  
  /* now extract name as .-concatenated string into name */
-  if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p, name, 1, 4))
+  if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 4))
    return 0; /* bad packet */
  
  GETSHORT(qtype, p); 
@@ -1660,7 +1721,7 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
 	
 	/* If the client asked for DNSSEC  don't use cached data. */
 	if ((crecp->flags & (F_HOSTS | F_DHCP | F_CONFIG)) ||
-	    (rd_bit && (!do_bit || cache_validated(crecp))))
+	    (rd_bit && (!do_bit || cache_not_validated(crecp))))
 	  {
 	    if (crecp->flags & F_CONFIG || qtype == T_CNAME)
 	      ans = 1;
@@ -1819,7 +1880,7 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
 		 the zone is unsigned, which implies that we're doing
 		 validation. */
 	      if ((crecp->flags & (F_HOSTS | F_DHCP | F_CONFIG)) ||
-		  (rd_bit && (!do_bit || cache_validated(crecp)) ))
+		  (rd_bit && (!do_bit || cache_not_validated(crecp)) ))
 		{
 		  do 
 		    { 
@@ -1975,7 +2036,7 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
 	      
 	      /* If the client asked for DNSSEC  don't use cached data. */
 	      if ((crecp->flags & (F_HOSTS | F_DHCP | F_CONFIG)) ||
-		  (rd_bit && (!do_bit || cache_validated(crecp)) ))
+		  (rd_bit && (!do_bit || cache_not_validated(crecp)) ))
 		do
 		  { 
 		    int stale_flag = 0;
@@ -2157,19 +2218,19 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
      
      if (!ans)
 	{
-	  if ((crecp = cache_find_by_name(NULL, name, now, F_RR | F_NXDOMAIN)) &&
-	      rd_bit && (!do_bit || cache_validated(crecp)))
+	  if ((crecp = cache_find_by_name(NULL, name, now, F_RR | F_NXDOMAIN)) && rd_bit)
 	    do
 	      {
 		int flags = crecp->flags;
 		unsigned short rrtype;
-		
+
 		if (flags & F_KEYTAG)
 		  rrtype = crecp->addr.rrblock.rrtype;
 		else
 		  rrtype = crecp->addr.rrdata.rrtype;
 		
-		if ((flags & F_NXDOMAIN) || rrtype == qtype)
+		if (((flags & F_NXDOMAIN) || rrtype == qtype) &&
+		    (!do_bit || cache_not_validated(crecp)))
 		  {
 		    char *rrdata = NULL;
 		    unsigned short rrlen = 0;
@@ -2232,14 +2293,15 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
 	}
      
      
-      if (qtype != T_ANY && !ans && rr_on_list(daemon->filter_rr, qtype))
+      if (qtype != T_ANY && !ans && rr_on_list(daemon->filter_rr, qtype) && !do_bit)
 	{
 	  /* We don't have a cached answer and when we get an answer from upstream we're going to
 	     filter it anyway. If we have a cached answer for the domain for another RRtype then
 	     that may be enough to tell us if the answer should be NODATA and save the round trip.
 	     Cached NXDOMAIN has already been handled, so here we look for any record for the domain,
 	     since its existence allows us to return a NODATA answer. Note that we never set the AD flag,
-	     since we didn't authenticate the record. */
+	     since we didn't authenticate the record; this doesn't work if we want auth data, so
+	     don't use this shortcut in that case. */
 	  
 	  if (cache_find_by_name(NULL, name, now, F_IPV4 | F_IPV6 | F_RR | F_CNAME))
 	    {
@@ -2338,7 +2400,7 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
      if (!(ansp = skip_questions(header, qlen)))
 	return 0; /* bad packet */
      anscount = nscount = addncount = 0;
-      log_query(F_CONFIG, "reply", NULL, "truncated", 0);
+      log_query(0, "reply", NULL, "truncated", 0);
    }

  if (nxdomain)
--- a/src/rfc2131.c
+++ b/src/rfc2131.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
+/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley

   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -1345,7 +1345,7 @@ size_t dhcp_reply(struct dhcp_context *context, char *iface_name, int int_index,
 	  else if (!lease && (ltmp = lease_find_by_addr(mess->yiaddr)))
 	    {
 	      /* If a host is configured with more than one MAC address, it's OK to 'nix 
-		 a lease from one of it's MACs to give the address to another. */
+		 a lease from one of its MACs to give the address to another. */
 	      if (config && config_has_mac(config, ltmp->hwaddr, ltmp->hwaddr_len, ltmp->hwaddr_type))
 		{
 		  inet_ntop(AF_INET, &ltmp->addr, daemon->addrbuff, ADDRSTRLEN);
--- a/src/rfc3315.c
+++ b/src/rfc3315.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
+/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley

   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
--- a/src/rrfilter.c
+++ b/src/rrfilter.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
+/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley

   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -377,7 +377,7 @@ int expand_workspace(unsigned char ***wkspc, int *szp, int new)
 int to_wire(char *name)
 {
  unsigned char *l, *p, *q, term;
-  int len;
+  unsigned int len;

  for (l = (unsigned char*)name; *l != 0; l = p)
    {
@@ -409,7 +409,7 @@ int to_wire(char *name)
 void from_wire(char *name)
 {
  unsigned char *l, *p, *last;
-  int len;
+  unsigned int len;
  
  for (last = (unsigned char *)name; *last != 0; last += *last+1);
  
--- a/src/slaac.c
+++ b/src/slaac.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
+/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley

   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ void slaac_add_addrs(struct dhcp_lease *lease, time_t now, int force)
 	else if (lease->clid_len == 9 && 
 		 lease->clid[0] ==  ARPHRD_EUI64 &&
 		 lease->hwaddr_type == ARPHRD_IEEE1394)
-	  /* firewire has EUI-64 identifier as clid */
+	  /* FireWire has EUI-64 identifier as clid */
 	  memcpy(&addr.s6_addr[8], &lease->clid[1], 8);
 #endif
 	else
--- a/src/tftp.c
+++ b/src/tftp.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
+/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley

   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ void tftp_request(struct listener *listen, time_t now)
 	}
      
      /* Enforce simultaneous transfer limit. In non-single-port mode
-	 this is doene by not listening on the server socket when
+	 this is done by not listening on the server socket when
 	 too many transfers are in progress. */
      if (!transfer && tftp_cnt >= daemon->tftp_max)
 	return;
@@ -742,15 +742,16 @@ static void free_transfer(struct tftp_transfer *transfer)

 static char *next(char **p, char *end)
 {
-  char *ret = *p;
-  size_t len;
+  char *n, *ret = *p;
+  
+  /* Look for end of string, without running off the end of the packet. */
+  for (n = *p; n < end && *n != 0; n++);

-  if (*(end-1) != 0 || 
-      *p == end ||
-      (len = strlen(ret)) == 0)
+  /* ran off the end or zero length string - failed */
+  if (n == end || n == ret)
    return NULL;
-
-  *p += len + 1;
+  
+  *p = n + 1;
  return ret;
 }

--- a/src/ubus.c
+++ b/src/ubus.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
+/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley

   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
--- a/src/util.c
+++ b/src/util.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
+/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley

   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -426,7 +426,7 @@ int hostname_order(const char *a, const char *b)

 int hostname_isequal(const char *a, const char *b)
 {
-  return hostname_order(a, b) == 0;
+  return strlen(a) == strlen(b) && hostname_order(a, b) == 0;
 }

 /* is b equal to or a subdomain of a return 2 for equal, 1 for subdomain */
--- a/submodules/dnsmasq-debian
+++ b/submodules/dnsmasq-debian
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Simon Kelley	83658efbf4	Fix occasional crashes with DNSSEC and large nunbers of --address configs. Commit `3e659bd4ec` removed the concept of an usptream DNS server which is capable of DNSSEC: they are all (at least in theory) now usable. As a very unfortunate side-effect, this removed the filter that ensured that dnssec_server() ONLY returns servers, and not domains with literal addresses. If we try and do DNSSEC queries for a domain, and there's a --address line which matches the domain, then dnssec_server() will return that. This would break DNSSEC validation, but that's turns out not to matter, because under these circumstances dnssec_server() will probably return an out-of-bounds index into the servers[] array, and the process dies with SIGSEGV. Many thanks to the hard workers at the Tomato project who found this bug and provided enough information to diagnose it.	2025-04-04 22:01:51 +01:00
Paul Donald	b0b4d90b6a	Multiple typo and spelling fixes.	2025-03-29 21:41:40 +00:00
Simon Kelley	bdce03f928	DNAME documentation update.	2025-03-15 17:02:02 +00:00
Simon Kelley	d390dc0338	Implement RFC6672 para 5.3.2. check for DNAME. Also fix overflow checking of NSEC type maps.	2025-03-15 16:47:55 +00:00
Simon Kelley	105c25e561	Fix DNSSEC and DNAME. Do the correct things to validate replies which include a DNAME record. Thanks to Graham Clinch for pointing this out.	2025-03-15 09:05:47 +00:00
Simon Kelley	67e07b7fe8	Make extract_name() easier to call operating on first name in message.	2025-03-14 15:12:46 +00:00
Simon Kelley	f5659b406b	Move find_pseudoheader() before add_edns0_config() in TCP codepath. There's no point in checking if the query has edns0 headers _after_ adding our own. This has the affect that if --add-cpe-id or --add-subnet or their friends are configured, a query via TCP without EDNS0 will get an answer with EDNS0. It's highly unlikely that this breaks anything, but it is incorrect. Thanks to Tijs Van Buggenhout for spotting this.	2025-03-14 15:12:46 +00:00
Simon Kelley	484fea238a	Silence compiler warning.	2025-03-14 15:12:46 +00:00
Simon Kelley	1e587bec57	Silence compiler warning.	2025-03-14 15:12:45 +00:00
Simon Kelley	581c201aa8	Avoid division by zero with unlucky choices of max-port and min-port.	2025-03-14 15:12:45 +00:00
Simon Kelley	5487f6979e	Fix (benign) use of uninitialised data.	2025-03-14 15:12:45 +00:00
Simon Kelley	99f12e3541	Default --dump-mask to all-on, rather than all-off.	2025-03-14 15:12:45 +00:00
Simon Kelley	7c1212e3d1	Fix query-combining for queries with class other than IN. Along the way, use of extract_request() and extract_name() got further refined.	2025-03-14 15:12:45 +00:00
Simon Kelley	0ccbdf8087	Make extract_name() easier to call operating on first name in message.	2025-03-14 15:12:45 +00:00
Simon Kelley	57f0489f38	Redesign the interaction between DNSSEC vaildation and per-domain servers. This should just work in all cases now. If the normal chain-of-trust exists into the delegated domain then whether the domain is signed or not, DNSSEC validation will function normally. In the case the delgated domain is an "overlay" on top of the global DNS and no NS and/or DS records exist connecting it to the global dns, then if the domain is unsigned the situation will be handled by synthesising a proof-of-non-existance-of-DS for the domain and queries will be answered unvalidated; this action will be logged. A signed domain without chain-of-trust can be validated if a suitable trust-anchor is provided using --trust-anchor. Thanks to Uwe Kleine-König for prompting this change, and contributing valuable insights into what could be improved.	2025-03-14 15:12:45 +00:00
Simon Kelley	3e659bd4ec	Remove the concept of "DNSSEC incapable servers". We're going to replace this with configured or extrapolated DS records.	2025-03-14 15:12:45 +00:00
Tijs Van Buggenhout	9af15871e6	Fix crash when no upstream servers defined. This is a regession introduced in `3b6df06fb8`. When dnsmasq is started without upstreams (yet), but a DNS query comes in that needs forwarding dnsmasq now potentially crashes as the value for "first" variable is undetermined. A segmentation violation occurs when the index is out of bounds of serverarray. Credits go to pedro0311 <pedro@freshtomato.org>	2025-03-14 15:09:35 +00:00
Simon Kelley	5897e79d05	Fix bogus compiler warnings.	2025-03-12 15:44:19 +00:00
Simon Kelley	fc9135ca9f	Documentation for --do-0x20-encode.	2025-03-09 16:15:16 +00:00
Simon Kelley	e427d4b0e6	Default-off 0x20 encoding and provide --do-0x20-encode option. For now, this causes too many problems to default on. Hopefully this will change for future releases.	2025-03-04 12:59:17 +00:00
Simon Kelley	9df1bd0cc1	Revert `368ceff6e0` and fix correct problem. The next() function is broken for any TFTP packet with padding which doesn't end with a zero. Rewrite to handle such packets. Thanks to Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> for persisting in finding the actual problem and proposing a solution. This patch is modelled on his, but rewritten for personal preference by Simon Kelley, who is responsible for all bugs.	2025-03-01 22:43:23 +00:00
Simon Kelley	5990074ab0	Fix stupid error in allocating 0x20-flip bitmaps.	2025-02-21 14:41:34 +00:00
Simon Kelley	dbb69bd192	Merge branch 'master' of onyx:dnsmasq/dnsmasq	2025-02-21 13:08:26 +00:00
Simon Kelley	d17581c4c6	Use correct packet length when 0x20 flipping truncated packet. This makes no difference in practice, since only the query is operated on, but it is more correct.	2025-02-21 13:02:04 +00:00
Simon Kelley	2c9ed7f425	Fix possible problems with case-encode bigmap array allocation.	2025-02-20 22:59:04 +00:00
Simon Kelley	717ff6adc3	Update plen when getting retried query from stash. They should be equal, but that depends on untrusted data.	2025-02-10 12:26:15 +00:00
Simon Kelley	f9f8d19bf5	Yet another 0x20 fix. To complement the previous one, which fixed the retry path when the query is retried from a different id/source address, this fixes retries from the same id/source address.	2025-02-09 11:06:59 +00:00
Simon Kelley	535be2f5d3	Fix possible SIGSEGV in bpf.c	2025-02-08 22:58:42 +00:00
Simon Kelley	bceab45dbe	Fix 0x20 problem. A retry to upstream DNS servers triggered by the following conditions 1) A query asking for the same data as a previous query which has not yet been answered. 2) The second query arrives more than two seconds after the first. 3) Either the source of the second query or the id field differs from the first. fails to set the case of the retry to the same pattern as the first attempt. However dnsmasq expects the reply from upstream to have the case pattern of the first attempt. If the answer to the retry arrives before the answer to the first query, dnsmasq will notice the case mismatch, log an error, and ignore the answer. The worst case scenario would be the first upstream query or reply is lost and there would follow a short period where all queries for that particular domain would fail. This is a 2.91 development issue, it doesn't apply to previous stable releases.	2025-02-07 19:56:33 +00:00
Helge Deller	368ceff6e0	TFTP off-by-2 bugfix Some of my PA-RISC UNIX machines boot remotely via tftp, but dnsmasq randomly fails to deliver (the identical file) to some of the machines. I traced the issue and basically dnsmasq fails with error "unsupported request from IP.x.y.z" (line 366 in tftp.c). Here is an example package which is sent (516 hex bytes): 76 6d 6c 69 6e 75 78 00 6f 63 74 65 74 00 12 74 10 3c 00 00 00 00 00 01 a9 24 00 00 00 00 00 00 1e 38 00 00 00 00 00 00 1c a0 00 00 00 00 00 00 1d 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 1d 28 00 00 00 00 00 00 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 d8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 1d 30 00 00 00 02 ff e0 00 00 00 00 03 60 a8 49 55 93 00 00 00 01 f0 d4 21 e4 00 00 00 00 00 00 1d 78 00 00 00 f0 f0 d8 51 38 00 00 00 f0 f0 d4 21 c0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 aa b8 00 00 00 f0 f0 e9 62 7c 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 01 ff ff ff ff ff ff 03 00 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 1e 38 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 60 00 00 00 00 00 01 a6 68 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f0 f0 d8 4f 30 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 ae ec 00 00 00 00 00 00 1f 70 00 00 00 00 00 00 1e b8 00 00 03 60 a8 49 55 93 00 00 00 02 18 71 1a 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 1e 38 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 07 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f0 f0 d2 f0 70 00 00 00 00 00 00 1f c0 00 00 00 f0 f0 d4 0b e8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 60 ff ff ff fc 00 60 18 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f0 f0 d8 8f d0 00 00 00 00 00 00 1f f8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f0 f0 d8 8d b8 00 00 00 00 00 00 1e e8 00 00 Please note the last 3 bytes: "e8 00 00". If the 3rd last byte is "00", then dnsmasq works and it fails it it's "e8". So, the bug is in line 366 of tftp.c: filename = next(&p, end) Here filename gets the value NULL from next(), because the "end" variable is off-by-2. The fix is to change line 363 to add an offset of 2: end = packet + 2 + len; Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Closes: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2293793	2025-02-06 17:04:06 +00:00
Simon Kelley	77c4e95d4a	Fix for case-sensitivity problems in DNS. Fix a case sensitivity problem which has been lurking for a long while. When we get example.com and Example.com and combine them, we send whichever query arrives first upstream and then later answer it, and we also answer the second with the same answer. That means that if example.com arrives first, it will get the answer example.com - good - but Example.com will _also_ get the answer example.com - not so good. In theory, fixing this is simple without having to keep seperate copies of all the queries: Just use the bit-vector representation of case flipping that we have for 0x20-encoding to keep the differences in case. The complication comes from the fact that the existing bit-vector code only holds data on the first 32 alpha letters, because we only flip that up to many for 0x20 encoding. In practise, the delta between combined queries can almost always be represented with that data, since almost all queries are all lower case and we only purturb the first 32 letters with 0x20 encoding. It's therefore worth keeping the existing, efficient data structure for the 99.9% of the time it works. For the 0.1% it doesn't, however, one needs an arbitrary-length data structure with the resource implications of that. Thanks to Peter Tirsek for the well researched bug report which set me on to these problems.	2025-02-06 17:02:50 +00:00
Simon Kelley	e44165c0f7	Fix bug in 0x20 encoding. We must only compare case when mapping an answer from upstream to a forwarding record, not when checking a query to see if it's a duplicate. Since the saved query name is scrambled, that ensures that almost all such checks will wrongly fail. Thanks to Peter Tirsek for an exemplary bug report for this.	2025-02-06 10:36:21 +00:00
Simon Kelley	a1a214c393	Bump date on manpage.	2025-02-05 21:34:54 +00:00
Simon Kelley	94b7144a1b	Fix c99ism added in `0b6144583b`	2025-02-05 21:02:54 +00:00
Matthias Andree	e72910dec8	Spell check v2.91 CHANGELOG	2025-02-05 20:46:55 +00:00
Simon Kelley	0b6144583b	Log failed TCP DNS connections upstream when --log-debug active.	2025-02-05 17:15:52 +00:00
Simon Kelley	f31667317d	Manpage typo.	2025-02-05 15:20:31 +00:00
Simon Kelley	5226b712a3	Add --no-0x20-encode config option. The "bit 0x20 encoding" implemented in `995a16ca0c` can interact badly with (hopefully) rare broken upstream servers. Provide an option to turn it off and a log message to give a clue as to why DNS service is non-functional.	2025-02-03 21:02:12 +00:00
Simon Kelley	1f84cde024	Tweak to logging. When a cached answer is too big, log cached reply is truncated and not config reply is truncated	2025-02-03 15:26:55 +00:00
Paul Donald	046bfa2af0	Clean up some of the man page formatting. Some writing was improved for clarity, especially regarding the use of tags which can be confusing and difficult to grasp.	2025-02-01 22:40:54 +00:00
Simon Kelley	0762732647	belt-and-braces extra call to check_log_writer() in tcp_request()	2025-02-01 15:24:24 +00:00
Brian Haley	efb8f10450	Fix potential memory leak When a new IPv6 address is being added to a dhcp_config struct, if there is anything invalid regarding the prefix it looks like there is a potential memory leak. ret_err_free() should be used to free it. Also, the new addrlist struct is being linked into the existing addr6 list in the dhcp_config before the validity check, it is best to defer this insertion until later so an invalid entry is not present, since the CONFIG_ADDR6 flag might not have been set yet. Signed-off-by: Brian Haley <haleyb.dev@gmail.com>	2025-01-24 23:01:08 +00:00
Simon Kelley	6dbdf16fd1	Move debian submodule to submodules/dnsmasq-debian.	2025-01-24 21:05:43 +00:00
Simon Kelley	6e6a45a7d9	Bump copyrights to 2025.	2025-01-23 17:08:39 +00:00
Simon Kelley	a4569c22cc	Correct BNF for --trust-anchor in manpage.	2025-01-20 16:20:13 +00:00
Simon Kelley	199e65c4d9	Remove misleading comment.	2025-01-20 15:55:42 +00:00
Simon Kelley	bb8811d472	Convert DNS names in logs to all lower case. 0x20 encoding makes them look odd, otherwise.	2025-01-20 15:25:26 +00:00
Simon Kelley	995a16ca0c	Implement "DNS-0x20 encoding". This provides extra protection against reply-spoof attacks. Since DNS queries are case-insensitive, it's possible to randomly flip the case of letters in a query and still get the correct answer back. This adds an extra dimension for a cache-poisoning attacker to guess when sending replies in-the-blind since it's expected that the legitimate answer will have the same pattern of upper and lower case as the query, so any replies which don't can be ignored as malicious. The amount of extra entropy clearly depends on the number of a-z and A-Z characters in the query, and this implementation puts a hard limit of 32 bits to make rescource allocation easy. This about doubles entropy over the standard random ID and random port combination.	2025-01-19 21:54:58 +00:00
Simon Kelley	65f9c1aca1	Case-sensitive matching of questions and answers. When checking that an answer is the answer to the question that we asked, compare the name in a case-sensitive manner. Clients can set the letters in a query to a random pattern of uppercase and lowercase to add more randomness as protection against cache-poisoning attacks, and we don't want to nullify that. This actually restores the status quo before commit `ed6d29a784` since matching questions and answers using a checksum can't help but be case sensitive. This patch is a preparation for introducing DNS-0x20 in the dnsmasq query path.	2025-01-19 00:08:36 +00:00
Simon Kelley	b72ecb3a59	Fix log message fields in wrong order in some auth replies.	2025-01-18 23:56:23 +00:00
Simon Kelley	c221030f89	Rename cache_validated() to cache_not_validated(). Let's give the poor programmers a chance.	2025-01-18 23:26:06 +00:00
Simon Kelley	5bbea085d0	Fix subtle bug in arbitrary-RR caching. If the client asks for DNSSEC RRs via the do bit, and we have an answer cached, we can only return the cached answer if the RR was not validated. This is because we don't the extra info (RRSIGS, NSECs) for a complete validated answer. In that case we have to forward again. This bug was that the "is the cache entry validated" test was in an outer loop rather than an inner one. A cache hit on a different RRtype that wasn't validated would satify the condition to use the cache, even if the cache entry for the required RRtype didn't. The only time when there can be a mix of validated and non validated cache entries for the same domain is when most are not validated, but one is a negative cache for a DS record. This bug took a long time to find.	2025-01-18 23:15:53 +00:00
Simon Kelley	622cf03ab9	Fix fubar that could return unsigned NODATA response when do bit set.	2025-01-18 22:16:29 +00:00
Simon Kelley	8ce27433f8	Handle DS queries to auth zones. When dnsmasq is configured to act as an authoritative server and has an authoritative zone configured, and recieves a query for that zone _as_forwarder_ it answers the query directly rather than forwarding it. This doesn't affect the answer, but it saves dnsmasq forwarding the query to the recusor upstream, whch then bounces it back to dnsmasq in auth mode. The exception should be when the query is for the root of zone, for a DS RR. The answer to that has to come from the parent, via the recursor, and will typically be a proof-of-nonexistence since dnsmasq doesn't support signed zones. This patch suppresses local answers and forces forwarding to the upstream recursor for such queries. It stops breakage when a DNSSEC validating client makes queries to dnsmasq acting as forwarder for a zone for which it is authoritative.	2025-01-18 08:57:14 +00:00
Simon Kelley	5d894620b4	Extend build fingerprinting to include CFLAGS. If the value of CFLAGS is changed between builds, the makefile will rebuid, in the same way as for COPTS.	2025-01-17 16:48:08 +00:00
Simon Kelley	71766c0c35	Tweak handling of duplicate DNS answers via UDP. If we get a duplicate answer for a query via UDP which we have either already received and started DNSSEC validation, or was truncated and we've passed to TCP, then just ignore it. The code was already in place, but had evolved wonky and only worked for error replies which would otherwise prompt a retransmit.	2025-01-13 20:30:37 +00:00
Simon Kelley	da58455508	Tweak `7d915a0bb9` A downstream query may have gone to TCP, not just DNSSEC queries.	2025-01-13 11:03:30 +00:00
Simon Kelley	b915c9a661	Attempt to keep running if a child process dies. If a child process dies unexpectedly, log the error and try and tidy up so the main process continues to run and doesn't block awaiting the dead child.	2025-01-13 10:56:19 +00:00
Simon Kelley	424aaa0f9d	Fix another `509afcd1d2` SNAFU	2025-01-13 10:32:55 +00:00
Andrew Sayers	c72c895869	Improve "no upstream servers configured" when D-Bus is enabled Print a specific INFO message instead of a generic WARNING message, so users know what to do. Starting dnsmasq without upstream servers indicates a problem by default, but is perfectly normal with D-Bus enabled. For example, NetworkManager starts dnsmasq with no upstream servers, then immediately populates it over D-Bus.	2025-01-12 22:32:32 +00:00
Simon Kelley	b7156116c2	Fix SNAFU in `509afcd1d2`	2025-01-12 22:28:12 +00:00
Simon Kelley	7d915a0bb9	Don't do retries over UDP when we've sent the query by TCP.	2025-01-12 22:02:05 +00:00
Simon Kelley	509afcd1d2	Refactor poll() loop. Handling events on file descriptors can result in new file descriptors being created or old ones being deleted. As such the results of the last call to poll() become invalid in subtle ways. After handling each file descriptor in check_dns_listeners() return, to go around the poll() loop again and get valid data for the new situation. Thanks to Dominik Derigs for his indefatigable sleuthing of this one.	2025-01-12 21:36:09 +00:00
Simon Kelley	51343bd9a2	Treat replies with CD flag set the same for UDP and TCP code paths.	2025-01-12 16:25:07 +00:00
Simon Kelley	b58276a73c	Return EDE OTHER error when DNSSEC validation abandoned. This distinguishes the case where we found a message was bogus from cases where the process failed.	2025-01-12 16:00:09 +00:00
Matthias Andree	f162d344c0	cache: Fix potential NULL deref in arcane situations.	2025-01-08 23:34:12 +00:00