pf-linux-port-legacy/docs/en/caveats.md

# Caveats — divergences from OpenBSD behavior

Português: [docs/pt-BR/caveats.md](../pt-BR/caveats.md).

These are the ways this port differs from running the same ruleset on
OpenBSD 8.0, or is not yet production-shaped. Everything here is grounded in
the code (`module/pfsrc/pfk_hooks.c`, `module/pfsrc/pfk_mod.c`,
`docs/porting-notes.md`) and in lab observations; nothing is speculative.

## Data path

### 1. PF runs in process context via a workqueue (netisr model), not in the packet fast path

OpenBSD evaluates `pf_test()` on the CPU that received the packet, at
`IPL_NET`, with a non-sleeping NET read lock. Linux gives us softirq context
and *sleepable* compat locks (rw-semaphores), so the hook never calls
`pf_test()` inline: it steals the skb (`NF_STOLEN`) onto an **ordered
workqueue** (`pfk_netisr`, `WQ_MEM_RECLAIM`) and runs the engine in process
context, then re-injects (`netif_rx()` for input, `dst->output()` for
output/transit).

Consequences, all observable:

- **Verdicts are asynchronous.** Anything chained after our hook on the same
  netfilter chain (other iptables/nft rules at higher priorities) does not
  see the packet until the reinjected pass comes through. Counters and log
  interleaving differ accordingly.
- **Latency + throughput**: every packet takes a work-queue round trip
  serialized on one ordered worker. Functional gates are the current bar;
  the planned `bench-basic.sh` is informational only.
- **Reordering**: the ordered queue preserves arrival order of *queued*
  work items, but the stack around it (RPS, multi-NAPI) can still hand us
  packets whose original completion order differs from reinjection order.

### 2. Re-entry protection is a per-direction tag in `skb->mark`

The reinjected survivor carries `skb->mark |= PFK_DONE_IN (0x50460010)` or
`PFK_DONE_OUT (0x50460020)`; our hooks accept any packet already tagged for
that direction instead of re-queuing it (otherwise PF_IN → netif_rx →
PF_IN… would loop). `skb->mark` is a **shared, writable 32-bit field**: any
subsystem that *overwrites* it — nft `meta mark set`, `CONNMARK --restore`,
tc filters, some VPN stacks — can either (a) clear our tag and cause the
packet to be **re-queued through PF again**, or (b) coincidentally set those
bits and let a packet **skip** a PF pass. Practical rule on a PF-on-Linux
host: do not use fwmark mangling on the same traffic; if you must, mask the
PF tag bits out of your mark space.

### 3. No NET-lock on the data path (M2 interim)

`pf_test()` currently runs **without** the compat NET read lock (comment in
`pfk_hooks.c`): with the workqueue model, a parked control writer (ruleset
change, purge ioctl) starved the packet side badly enough to be
counter-productive. Rule-set mutation and packet walk therefore run
concurrently, protected by what upstream `pf.c` itself uses (PF_LOCK/RCU-ish
patterns) — a deliberate interim deviation being reworked with the lock
model in M5+. Until then: expect correctness under steady state, not under
aggressive concurrent reload; the reload-under-traffic soak is an open gate.

### 4. Fail-open under memory pressure

The queue item is `kmalloc(GFP_ATOMIC)` in softirq. If it fails, the hook
returns `NF_ACCEPT` — the packet **bypasses PF**. This is a deliberate
availability choice (mirrors dropping into a full queue bypassing the qdisc)
but it is a security trade-off worth knowing: PF verdicts are best-effort
exactly when the host is out of atomic memory.

### 5. Hook ordering vs conntrack differs by direction

- Ingress (`PREROUTING`, `NF_IP_PRI_FIRST`): PF runs **before** defrag and
  conntrack — as designed (spec §4.2).
- Output (`LOCAL_OUT` at `NF_IP_PRI_CONNTRACK+1`): PF sees locally generated
  traffic **after** conntrack has already committed the entry.
- Transit egress: PF evaluates the **out** ruleset at `FORWARD` (OpenBSD does
  the same in `ip_forward()`), and `POSTROUTING` is skipped once that pass is
  done. `nat-to`/`rdr-to` were validated against this ordering (gates 05/06).
- The "overlapping policy with conntrack" warning from the design still
  applies: if iptables/nft SNAT also runs, PF's translation happens at the
  layer it is hooked into, and double translation is yours to avoid.

## Control plane / lifecycle

### 6. Unload is hardened and soak-verified

`rmmod pf` deregisters `/dev/pf`, zeroes `pf_status.running` under the NET
lock, deletes **and syncs** both purge timers (they self-rearm — a real rmmod
hang was observed and fixed by stopping sources before flushing the
workqueue), unregisters hooks and flushes `pfk_netisr`. Gate `14-soak.sh`
drives ICMP+TCP traffic, checks `dmesg` for faults, then runs
`rmmod` → `insmod` → `rmmod` and compares the slab footprint before and
after: clean unload, successful reload, no growth. Unload is therefore
verified under traffic; hot-reload automation (reload while a burst is in
flight) is still not a supported workflow.

## Behavioral notes verified today

### 7. `pfctl -s states` lists real states, including translations

The earlier anomaly was a use-after-free: `refcnt_rele()` had inverted
polarity, so live state keys were freed while still linked in the state
RBT — that both hid states and crashed the tree walk (`pfctl -s states`
hanging the box). After the fix, gates 01/04/05/06/07 assert on the listed
states, and translated flows print both tuples (`10.0.2.1:59335
(10.0.1.10:4380) -> 10.0.2.20:8`).

### 8. Consumers still required for two features

`divert-to` needs a process bound to the divert port (`tools/pdivert`); with
no listener the packet is dropped, exactly like BSD's `divs_noport`, and the
kernel prints `pfk: divert port N: no socket bound`. `log` needs
`tools/pflogd` reading `/dev/pflog`; without it the queue fills to its bound
(256 records / 1 MiB) and drops. Neither is a stub any more, but neither does
anything until its consumer runs (see [pf-guide.md](pf-guide.md)).

### 9. Queues: path verified; shaping semantics are HFSC's, not a bug

`15-queue.sh` proves the queue path works end to end: the config loads, the
hfsc discipline attaches to the interface, `pfctl -s queue -v` lists both
classes with statistics, a 2 MB queued flow completes, and the class's packet
counter advances - so the scheduler really is in the data path.

What the lab cannot show is a *rate cap*, and that is HFSC semantics rather
than a port defect: OpenBSD 8.0's `pf.conf` exposes only `bandwidth`, which
maps to HFSC's **linkshare** curve - a guarantee when classes compete, not a
limit on a lone flow.  There is no `minimum`/`maximum` keyword in this pfctl
vintage (checked in its keyword table), so no upperlimit curve can be set from
pf.conf.  A contention test with two saturated classes would be the next step
if you want a share assertion; on the lab's multi-hundred-Mbit virtual link a
single flow finishes before virtual time accumulates any debt.

Bugs found and fixed while getting here (details in `docs/porting-notes.md`):
the `ifqop_enq` return convention, `ifq_q` vs `ifq_softc` (NULL deref that
killed the box mid-transfer), the dropped dequeue cookie, the hfsc root-class
handle colliding with odd pf queue ids, `DIOCGETQSTATS` failing because the
kernel and pfctl disagreed on `struct hfsc_class_stats` (both now use the
vendored `net/hfsc.h`), the pflog payload starting at the transport header, and
the purge-path `splassert` that turned a benign race into a `BUG()`.

## Compat-layer deviations (from `docs/porting-notes.md`, M1 record)

These are deliberate, marked-in-code divergences of the compat layer; they
matter when reasoning about rule semantics:

- **Socket-owner matching** (`user`/`pid` on rules): uid only — Linux `struct
  sock` carries no egid/cpid, so gid degrades to `(gid_t)-1`, pid to
  `NO_PID`.
- **Checksums**: driver offload is not trusted on ingress (M1 decision) —
  TCP checksums are recomputed in software; output pseudo-checksums are done
  in the port's own path.
- **IP options / record-route / timestamps**: not processed on the PF output
  path; **ICMP redirects are not generated** by PF's route code (the Linux
  FIB emits those).
- **Routing labels**: non-goal — the ioctl layer rejects labeled rules;
  `rtable_iterate()` always returns NULL (no multipath uRPF iteration).
- **Interface groups**: Linux has none; `group …` matches behave like a
  missing group on OpenBSD.
- **GSO/multi-segment skbs**: handled by linearization on entry to the mbuf
  shim (perf cost documented in spec §10; gates will quantify).
- **Single instance**: one PF world in `init_net`, like OpenBSD has one
  kernel. Containers/namespaces are not visible to PF and cannot be filtered
  with it in this design.

## Screencast pipeline (2026-11-12)

### 10. MiniMax video generation is not enabled on this account

Every MiniMax video model (`T2V-01`, `T2V-01-Director`, `MiniMax-Hailuo-02`)
answers with API error **2068 — "The current Token Plan tier does not support
this model"**. The narration (TTS) and the title artwork work fine; only the
video models are blocked. The phase transitions are therefore rendered
locally with ffmpeg (a crossfade over a chapter card) instead of AI-generated
clips. Upgrading the plan is the only thing needed to change that — the
extension point is `scripts/screencast/join.py`, which builds the cards.

### 11. The narration is a separate track, not a dubbing of the video

Each phase is recorded **once** and serves both languages: the terminal
session is language-neutral, and the two narrated versions differ only in the
audio track and the burned-in subtitles. The recorder holds each beat on
screen for as long as the longest narration segment (EN or PT) needs, so the
voice and the terminal action stay in step in both.

### 12. What the videos do not show

The videos are a demonstration, not a test run: the lab's own gate suite
(`scripts/vm-run-tests.sh`) is the authority for PASS/FAIL, and its logs live
in `out/test-logs/`. The screencasts show the same commands, but a video frame
is not a verdict.

## Capacity findings (2026-11-12, from `scripts/stress/run-stress.sh`)

### 13. The workqueue backlog grows with the offered rate: above ~1 Gbit/s the guest OOM-panics

This is the sharpest consequence of §1 and it is **reproducible**, not
theoretical. PF steals every skb onto one ordered workqueue and runs the
engine in process context, so the number of packets in flight is bounded only
by the memory the backlog takes.

Measured on the lab (Alpine guest, **1 GB** RAM, 4 TCP streams through a
stateful ruleset):

| Offered rate (per stream × 4) | Result |
|---|---|
| 50 Mbit/s (200 Mbit/s total) | stable |
| 100 Mbit/s (400 Mbit/s total) | stable |
| 250 Mbit/s (**1 Gbit/s** total) | **kernel panic: "System is deadlocked on memory"** |

The panic is an OOM with no killable process; the slab at that moment shows
`kmalloc-8k` ≈ 50 MB, `skbuff_head_cache` ≈ 18 MB and `files_cache` ≈ 40 MB,
i.e. the backlog is what ate the 1 GB. The guest reboots (120 s watchdog
delay) and every connection through the firewall is lost with it.

Practical consequences:

- **Rate-limit what you point at PF**, and size the box for the backlog:
  memory needed grows with the offered rate, not with the number of
  concurrent flows.
- The stress test (`tests/vm/16-stress.sh`) therefore runs its traffic phases
  at a **bounded** rate (default 100 Mbit/s per stream = 400 Mbit/s total) —
  the regime this port survives — and reports the ceiling separately instead
  of OOM-killing the firewall under test.
- The functional gates (01-15) are unaffected: they move megabytes, not gigabits
  per second.

What would fix it is a real fast path (evaluate `pf_test()` inline in
softirq, as OpenBSD does) or a bounded queue with a drop policy — both are
design changes beyond this port's scope.

## What is *not* a caveat

ARP and other non-IPv4/IPv6 EtherTypes never enter the netfilter IPv4/IPv6
hooks — they pass through the box untouched, exactly as PF on OpenBSD ignores
non-IP. `/dev/pf` is 0600 root-only by design (matches OpenBSD's
`securelevel`-era default for `pfctl` write access being root).