1. /api/render: cap de 512 KiB na entrada (amplificação ~2× medida); decodeJSON agora amarra http.MaxBytesReader ao ResponseWriter (413 real ao cliente em todos os endpoints JSON) 2. Login com rate-limit por IP em memória (5 falhas/15 min → 429, acerto reseta, RemoteAddr puro — X-F-F não é confiável) + log de falha com IP 3. Upload: MaxBytesReader no corpo inteiro (64 MiB + 64 KiB) antes do parse do multipart; quota global de 2 GiB (MaxFilesTotalBytes) em AddFile 4. sanitizeRich neutraliza href/src com javascript:/vbscript:/data: (case/whitespace-insensível); link legítimo preservado 5. Cookie Secure passa a ser configuração explícita (NOTES_SECURE_COOKIE) — X-Forwarded-Proto é spoofável; documentado em .env.example e compose 6. Cookie agora carrega id de sessão opaco (crypto/rand 32B, TTL 30d, revogação no logout e no restart); token mestre só vale via Bearer — furo pego pelo próprio teste novo (token no cookie era aceito) Testes: rate-limit, revogação, canais separados, render 413, upload cap sw v16
259 lines
8.0 KiB
Go
259 lines
8.0 KiB
Go
package api_test
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import (
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"bytes"
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"encoding/json"
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"io"
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"mime/multipart"
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"net/http"
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"net/http/httptest"
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"strings"
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"testing"
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"github.com/lgcosta/notas-online/internal/store"
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)
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// auth faz uma chamada autenticada via helper comum.
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func auth(t *testing.T, srv *httptest.Server, method, path, body string) *http.Response {
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return do(t, srv, method, path, body, testToken, "")
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}
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func uploadFile(t *testing.T, srv *httptest.Server, name string, content []byte, folderID, noteID string) map[string]any {
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t.Helper()
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var buf bytes.Buffer
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mw := multipart.NewWriter(&buf)
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part, err := mw.CreateFormFile("file", name)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if _, err := part.Write(content); err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if folderID != "" {
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_ = mw.WriteField("folder_id", folderID)
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}
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if noteID != "" {
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_ = mw.WriteField("note_id", noteID)
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}
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mw.Close()
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req, _ := http.NewRequest("POST", srv.URL+"/api/files/upload", &buf)
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req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+testToken)
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req.Header.Set("Content-Type", mw.FormDataContentType())
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resp, err := srv.Client().Do(req)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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defer resp.Body.Close()
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if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusCreated {
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body, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
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t.Fatalf("upload %s: %s %s", name, resp.Status, body)
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}
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var out map[string]any
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json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&out)
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return out
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}
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func TestFilesAPI(t *testing.T) {
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srv := newTestServer(t)
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// upload markdown avulso (raiz)
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png := []byte("\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n" + strings.Repeat("x", 600))
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md := uploadFile(t, srv, "guia.md", []byte("# Guia\n\nconteudo"), "", "")
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mdID := md["id"].(string)
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if md["mime"] != "text/markdown; charset=utf-8" {
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t.Errorf("mime md: %v", md["mime"])
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}
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if md["url"] != "/api/files/static/"+mdID {
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t.Errorf("url: %v", md["url"])
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}
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// pasta + upload de imagem dentro dela
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folder := auth(t, srv, "POST", "/api/folders", `{"name":"prints","parent":""}`)
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var f map[string]any
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decode(t, folder, &f)
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fid := f["id"].(string)
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img := uploadFile(t, srv, "foto.png", png, fid, "")
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imgID := img["id"].(string)
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if !strings.HasPrefix(img["mime"].(string), "image/") {
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t.Errorf("mime img: %v", img["mime"])
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}
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if img["folder"] != fid {
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t.Errorf("folder: %v", img["folder"])
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}
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// subpasta
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sub := auth(t, srv, "POST", "/api/folders", `{"name":"2026","parent":"`+fid+`"}`)
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var subm map[string]any
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decode(t, sub, &subm)
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subID := subm["id"].(string)
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// ciclo: mover prints para dentro de 2026 → 400
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cyc := auth(t, srv, "PUT", "/api/folders/"+fid, `{"name":"","parent":"`+subID+`"}`)
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if cyc.StatusCode != http.StatusBadRequest {
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t.Fatalf("ciclo deveria 400: %s", cyc.Status)
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}
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cyc.Body.Close()
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// árvore hierárquica
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treeResp := auth(t, srv, "GET", "/api/files/tree", "")
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var tree struct {
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Tree []struct {
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ID string `json:"id"`
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Name string `json:"name"`
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Children []struct {
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ID string `json:"id"`
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Files []struct {
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ID string `json:"id"`
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} `json:"files"`
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} `json:"children"`
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Files []struct {
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ID string `json:"id"`
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} `json:"files"`
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} `json:"tree"`
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RootFiles []struct {
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ID string `json:"id"`
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} `json:"rootFiles"`
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}
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decode(t, treeResp, &tree)
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if len(tree.Tree) != 1 || tree.Tree[0].Name != "prints" {
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t.Fatalf("tree raiz: %+v", tree.Tree)
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}
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if len(tree.Tree[0].Files) != 1 || tree.Tree[0].Files[0].ID != imgID {
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t.Errorf("files em prints: %+v", tree.Tree[0].Files)
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}
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if len(tree.Tree[0].Children) != 1 || tree.Tree[0].Children[0].ID != subID {
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t.Errorf("children: %+v", tree.Tree[0].Children)
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}
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if len(tree.RootFiles) != 1 || tree.RootFiles[0].ID != mdID {
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t.Errorf("rootFiles: %+v", tree.RootFiles)
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}
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// static: imagem inline com headers endurecidos
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st := auth(t, srv, "GET", "/api/files/static/"+imgID, "")
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if st.Header.Get("Content-Type") != "image/png" {
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t.Errorf("content-type img: %q", st.Header.Get("Content-Type"))
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}
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if st.Header.Get("Content-Disposition") != "" {
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t.Errorf("img não deveria ter Content-Disposition: %q", st.Header.Get("Content-Disposition"))
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}
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if st.Header.Get("Content-Security-Policy") != "sandbox" {
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t.Error("CSP sandbox ausente")
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}
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body, _ := io.ReadAll(st.Body)
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st.Body.Close()
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if !bytes.Equal(body, png) {
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t.Errorf("conteúdo png difere (%d bytes)", len(body))
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}
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// Range (preview parcial de vídeo)
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rq, _ := http.NewRequest("GET", srv.URL+"/api/files/static/"+mdID, nil)
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rq.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+testToken)
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rq.Header.Set("Range", "bytes=0-4")
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rr, err := srv.Client().Do(rq)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if rr.StatusCode != http.StatusPartialContent {
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t.Errorf("range: %s", rr.Status)
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}
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rbody, _ := io.ReadAll(rr.Body)
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rr.Body.Close()
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if string(rbody) != "# Gui" {
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t.Errorf("range body: %q", rbody)
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}
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// XSS guard: .html anexado vira attachment (nunca roda same-origin)
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h := uploadFile(t, srv, "malicioso.html", []byte("<script>alert(1)</script>"), "", "")
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hs := auth(t, srv, "GET", "/api/files/static/"+h["id"].(string), "")
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if !strings.Contains(hs.Header.Get("Content-Disposition"), "attachment") {
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t.Errorf("html deveria ser attachment: %q", hs.Header.Get("Content-Disposition"))
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}
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hs.Body.Close()
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if h["mime"] != "text/html; charset=utf-8" {
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t.Errorf("mime html: %v", h["mime"])
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}
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// mover md para 2026 + associar a uma nota + renomear
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noteResp := auth(t, srv, "POST", "/api/notes", `{"title":"Com anexo","format":"md","categories":[],"content":"oi","author":"","message":""}`)
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var note map[string]any
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decode(t, noteResp, ¬e)
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mv := auth(t, srv, "PUT", "/api/files/"+mdID+"/move",
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`{"folder":"`+subID+`","note":"`+note["id"].(string)+`","name":"guia-v2.md"}`)
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if mv.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
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t.Fatalf("move: %s", mv.Status)
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}
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var mvd map[string]any
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decode(t, mv, &mvd)
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if mvd["folder"] != subID || mvd["note"] != note["id"].(string) || mvd["name"] != "guia-v2.md" {
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t.Errorf("move result: %+v", mvd)
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}
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// nota fantasma na associação → 400
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bad := auth(t, srv, "PUT", "/api/files/"+mdID+"/move", `{"note":"naoexiste1"}`)
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if bad.StatusCode != http.StatusBadRequest {
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t.Errorf("nota fantasma: %s", bad.Status)
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}
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bad.Body.Close()
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// excluir pasta raiz remove subtree e arquivos (png + md movido)
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del := auth(t, srv, "DELETE", "/api/folders/"+fid, "")
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if del.StatusCode != http.StatusNoContent {
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t.Fatalf("delete folder: %s", del.Status)
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}
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gone := auth(t, srv, "GET", "/api/files/static/"+imgID, "")
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if gone.StatusCode != http.StatusNotFound {
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t.Errorf("arquivo da pasta excluída deveria 404: %s", gone.Status)
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}
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gone.Body.Close()
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// excluir arquivo avulso
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del2 := auth(t, srv, "DELETE", "/api/files/"+h["id"].(string), "")
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if del2.StatusCode != http.StatusNoContent {
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t.Fatalf("delete file: %s", del2.Status)
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}
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finalTree := auth(t, srv, "GET", "/api/files/tree", "")
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var ft map[string]any
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decode(t, finalTree, &ft)
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if len(ft["tree"].([]any)) != 0 || len(ft["rootFiles"].([]any)) != 0 {
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t.Errorf("árvore final deveria estar vazia: %+v", ft)
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}
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// static inexistente → 404 (id nunca vira path; traversal impossível)
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respBad := auth(t, srv, "GET", "/api/files/static/naoexiste1", "")
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if respBad.StatusCode != http.StatusNotFound {
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t.Errorf("static inexistente: %s", respBad.Status)
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}
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respBad.Body.Close()
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// upload sem token → 401
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noAuth := do(t, srv, "GET", "/api/files/tree", "", "", "")
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if noAuth.StatusCode != http.StatusUnauthorized {
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t.Errorf("tree sem auth: %s", noAuth.Status)
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}
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noAuth.Body.Close()
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}
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func TestUploadRejectsOversizeBody(t *testing.T) {
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// corpo maior que o cap (64 MiB + 64 KiB): MaxBytesReader deve abortar
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// antes do multipart ser gravado em temporários
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big := bytes.Repeat([]byte("A"), store.MaxFileBytes+128<<10)
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var buf bytes.Buffer
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w := multipart.NewWriter(&buf)
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fw, _ := w.CreateFormFile("file", "big.bin")
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_, _ = fw.Write(big)
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_ = w.Close()
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srv := newTestServer(t)
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req, _ := http.NewRequest("POST", srv.URL+"/api/files/upload", &buf)
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req.Header.Set("Content-Type", w.FormDataContentType())
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req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+testToken)
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resp, err := srv.Client().Do(req)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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resp.Body.Close()
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if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusBadRequest {
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t.Fatalf("esperava 400 para corpo acima do cap, obtive %s", resp.Status)
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}
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}
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